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Abstract 
The Soviet psychologist and neurologist Alexander Luria (1902-1977) asserted that 
human consciousness is formed by and participates in forming history. His explicitly 
Marxist approach to psychology and neurology itself emerged from a particular time 
and place. This thesis seeks to restore Luria’s work to its history, situating his 
research in its Soviet context - from the October Revolution in 1917 through the 
collectivisation of agriculture and Stalinist Terror to the Second World War. 
This PhD follows the course of Luria’s career through Soviet history, and is also 
structured around the developmental trajectories that informed his research. Luria’s 
work was consistently concerned with tracing the emergence of the ‘culturally 
developed’ human being, defined as an educated person capable of exerting an 
influence on their environment. He argued that this figure was the result of various 
developmental trajectories: the biological evolution of the species from animal to 
human, the cultural development of societies from ‘primitivism’ to ‘civilization’, and 
the maturation of the individual from baby to adult.   
Chapter 1 discusses Luria’s early engagement with psychoanalysis and his rejection 
of the Freudian death drive. Chapter 2 considers experiments Luria conducted in 
Soviet Central Asia during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932), 
exploring his engagement with Stalinism through an analysis of his attempt to trace a 
transition from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’ thought. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
contradictory figure of the revolutionary child, who occupied a symbolic position in 
Soviet culture between change and continuity. Finally, Chapter 4 turns to consider 
Luria’s work with people who survived brain injuries inflicted during the Second 
World War. It concludes by arguing that the war violently interrupted the 
progressive developmental trajectories Luria’s work had hitherto been structured 
around (which broadly agreed with orthodox Marxist-Leninist accounts of historical 
progress). It is at that moment, I contend, that he finally developed the ‘real, not 
sham’ Marxist psychology he had always sought to create.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
Acknowledgments  
Laura Salisbury is responsible for introducing me to Alexander Luria’s work. She 
has supported this project from the outset and encouraged me throughout. Esther 
Leslie gave me invaluable advice on the structure of the thesis and its theoretical 
framework.  
A doctoral award from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) made 
this PhD possible. Thanks Mary Lou Reker and the staff at the John W. Kluge 
Center at the Library of Congress for all their help during my fellowship there (also 
funded by the AHRC).  
Thanks to the archivists who helped me to locate materials at The Institute of 
Education (London), Wellcome Collection (London), The American Philosophical 
Society (Philadelphia), Northwestern University Library Archives (Chicago), 
American Jewish Archives (Cincinnati) and Harvard University Archives 
(Cambridge, MA). Special thanks to Lizette Royer Barton at the Drs. Nicholas and 
Dorothy Cummings Center for the History of Psychology at The University of 
Akron and Tatiana Anokhina at RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature and 
Art) (Moscow). I’m also enormously grateful to Jerome Bruner for taking time to 
talk to me whilst I was in New York, to Mike Cole for sharing his personal 
correspondence and to Anton Yasnitsky for making reading recommendations. 
As an undergraduate at UCL, I was inspired by Rebecca Spang’s formidable 
combination of humour, rigour and commitment to teaching. Her course Rousseau, 
Marx, Freud was a formative experience. Echoes of the conversations that took 
place in those seminars can be heard throughout this thesis.  
In Moscow I’m not sure what would have happened if I hadn’t met Elena Khrianina 
who gave me somewhere to live, helped me figure out the Russian archives, 
deciphered Eisenstein’s handwriting and generally kept me company.  
Thanks to my parents Marilyn and Neil Proctor and to all the friends who made 
suggestions, read my work or talked to me about different aspects of it: Jacob Bard 
Rosenberg, Richard Braude, Christina Chalmers, Sam Dolbear, Koshka Duff, Sam 
Goff, Rose-Anne Gush, Owen Hatherley, Sophie Jones, Ed Luker, Agata Pyzik, 
Michael Runyan, Amy Tobin, Andrew Witt and many others I’ve probably failed to 
mention. 
The genre dictates that one thanks one’s family or partner last, but this thesis owes as 
much to collaborations, conversations and collective projects as it does to any 
particular individuals. Sharing ideas with politically committed friends and comrades 
in London, Newcastle, Berlin, New York, Washington DC, Oakland, St Petersburg 
and Moscow, however fleeting those encounters often were, made completing a PhD 
less of a solitary endeavour.  
 
 
 7 
 
List of Illustrations 
 
Chapter 1 
Plate 1.1 Gorky House Museum (former home to the Russian Psychoanalytic 
Society), http://s.inyourpocket.com/gallery/55442.jpg, accessed 
August 18 2015 
Chapter 2 
Plate 2.1 Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Horace Kallen from 
Samarkand, Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, May 15 1931. Horace 
Kallen Papers, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, MS-1, 
Box 19, Folder 18 
Plate 2.2 Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Horace Kallen from Andijan, 
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, August 12 1932. Horace Kallen 
Papers, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, MS-1, Box 19, 
Folder 18 
Plate 2.3  Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Kurt Lewin from Tbilisi, 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, January 25 1936. Kurt Lewin 
Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology, Akron, 
Ohio, Box M231, Folder 1 
Plate 2.4 Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Sergei Eisenstein from 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, August 28 1930, Sergei 
Eisenstein Papers, Russian State Archives of Literature and Art 
(RGALI), Moscow, 123-1-19321/2-7 
Plate 2.5   Examples of tests used by Kurt Koffka in Central Asia, Kurt Koffka 
Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology, Akron, 
Ohio, Box M377, Folder ‘Uzbekistan’ 
Plate 2.6 Example of test used by Alexander Luria in Central Asia, Alexander 
Luria, The Making of Mind: A Personal Account of Soviet 
Psychology, ed. by Michael Cole and Sheila Cole (Cambridge, MA; 
Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 65 
Plate 2.7 Uzbek woman in paranja with children, 1929 by Arkady Shaikhet, 
http://www.mamm-mdf.ru/exhibitions/continuation/, accessed August 
29 2015 
 
Chapter 3 
Plate 3.1 Walter Benjamin’s Archive: Images, Texts, Signs, ed. by Esther Leslie 
(London; Verso, 2007), p. 90 
Plate 3.2 Walter Benjamin’s Archive p. 85 
 8 
Plate 3.3   Walter Benjamin’s Archive, p. 100 
Plate 3.4 Toy assembly line, Ella Winter, Red Virtue: Human Relationships in 
the New Russia (New York, NY, Harcourt Brace and Co, 1933), p. 
245 
Plate 3.5 ‘Proletarian Toys’, N. Tseretelli, Russkaia Krest’ianskaia Igrushka 
[Russian Peasant Toys] (Moscow; Akademia, 1933), p. 53 
Plate 3.6 ‘Constructive’ toys, E. Molozhavaya, Siuzhetnaia Igrushka – 
Tematika i Oformlenie [Plotted Toys - Theme and Design] 
(Moscow/Leningrad; Vsesoyuznoe Kooperativnoe Ob’edlenennoe 
Izdatel’stvo, 1935), p. 52, p. 6 
 
Plate 3.7 Example of completed task from Luria and A. N. Miranova’s 
experiments with identical twins, 1936, A. R. Luria and A. N. 
Miranova, ‘Eksperimentalnoye rasvitiye konstrukivnoy deyatelnosti’ 
[‘The Experimental Development of Constructive Activity’] 
(Moscow, Mediko-Geneticheskogo Institut, 1936), 487-505, p. 493 
 
Plate 3.8 A. Olsuf’eva, Igrushki [Toys], with illustrations by L. Popova, 
(Moscow; Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1928) 
 
Plate 3.9 S. Marshak, Morozhenone [Icecream] , with illustrations by V. 
Lebedev (Moscow; Molodaia Gvardiia, 1929), p. 8 
 
Plate 3.10 Nikolai Chukovsky, Malen’kie Deti [Little Children] (Leningrad; 
Krashaia Gazeta, 1928) 
  
Plate 3.11 Nikolai Chukovsky, Hasha Kukhnia [Our Kitchen], (Leningrad; 
Gosudarskvennoe izdael’stvo, 1928) 
 
Plate 3.12 Home for abandoned children, 1931, Rabotnitsa [Working Woman], 
18 (1931), p. 50 
Chapter 4 
Plate 4.1 X-rays of Zasetsky’s skull, http://libelli.ru/work s/luria/19.htm, 
accessed 26 August 2015 
Plate 4.2 Zasetsky’s drawing of his vision before and after injury, Alexander 
Luria, The Man with a Shattered World: The History of a Brain 
Wound, trans. by Lynn Solotaroff (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 39 
Coda 
Plate 5.1 Children’s drawing, Alexander Luria, ‘The Child and Its Behaviour’ 
in Vygotsky and Luria, Studies on the History of Behaviour: Ape, 
Primitive and Child, ed. and trans. by Victor I. Golod and Jane E. 
Knox (Hillsdale, NJ; Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993), p. 160 
 
 9 
Plate 5.2 Uzbek woman’s drawing of a horse rider. Sergei Eisenstein Papers, 
Russian State Archives of Literature and Art (RGALI), Moscow, 123-
2-1301/2-69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
Note on transliteration  
Except in the case of proper names familiar to the English-language reader (for 
example, Luria, Trotsky, Vygotsky and Krupskaya), Russian words have been 
transliterated according to the Library of Congress scheme and are italicised in the 
text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
Introduction  
 
You know, it happens that an electric bulb will unexpectedly go out. It 
burned out, you say. And if you shake this burned out bulb then it’ll light up 
again and will still burn for some time. Inside the bulb a catastrophe is taking 
place. Tungsten filaments break off and through the contact of the fragments 
life returns to the bulb. A short, unnatural, undisguisedly doomed life – a 
fever, an overly bright incandescence, a brilliance. Then will come darkness, 
life will not return, and in the darkness the dead scorched filaments will only 
rattle. Do you understand? But the brief brilliance is beautiful. 
 
I want to shake the heart of the burned out epoch. The heart-bulb, so that the 
fragments would touch and to bring about a momentary, beautiful brilliance.
1
 
 
Yuri Olesha, Envy, 1927 
 
Situating Subjectivities 
 
‘Let us assume a brain has been removed from its cranium and placed on a glass 
table before us.’2 In a discussion of the localisation of brain function, Alexander 
Luria (1902-1977) invites his readers to imagine a brain removed from its body and 
displayed in isolation, its gelatinous surface visible from all angles. In such a 
situation, he explains, it would be possible to observe a fleshy grey mass of tissue 
ridged with ‘deep furrows and raised convulsions.’3 The ‘uniform and monotonous’ 
appearance of this lump of dead meat, however, belies the living brain’s 
extraordinary complexity and dynamism.
4
 Observing a brain in such a manner, Luria 
suggests, tells us very little about human experience. His solution was to return 
brains to their skulls, situating brains in people and people in the world. As he 
commented in a lecture series delivered in 1976: 
In order to explain the highly complex forms of human consciousness one 
must go beyond the human organism. One must seek the origins of conscious 
activity and ‘categorical’ behaviour not in the recesses of the human brain or 
in the depths of the spirit, but in the external conditions of life. Above all, this 
                                                 
1
 Yuri Olesha, Envy, trans. by T.S. Berczynski (London; Ardis, 1975), p. 71.
 
2
 Alexander Luria, The Man with a Shattered World: The History of a Brain Wound, trans. by Lynn 
Solotaroff (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 22. 
3
 Luria, Shattered, p. 22. 
4
 Luria, Shattered, p. 23. 
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means that one must seek these origins in the external processes of social life, 
in the social and historical forms of human existence.
5
  
 
In a speech delivered in 1924, over fifty earlier, he described his aims in strikingly 
similar, albeit more explicitly ideological, terms: 
For Marxism, the human mind is a product of the activity of the brain, and, in 
the final analysis, of the effects of the social environment and the class 
relations and conditions of production underlying it on the brain and on each 
individual human being. Any attempt to isolate “thought” or “mind” as some 
discrete class of phenomena Marxism regards as an unscientific and patently 
idealistic approach to things.
6
          
 
Luria persistently asserted that humans could not be understood in isolation from 
history.  
 
The Russian Psychoanalytic Society, The Moscow Department of 
Criminology, The Communist Academy of Education, The Academy of Science, The 
Medico-Genetic Institute, The Ukrainian Psychoneurological Academy, The State 
Institute of Experimental Medicine, The Burdenko Institute of Neurosurgery, The 
Institute of Defectology of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the Russian 
Federation, The Laboratory of Neuropsychology - reading a list of the institutions 
and organisations with which Luria was associated over the course of his long 
working life indicates that his was a career of almost bewildering diversity which 
saw him engage in fields across (and occasionally beyond) the ‘psy’ disciplines.7 
Luria’s bibliography, which runs to approximately 350 publications in Russian alone, 
is similarly expansive.
8
 His writings encompass monographs on handwriting, 
memory, speech and children’s play, theoretical articles on the relationship of 
Marxism to psychoanalysis, diagram-heavy textbooks on the localisation of 
functions in the cerebral cortex, batteries of tests for use by clinicians, and two case 
                                                 
5
 A.R. Luria, Language and Cognition, trans. by James V. Wertsch (Washington, DC; VH Winston 
and Sons, 1981), p. 25. 
6
 A.R. Luria, ‘Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic Psychology’, Journal of Russian and East 
European Psychology, 40, 1 (2002), 26–53, p. 27. Originally published in K.K. Kornilov, 
Psikhologiia i Marksizma [Psychology and Marxism] (Leningrad; Gosudarstvenoe psikhologii, 1925), 
pp. 47-80.
 
7
 Nikolas Rose introduced the term ‘psy’ disciplines’ to designate a range of scientific practices that 
since the 19th century have participated in determining how human beings understand themselves and 
that have helped to enable new forms of governance. See, Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: 
Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-21. Rose 
briefly discusses Soviet psychology declaring that much about the subject ‘remains to be analysed’ (p. 
15). 
8
 For a bibliography of Luria’s publications see Evgenia D. Homskaya, Alexander Romanovich Luria: 
A Scientific Biography, trans. by Daria Krotova (New York, Plenum Press, 2001), pp. 127-161. 
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histories written for a mass audience. His clinical work brought him into contact 
with a correspondingly broad range of test subjects and patients both ‘normal’ and 
pathological. Luria’s shifts in disciplinary focus and institutional affiliation were 
partly dictated by the shifting priorities of the Soviet state which, as we shall see, 
forced him to abandon certain disciplinary approaches at particular moments. Yet in 
spite of these external exigencies and the undeniably capacious scope of his 
expertise, Luria’s central concerns remained remarkably consistent across his career. 
Indeed, he resisted drawing any clear distinctions between his contributions to such 
seemingly discrete disciplinary spheres at all. As his biographer and erstwhile 
collaborator Evgenia Homskaya notes: 
 
All his life he worked at the junction of several different sciences. He always 
saw the subject of his study in its entirety (as a ‘whole’) and was able to 
synthesise fragmentary knowledge into a harmonious system.
9
  
 
He described his life’s work as a continuation of the project instigated by his 
collaborator and mentor Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) and coined the term 
‘neuropsychology’ to describe the new ‘synthetic’ scientific discipline he sought to 
create.
10
 This thesis follows Luria in considering the distinct fields he engaged in as 
interlocking parts of a complex whole. 
 
 
In a letter to his American friend and fellow psychologist Jerome Bruner in 1958, 
Luria criticised what he saw as the most worrying trends then emerging in 
neurology:                        
I think Engels was right by saying that “a function does not create an organ 
for its realisation”, and that's not to do with metaphysics, that's a real biology, 
a real mode of formation of modes of living. It would be a big failure to 
deduce forms of behaviour from pre-existing forms of nervous cells and 
nervous connections.
11
     
 
                                                 
9
 Homskaya, pp. 1-2. 
10
 See, A.R. Luria, The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology, trans. by Basil Haigh, 
(New York, NY; Basic Books, 1973), p. 105. 
11
 Alexander Luria to Jerome Bruner, August 15 1958, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Archives 
(HUA), Jerome Bruner Papers, General Correspondence 1975-1977, HUG 4242.5, Box 88. 
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These prescient remarks anticipate criticisms that have recently begun to proliferate 
in the social sciences in response to what Raymond Tallis has designated 
‘neuromania’.12 Fernando Vidal, in a much-cited argument that chimes with Luria’s 
discussion with Bruner, claims that the contemporary obsession with, and often blind 
faith in, neuroscientific research has led to a perceived identity between brain and 
self, giving birth to a new figure: the cerebral subject. Vidal’s work seeks to unmask 
the social and political assumptions that allow ‘neurocultures to prey on the most 
diverse pieces of evidence and the most varied beliefs in order to feed the ideology 
of brainhood’.13 Like Luria before him, Vidal stresses the dehistoricising tendencies 
of much neuroscientific discourse, which isolates brains from people and people 
from society. 
 Critical Neuroscience is a recent endeavour informed by the work of the 
Frankfurt School whose concerns overlap with Vidal’s. This emerging body of 
criticism attempts to probe the social and political implications of neuroscientific 
research: the values it mobilises, the interests it serves, the vision of nature and 
subjectivity it participates in construing. In their introduction to an interdisciplinary 
collection of essays inaugurating the project, Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby 
state: ‘The goal is to work towards an integrated approach to behaviour that situates 
the brain and cognition in the body, the social milieu and the political world.’14 The 
essays in the collection explore the ‘reciprocal interactions between neuroscience 
and social life’ and are committed to a ‘politics of situated subjectivity’, which 
refuses to accept the identity of brain and self or to cordon brains off from society or 
history.
 15
 Luria presented the brain in a manner amenable to these descriptions. 
Taken at face value, Luria’s work thus seems to provide a powerful theoretical 
counter-balance to the dominant contemporary paradigms Critical Neuroscience 
seeks to redress.  
 
                                                 
12
 Raymond Tallis, Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinistis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity 
(Durham; Acumen, 2011), pp. 29-49. 
13
 Fernando Vidal, ‘Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity’, History of the Human Sciences, 
vol. 22, no. 1, 2009, 5-36, p. 20. A similar argument is made by Joelle M. Abi-Rached and Nikolas 
Rose in ‘Birth of the Neuromolecular Gaze’, History of the Human Sciences, 23, 1 (2010), 11-36. 
14
 Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby, ‘Introduction’ in Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the 
Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience , ed. by Choudhury and Slaby, (Chichester; Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012), pp. 1-26, p. 3. 
15
 Choudhury and Slaby, p. 7, p. 10. 
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 Luria was by no means the most ideologically fervent Soviet scientist, neither 
was his the only Marxist approach to human development elaborated in the Soviet 
Union.
16
 Unlike his peers, however, Luria dedicated a huge amount of time and 
energy to establishing conversations with psychologists, educators and neurologists 
in the West, thus ensuring that his work reached an international audience.
17
 Luria’s 
position in ‘world science’ is assured; his publications still cited and revered.18 His 
mid-career shift from psychoanalytic and psychological research into neurological 
investigations dovetails with the history of twentieth-century developments in the 
‘psy’ disciplines, in dialogue with yet divergent from his contemporaries outside the 
Soviet Union.
 
Hitherto, the political orientation of his research and the historical 
context out of which it arose has not been emphasised or explored in any detail.
19
 
Almost all of the existing literature on Luria is written by and for practicing 
psychologists, neurologists and educators, and is thus addressed to the present.
20
 
Such works treat his theories as compatible with contemporary research agendas. 
This thesis is also addressed to the present but by insisting that Luria’s research was 
of its time, it is my hope to demonstrate that his work does not align so comfortably 
with current agendas and assumptions. Luria’s work might therefore provide the 
                                                 
16
 Conversely, the fact that Luria did couch his theories in explicitly political terms differentiates him 
from the most dominant figure in Soviet psychology: Ivan Pavlov. Although Pavlov’s work was 
officially embraced by the Soviet regime, it was declared Marxist post factum: the reflexologist began 
his career before the revolution, was hostile to Bolshevism, and only embraced the revolutionary 
cause in the final years of his life. See, Daniel P. Todes, Ivan Pavlov: A Russian Life in Science 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014). 
17
 Luria’s former student Michael Cole informed me that Luria set aside a few hours every day to 
keep up with his international correspondence. (Telephone interview, September 23 2014). K.E. 
Levitin recalls that Luria’s apartment had a ‘huge custom-made mailbox’ to accommodate his post. 
See, K.E. Levitin, ‘Epilogue: Luria’s Psychological Symphony’, Journal of Russian and East 
European Psychology, 6, 36 (1998), 33-62, p. 53 Luria’s commitment to reaching an international 
audience distinguishes him from Vygotsky’s other major collaborator Aleksei Leon’tiev (1903-1979). 
This thesis does not discuss the influences of Luria and Leon’tiev’s work on one another. On the 
historiography of Vygotsky’s collaborators which challenges the narrative, dominant prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, that the ‘troika’ ‘Vygotsky-Luria-Leon’tiev’ should be considered as a 
single school of psychology, see: Anton Yasnitsky, ’Vygotsky Circle as a Personal Network of 
Scholars: Restoring Connections Between People and Ideas,’ Integrative Psychological and 
Behavioural Science, 45, 4 (2011), 422–57. 
18
 For overviews of Luria’s global influence, see: R.L. Solso and C.A. Hoffman, ‘Influence of Soviet 
Scholars’, American Psychologist, 46 (1991), 251–253 and David E. Tupper, ‘Introduction: 
Alexander Luria’s Continuing Influence on Worldwide Neuropsychology’, Neuropsychology Review, 
9 (1999), 1–7. Oliver Sacks (whose engagement with Luria I discuss in the Coda) was the most 
famous advocate of Luria’s work. 
19
 Interestingly, a Russian-language overview of twentieth century Russian psychology characterises 
Luria’s work as ‘Marxist psychology’ rather than ‘cultural-historical psychology’, the moniker more 
frequently used in English-language publications. See, A. V. Petrovskii, Psikhologiia v rossii: XX Vek 
[Psychology in Russia: Twentieth Century] (Moscow; Izd-vo URAO, 2000), pp. 8-9. 
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basis for an immanent critique of the scientific paradigms that his work is often 
included in, a kind of Trojan Horse sitting quietly within the city walls. As such, the 
key primary materials that form the basis for this thesis are not untranslated or 
unpublished material, revealing some hitherto overlooked episode in scientific 
history. Instead, my analysis deliberately focuses on Luria’s most well-known 
publications, widely available in English translation, as I hope to demonstrate that 
attending to the manifest content of these works allows for an analysis of their latent 
and frequently overlooked political and historical content.   
 
 However, asserting the political orientation of Luria’s research did not prove 
the uncomplicated process I had initially anticipated when I first conceived of this 
project; it transpired that considering Luria’s research in isolation from the history it 
emerged from and influenced was as limiting as examining a brain on a glass table. 
Luria asserted that ‘the eye of science does not probe “a thing,” an event isolated 
from other things or events. Its real object is to see and understand the way a thing or 
event relates to other things or events.’21 This thesis aims to approach his scientific 
output in a similar manner. 
 
The archaeological metaphor is a common motif in the often melancholic 
work of those attempting to rescue something of the optimistic utopianism of the 
early twentieth-century for the present, a past which could still imagine the 
possibility of a radically different future.
22
 Though sympathetic to such discussions, 
which intend to recover some hope from beneath the wreckage of the twentieth-
century, in unearthing Luria’s work I do not aim to pull the original artefact whole 
from the rubble, but to consider it in relation to the ravages of time: full of cracks 
and holes, and covered in layers of dirt. For Luria’s Marxist approach to human 
development was not only conceived negatively, as a critique of ‘bourgeois’ western 
                                                                                                                                          
20
 See, for example, Luria’s Legacy in the 21st Century ed. by Anne-Lise Christensen, Elkhonon 
Goldberg and Dmitri Bougakov (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2009).  
21
Luria, The Making of Mind: A Personal Account of Soviet Psychology, ed. by Michael Cole and 
Sheila Cole (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 174. 
22
 See, for example, Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, NY; Basic Books, 2001), p. 
78, Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: the Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West 
(Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2000), p. 68, T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes in the History of 
Modernism, (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1999), p. 1, Mike Davis, City of Quartz: 
Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London; Verso, 1990), p. 12 and Owen Hatherley, Militant 
Modernism (Winchester; Zero Books, 2008), p. 8 
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models, but developed in a particular, if volatile, historical context. As Marx 
famously intones in the opening pages of The 18
th
 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
‘Humans make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past.’23 Luria sought to emphasise the connection 
between psychology and history, but his research was itself influenced by the 
dramatic and violent history of the Soviet Union: revolution, collectivisation, terror 
and war. His understanding of what constituted a Marxist approach to individual and 
historical development was also specific to his Soviet context. If descriptions of the 
brain today, as a malleable non-hierarchical network without centre, coincide with 
descriptions of contemporary capitalism,
24
 then Luria’s understandings of individual 
development similarly overlapped with orthodox Marxist-Leninist understandings of 
historical development that permeated Soviet discourse.
25
 Although he always 
asserted the primacy of history for understanding human psychology, a gap remained 
between his meta-historical framework and the concrete historical circumstances in 
which he conducted his research. This thesis is addressed to that gap. The gap I 
identify is not, however, understood as being located between Luria’s texts and the 
world beyond them but is treated more like a fault line that runs across their pages. 
Unlike in many of Vygotsky’s most celebrated writings in which eloquent 
discussions of Marx and Engels, Spinoza and Hegel, Shakespeare and Mayakovsky 
are brought to bear on psychological debates (often with little or no reference to his 
clinical observations), Luria’s publications more closely adhered to his empirical 
laboratory investigations.
26
 Vygotsky often merely stated that human consciousness 
should be situated in history, whereas Luria’s works also document social history, 
providing glimpses of the experiences and outlooks of a diverse array of Soviet 
                                                 
23
 Karl Marx, ‘The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, Karl Marx/Frederick Engels, Collected 
Works, vol. 11, trans. by Clemens Dutt (New York, NY; International Publishers, 1979), pp. 99-197, p. 
103 (modified translation). 
24
 Martin Hartmann and Alex Honneth, ‘Paradoxes of Capitalism,’ Constellations, 13, 1 (2006), 41–
58. See also, Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain? trans. by Sebastian Rand 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). I discuss Malabou’s engagement with Luria in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
25
 Stalin’s programmatic definition of Marxist-Leninism can be found here: History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, ed. by a Commission of the CC of the CPSU 
(B) (Moscow; Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939). 
26
 See, for example, Lev Vygotsky The Psychology of Art, trans. by Scripta Technica Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1971) and ‘The Historical Meaning of The Crisis in Psychology’ in The 
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people through accounts of his clinical encounters. History intrudes into his works in 
a manner that precludes them from being considered as self-contained philosophical 
treatises and hence complicated my initial attempt to import them wholesale into a 
contemporary context; his publications strain under the weight of their history. 
Analysing Luria’s writings thus necessitated developing a methodological approach 
that probed the relation between theory and praxis, ideas and history; an approach 
capable of acknowledging that although his work recognised the primacy of history 
for understanding human consciousness it was, simultaneously, an approach to 
psychology with a history. Ultimately, this PhD contends that the attentiveness to 
history achieved in Luria’s literary or ‘romantic’ case histories constitutes his major 
theoretical contribution and thus proposes that the fine-grained analysis of 
experiential specificity evident in those texts might be the aspect of his approach 
most capable of challenging the very different (though no less politically charged) 
assumptions and practices of the present. As in Luria’s writings, the historical and 
theoretical objectives of this project are necessarily intertwined. 
  
Psychology in Revolution 
 
In 1976, a year before his death, Luria wrote to his old friend, the American 
psychologist Jerome Bruner, to inform him that he was working on a 'highly 
personal' and possibly final book, declaring: 'the motive is not to write an 
autobiography but rather a history of a social atmosphere after the revolution with all 
the enthusiasm of trying to find new ways.'
27
 The resulting text, The Making of Mind, 
first published in 1979, forgoes a description of Luria's birth in 1902 and instead 
begins with the October Revolution of 1917:  
I began my career in the first years of the great Russian Revolution. This 
single, momentous event decisively influenced my life and that of everyone I 
knew […] My entire generation was infused with the energy of revolutionary 
change – the liberating energy people feel when they are part of a society that 
is able to make tremendous progress in a very short time.
28
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
René van der Veer (Plenum Press, New York, 1997), pp. 233-343. Tuberculosis forced him to 
withdraw from laboratory work in the final years of his life.   
27
 Alexander Luria to Jerome Bruner, March 16 1976,  HUA, Jerome Bruner Papers, General 
Correspondence 1975-1977, HUG 4242.5, Box 88. 
28
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Luria clearly aligned his own personal and professional development with the fate of 
the Soviet project with which his adult life was almost coterminous (he died in 1977, 
less than a decade before the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev’s sweeping 
reforms).
29
 This thesis will attempt to situate Luria’s work in its revolutionary 
‘atmosphere’, contextualising, supplementing and interrogating Luria’s own 
accounts, in order to ask how this historical attempt to create a Marxist psychology 
might challenge the psychological paradigms of the post-Soviet present (which, like 
the globalised capitalist economy, now operate on either side of the fallen iron 
curtain) without, however, glossing over the brutalities and oppressions of the Soviet 
past.
30
 
 
Although Luria foregrounded the close relationship between his 
psychological career and the dramatic events of Soviet history, and his psychological 
theories understood human development in relation to its particular cultural milieu, 
discussions of Soviet history have not featured prominently in accounts of Luria’s 
work. In the obituary that appeared in The New York Times sixty years after the 
revolution, Luria was described as: ‘A Communist Party member who remained 
aloof from Marxist-Leninist ideology.’31 This statement implies that Luria 
maintained a contradictory relationship to the Soviet establishment: paying lip-
service to the regime, while remaining intellectually autonomous. This narrative, as 
Loren Graham discusses, was typical of the Cold War-era. Graham identifies a 
tendency in Western writings on Soviet science to emphasise the distinctly Soviet 
qualities of scientists deemed unsuccessful, while downplaying the social and 
cultural factors that influenced the work of scientists, like Luria, whose work 
                                                 
29
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achieved international acclaim.
32
 As such, the case of the Soviet geneticist Trofim 
Lysenko historically functioned as the paradigmatic example of the detrimental 
impact of the explicitly ideological Soviet approach to nature, overlooking the fact 
that Soviet geneticists were themselves instrumental in discrediting Lysenko’s 
work.
33
 Articles published in The Times in the mid-1960s exemplify the tenor of the 
discussions that accompanied the Lysenko scandal.  Lysenko is described as the 
'virtual dictator of Russian biology under Stalin'
34
 who conducted a ‘reign of terror 
among his fellow geneticists’35 and whose success was 'symptomatic of the close 
connexion between science and politics in the Soviet system […] [which] fitted the 
communists' views about the infinite plasticity of man and Stalin's grandiose ideas 
about transforming nature.'
36
 Similarly, Western discussions of the imprisonment of 
dissidents in psychiatric institutions tended to cast the USSR as a uniquely punitive 
and oppressive state, rather than considering parallels with contemporaneous 
psychiatric practices in the West or analysing other psychological developments in 
the Soviet context that did not participate in those repressive programmes.
37
  
 
A glaring example of the inverse tendency identified by Graham can be 
found in Jerome Bruner’s introduction to the English translation of Lev Vygotsky’s 
Thought and Language, published in 1962 at Luria’s behest. Bruner is quick to state 
that Vygotsky's work transcends the time and place of its composition and should be 
considered as a part of global psychology: 'it avails little to trace the ideological 
course of Vygotsky's work through the groundswells and storms of psychology in the 
Soviet Union.’38 He removes Vygotsky from his historical context and isolates him 
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as a solitary genius: ‘Vygotsky is an original'.39 Bruner retroactively foists a brand of 
liberalism on Vygotsky, going so far as to claim that the Soviet psychologist’s work 
could be better understood as a theory of individualism than as an approach informed 
by Marxism:  
To me, the striking fact is that given a pluralistic world where each comes to 
terms with the environment in his own style, Vygotsky's developmental 
theory is also a description of the many roads to individuality and freedom. It 
is in this sense, I think, that he transcends, as a theorist of the nature of man, 
the ideological rifts that divide our world so deeply today.
40
 
 
The translators of Thought and Language had, however, seen fit to cut large sections 
of Vygotsky’s text, including many of his references to Marx and Engels and all 
mentions of Lenin.
41
 They also declared that they chose to omit 'polemical 
discussions that would be of little interest to the contemporary reader'.
42
 Bruner’s 
insistence on Vygotsky’s detachment from Soviet concerns is undermined by these 
editorial decisions. According to Graham, Luria and Vygotsky’s work though 
explicitly Marxist was influential in the West and was therefore distanced from its 
Soviet origins. Indeed, in obituaries that appeared in The Times, Luria is defined in 
opposition to a stereotyped image of the Soviet psychologist as a coldly mechanistic 
‘rigid Pavlovian’. Luria is hailed for his concern for ‘the acting and suffering 
individual’; his work is said to exhibit an ‘ultimate concern with the human 
condition,’ at odds with mainstream Soviet practices.43 Like Bruner’s discussion of 
Vygotsky, this implicitly casts Luria as a liberal individual adrift in a totalitarian 
society. In opposition to this tendency to downplay the ‘groundswells and storms’ 
from which Luria’s writings emerged, a tendency which has outlived the Cold War, it 
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is the intention of this thesis to emphasise the distinctly Soviet aspects of Luria’s 
work.
44
  
   
 Luria was not alone in framing the October Revolution as a revolution in 
mental life. In The Mind and Face of Bolshevism, his seminal 1929 analysis of early 
Soviet life, René Fülöp-Miller declared:  
What has been enacted in Russia is in truth more than a revolution in the 
ordinary meaning of the word: we have to deal with something more 
important than a mere modification of social and political conditions, or of 
the social position of a few classes of the population. The revolution has 
touched the ultimate problems of mankind. With unheard of boldness, an 
attempt is being made in Russia to make a correction in the archetype of 
humanity itself, to wipe out the former type of the lord of creation, that of the 
‘soul-encumbered individual creature’, and to replace it by a ‘higher type’, by 
what is believed to be a new and more valuable species of living being, by 
the ‘collective man’, to replace the individual with the ‘dividual’’45  
 
These lines recall the bombastic closing passages of Leon Trotsky’s Literature and 
Revolution (1924) with its call to create a new kind of human under communism, 
which found its ways on to the pages of Soviet psychology textbooks in the decade 
following the revolution. The American psychologist John Dewey similarly 
remarked when he visited the Soviet Union in 1928: ‘It seems to me that the simplest 
and most helpful way to look at what is now going on in Russia, is to view it as an 
enormous psychological experiment in transforming the motives that inspire human 
conduct.’46 The revolution set out to transform the world which would, it was hoped, 
precipitate a transformation of human consciousness. 
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The revolution had an impact not only on individual psychological 
experience, but also influenced research agendas in the ‘psy’ disciplines. Luria’s 
work was explicitly addressed to the problem of the mutually transformative 
relationship between human consciousness and society.  He thus contributed to 
revolutionary debates about human development; the Soviet ‘psy’ disciplines were 
not only shaped by history, but also participated in shaping it. Walter Benjamin 
likened the whole atmosphere of Moscow in 1927 to a laboratory, in which 'no 
organism, no organisation' was untouched by the experimental fervour.
47 
Maria 
Gough's The Artist as Producer: Russian Constructivism in Revolution, quotes this 
passage in its opening paragraph. For Gough, whose work is focused on avant garde 
art practices, experimentation in the early Soviet period is 'not a process sequestered 
in a laboratory, but rather pervades every aspect of everyday life.'
48
 Constructivist 
artists did not intend to confine themselves to galleries, but hoped that radically 
transforming quotidian objects might transform human subjects in turn. In an essay 
in LEF (the journal of the Left Front of the Arts), discussed favourably by Vygotsky 
in The Psychology of Art (1924), Nikolai Chuzhak proclaimed: ‘There are no more 
“temples” of art, or shrines, where the sacred absolutes of priests reside, shrouded in 
incense. There are workshops, factories, mills, and streets.’49 In attempting to convey 
the revolutionary ‘atmosphere’ that Luria’s research was conceived in - the shifting 
textures and routines of everyday life [byt] that characterised the immediate post-
revolutionary period - I have drawn inspiration from art historical, literary and 
cultural historical accounts. Histories of Soviet psychology tend to remain 
sequestered within laboratories, but Soviet psychologists were swept up in the 
revolutionary tumult with everything else.
50
 Luria was an active participant in what 
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T.J. Clark has described as the 'buzz of voices, all rattled and contradictory' 
unleashed by the October Revolution, but he continued to participate in Soviet 
society long after the ‘state started shouting through the revolution’s mouth.’51  
 
Luria’s career began in the early years of the Soviet experiment, a moment of 
optimism and uncertainty, when the question of what a Marxist approach to 
psychological questions could and should be was still unsettled, but his career 
continued into the Stalinist period when the parameters of Soviet discourse began to 
narrow. Recent art historical scholarship has begun to redress a tendency in accounts 
of the Soviet avant garde to carve out a neat distinction between pre and post Stalin 
eras, which traditionally argued that the bold aesthetic experimentations of the 
former were replaced by a restrictive form of realism imposed from above.
 52
 In a 
discussion of the painter Aleksandr Deineka whose stylistic approach shifted in 
accordance with state priorities, for example, Christina Kiaer argues that although 
the boundaries of debate did become increasingly circumscribed, artists continued to 
actively engage in aesthetic discussions rather than passively adopting officially 
ordained styles. She claims that the artworks produced in the 1930s can only be 
understood if it is acknowledged that Soviet artists were ‘creators as well as 
victims.’53 The state may have sought to muffle the contradictory voices buzzing in 
the wake of the revolution, but it would be a mistake to imagine the individuals 
engaged in producing artistic or scientific work in the Stalin-era as nothing more 
than ventriloquist’s dummies. The process of attempting to make sense of Luria’s 
engagements with Stalinism in the 1930s, retroactively complicated my 
understanding of his work during the 1920s: how to retain sympathy for Luria’s 
project without ignoring the gap between dreams and reality that characterised 
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Soviet life from the very beginning? This may be an uncomfortable endeavour, but is 
nonetheless necessary to penetrate the ‘atmosphere’ enveloping Luria’s work.  
 
 Luria’s career was influenced by shifts in state policy, both practically and 
theoretically. That the Soviet state had a major impact on Luria’s research is 
undeniable, but the meanings, extent and outcomes of that impact were constantly 
shifting. Luria’s career can only be comprehended if this ambivalence and volatility 
is acknowledged.  In Stalinist Science, Nikolai Krementsov discusses the relationship 
between Soviet scientists and the state, declaring: 'The nomenklatura system forced 
practically all Soviet scientists who occupied any administrative post to participate 
actively in ongoing ideological campaigns in order to maintain their high position.'
54
 
As we shall see, Luria was not immune from these campaigns and faced public 
criticism at various points during the Stalin era: he recanted his early interest in 
psychoanalysis, faced denunciation for being insufficiently interventionist in the 
1930s, and narrowly avoided persecution in the anti-Semitic Doctor’s Plot in the 
early 1950s.
55
 Almost immediately after Stalin’s death in 1953, however, Luria 
began to re-establish his international contacts.
56
 In February 1958 he received a 
letter from the American Zionist writer Horace Kallen who had visited the 
psychologist in Moscow three decades earlier:  
It is years since I have had a communication so welcome. You have been in 
our minds over and over again since 1929 and we had been wondering what 
had happened to you. To see your handwriting at the end of almost thirty 
years and to learn that you have been filling a Chair in Psychology in 
Moscow University is to experience something like a friend’s or a child’s 
rebirth.
57
 
 
Having fallen out of touch with Luria in the early 1930s, it is evident that Kallen, 
reading news of the Stalinist purges from afar, had feared the worst. At the height of 
the terror Luria had reason to fear the worst himself,
58
 but to focus on this phase in 
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his career (and in Soviet history) would overlook the extent to which his work also 
benefited from the enormous prestige attached to science by the Soviet regime. 
Indeed, even in the 1930s, at the very moment his work was being publicly 
denounced, Luria was offered the opportunity to set up an independent institute in 
the Ukrainian city of Kharkov equipped with sixteen rooms, funded positions for 
fifteen co-workers and a budget of 100,000 roubles per year.
59
 In 1951, shortly after 
the notorious ‘Pavlovian Session’ when all Soviet psychologists were forced to 
demonstrate their allegiance to Ivan Pavlov’s theorisations of conditioned reflexes, 
he was awarded the Order of Lenin, the USSR’s highest decoration.60 In the post-war 
years he frequently travelled to international conferences in the West and lived for 
most of his adult life in a comfortable apartment in central Moscow. Although Luria 
relied on his colleagues abroad to supply him with commodities that were scarce in 
the USSR (including fountain pen cartridges, medicines and camera film), he also 
had access to luxuries unavailable to his foreign colleagues. Many of his most 
celebrated works, including his autobiography and case histories, were completed 
during long periods of relaxation at state-run rest houses situated on grand estates 
confiscated from the long-since exiled aristocracy.
61
 In his autobiography, Luria 
differentiated his career from his western contemporaries by contrasting their 
‘comparatively quiet, slow-moving environment’ and ‘well-ordered, systematic 
education’ with his own chaotic experience in post-revolutionary Russia.62 By the 
time Luria was writing his memoirs in the 1970s, however, the society in which he 
lived was no longer in such dramatic flux. The tension between transformation and 
stability evident in Luria’s biography was also reflected in his research. Central to 
this thesis is the contradictory relationship between rupture and routine, between 
revolutionary transformation and the formation of the new norms and systems that 
came to characterise Soviet life.
63
 Luria’s research, like much Soviet discourse, was 
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structured around an ideal image of harmony; my intention is to understand that 
vision in relation to the cacophonous reality from which it emerged.  
 
Inner Turmoil 
 
‘Psychology is religion and the chief occupation of societies, such as those in the 
West, in which individual private souls are strictly separated from each other through 
an external legal and economic system of relations. In contrast, the Soviet state 
intervened directly in the souls of its subjects and manipulated their impressions, 
feelings and experiences.’64 Boris Groys’s bombastic declaration asserts that 
psychology as a discipline was fundamentally incompatible with the Soviet system. 
Psychology, for Groys, necessarily relies on a conception of autonomous 
individuated subjectivity at odds with his understanding of Soviet experience in 
which the ‘territory of the psyche that was congruent with the territory of the state. 
In the Soviet era, private psychology was subordinated to official ideology and 
therefore was also nationalised.’65 This thesis intends to trace a history of the Soviet 
‘psy’ disciplines that challenges this characterisation. ‘Psy’ disciplines in the USSR 
were indeed subordinated to official ideology (although that by no means resulted in 
a single monolithic approach), but this thesis points to the continued incongruities 
evident on the pages of Luria’s publications between the psychic territories he 
attempted to navigate and the state-sanctioned maps he employed. Luria’s 
experiments brought him into contact with a broad range of Soviet citizens including 
industrial workers, convicted murderers, rural school children, deaf babies, Uzbek 
kolkhoz members, orphaned teenagers and brain-injured Red Army soldiers. His 
publications reveal that the responses of the people he encountered frequently failed 
to conform to his ideal frameworks for understanding individual development, 
indicating that Soviet experience was never identical with the official state narratives 
in the manner described by Groys.  
 
Questions of agency and conceptualisations of self-hood are central to 
historiographical accounts of Soviet history, which often rely (however implicitly) 
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on assumptions about human psychology. But as Anna Krylova powerfully argues, 
historians’ assumptions about subjectivity and human nature are no less culturally 
contingent than those of the historical actors they analyse.
66
 This thesis, wary of 
making universalising claims about human conduct that might interfere with its 
analysis of historically situated ‘psy’ disciplines, therefore focuses on Luria’s 
conceptualisations of subjectivity, agency and motivation, rather than attempting to 
portray him as an individual; as Luria noted in the conclusion to his autobiography: 
‘People come and go, but the creative sources of great historical events and the 
important ideas and deeds remain.’ 67 Following Luria’s assertion, this PhD 
deliberately eschews a detailed biographical account of his life and does not attempt 
to describe his temperament or emotional sensibilities. This approach is also 
designed to avoid hagiography. Moreover, pushing Alexander Luria the man into the 
background allows for the people he encountered in his research to come more 
clearly into view. This thesis is less interested in the ‘extraordinary person’68 behind 
the name embossed on the spine of Luria’s books than in the often disenfranchised or 
marginalised Soviet people Luria and his collaborators sought to understand and, in 
some cases, treat.
 69
 
 
Krylova persuasively claims that historians’ conclusions about Soviet 
subjectivity might be understood in terms of their divergent interpretations of the 
relationship between the state and the individual, the official and the unofficial, the 
public and the private, the sincere and the cynical.
70
 Based on the biographical 
                                                 
66
 See, Anna Krylova,‘The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies’, Kritika, 1, 1 (2000), 119-
146. 
67
 Luria, Making of Mind, p. 188. 
68
 Homskaya, p. 1. 
69
 The people this approach risks ignoring are Luria’s professional collaborators. It also downplays 
one of the most distinctive elements of Soviet psychology: the prominent role allotted to women. 
Collaboration is the main lens through which Anna Stetsenko has interpreted Luria and Vygotsky’s 
working practices. See, for example, Anna Stetsenko and Ivan Arievitch, ‘Vygotskian Collaborative 
Project of Social Transformation: History, Politics, and Practice in Knowledge Construction’, The 
International Journal of Critical Psychology, 12 4 (2004), 58–80. By zooming out to look at the 
broader historical context Luria’s work developed in and by focusing attention on his patients at the 
expense of his colleagues it is my hope that my project compliments this existing scholarship and 
similarly avoids treating Luria as a solidary genius.  
70
 Jochen Hellbeck similarly asserts: ‘A division between inner striving and outward compliance no 
longer suffices to understand the self-transformative and self-awakening power of Soviet 
revolutionary ideology.’ Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 11. Also part of this trend in post-Soviet 
scholarship on subjectivity, see Igal Halfin, Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 29 
 
details available, it would be possible to cast Luria as the victim of an oppressive 
regime, as a self-interested cynic consciously manipulating the official rhetoric to his 
own professional advantage or as a genuinely committed Marxist, who wilfully 
overlooked the flaws of the Soviet state.
71
 Such contradictions are evident both in 
Luria’s published work and in his private correspondence. Regardless of his 
motivations, however, Luria conducted work within the Soviet system and 
elaborated a psychological theory consistent with, if not reducible to, Marxist-
Leninist theory. In so doing he neither capitulated fully to external historical forces 
nor existed outside of them, but participated in forming history.      
 
 In the wide-ranging survey Russian Psychology (1989) David Joravsky 
discusses the contradictory position of Soviet psychologists, whose theoretical 
insistence on the need to create a ‘New Soviet Person’ was combined with the 
continuation, in practice, of psychological studies that enjoined patients to adjust to 
their existing social conditions. Joravsky takes Luria’s career as ‘the most revealing 
case in point’ of this tendency.72 He claims that Luria’s autobiography, though 
peppered with ‘standard phrases’ concerning revolutionary transformation, is 
characterised by ‘reticence on distinctly Soviet issues’, particularly the class 
backgrounds of the people he studied.
73
 Joravsky charges Luria with glossing over 
clashes and conflicts to produce a smooth account written in a ritualistic, almost 
robotic style. Luria’s career was, he says, defined by ‘political caution, a scientist’s 
effort to avoid ideological conflict, and a consequent retreat from field after field of 
research’.74  Joravsky is not even convinced that Luria’s work was couched in 
distinctly Marxist vocabulary, declaring that ‘no characteristic ideas of Marx or 
Lenin can be discovered’ on the pages of his works in any period.75 This thesis will 
follow Joravsky in treating Luria as exemplary of the paradox of elaborating a 
Marxist psychology in the Soviet Union. Joravsky is certainly correct to accuse 
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Luria of failing to attend closely to the environmental specificities his research 
proclaimed to address. Contra Joravsky’s assessment, however, I contend that Luria 
did consistently frame his work in explicitly Marxist-Leninist terms throughout his 
long career. It is this paradox that makes Luria prototypically Soviet for this is the 
paradox of the Soviet project itself: egalitarian Marxist theory deployed to uphold 
and consolidate an oppressive social order.  
 
 Here I follow the example of Slavoj Žižek who has criticised the ways in 
which the composer Dmitri Shostakovich has been hailed in Western secondary 
literature as a closet heroic dissident who nobly smuggled criticisms of the Soviet 
regime into his symphonies. Žižek does not, however, conclude the inverse: that 
Shostakovich’s work was the acoustic embodiment of communism. Indeed, as Žižek 
observes, the most disastrous thing imaginable for the Soviet state would have been 
if its citizens actually acted on the ideological tenets of Marxism. What made 
Shostakovich a prototypical Soviet composer was his ‘inner distance towards the 
‘official’ Socialist reading of his symphonies’.76 Shostakovich’s symphonies are 
contradictory: they contain an ‘inner turmoil’, which captures the tension between 
emancipation and oppression integral to the Soviet experience.
77
 It is that turmoil 
that this thesis identifies in Luria’s work. In treating Luria’s career as exemplary of 
the paradoxes faced by those working within the Soviet system, I neither attempt to 
extricate an individual from an oppressive state apparatus nor declare the identity of 
those things, but hope to explore the entanglement of Luria’s psychological work 
with Soviet history. In so doing I hope to demonstrate that situating Luria’s theories 
in history complicates his project without invalidating it. Indeed, historicising his 
project is consistent with his overall aims. Luria stumbled when he allowed a 
particular vision of historical progress to take precedence over the historical 
processes observed by his research. Ultimately, however, historical events 
overwhelmed him, rendering that vision untenable and prompting him to develop a 
new mode of scientific writing.  
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False Identity: Note on Method 
 
‘There is as yet no critical theory of the neurosciences’, Martin Hartmann declares in 
his contribution to Critical Neuroscience.
78
 Hartmann’s piece is the only essay in the 
collection which explicitly attempts to outline what such a theory might entail. He 
envisages an approach that would engage directly with contemporary neuroscientific 
research in order to lay bare its coercive aspects. In setting out this potential model, 
he draws primarily on the work of Jürgen Habermas who, he argues, built on the 
early foundations laid by Max Horkheimer in the 1930s but ‘dropped this Marxist 
frame’.79 Unlike Hartmann and Habermas, this thesis holds on to Marxist frames, 
seeking to participate in the denaturalisation of the present, identified by Hartmann 
as a central element of critical theoretical approaches, through the rehistoricisation of 
Luria’s psychological and neuropsychological work.  
 
  My approach is primarily informed by the work of Luria’s non-Soviet 
contemporaries Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and Walter Benjamin (1892-1940).
80
 
As figures who shared a time with Luria but inhabited different spaces, Adorno and 
Benjamin’s writings both converge with and diverge from Luria’s in illuminating 
ways. For the purposes of this thesis, their understandings of dialectical development 
and critiques of progress provide a counterpoint to Luria’s more orthodox Marxist 
model.  
 
  In the programmatic essay ‘Traditional and and Critical Theory’ (1937), Max 
Horkheimer argues that traditional theory naturalises the social by imagining a world 
driven by alien external forces beyond the control of human agency. Such theory, 
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Horkheimer claims, serves to uphold the existing political order: ‘The scholar and 
his science are incorporated into the apparatus of society; his achievements are a 
factor in the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs, no 
matter what fine names he gives to what he does.’81 A critical theorist, on the other 
hand, is ‘wholly distrustful of the rules of conduct with which society as presently 
constituted provides each of its members.’82 In the aphorism ‘Ego is id’ in Minima 
Moralia (1951), in an argument that recalls Horkheimer’s earlier attack on traditional 
theory, Adorno suggests that the discipline of psychology is structured to uphold the 
status quo, identifying the concomitant emergence of psychology with the ‘rise of 
the bourgeois individual’.83 Adorno conceives of psychology as a discipline that is 
incorporated into the apparatus of society. Like the bourgeoisie, psychology, for 
Adorno, also has an oppressive dimension. Psychology, he claims, is premised on 
rationalisation; it elevates human subjects above all else but in so doing negates 
subjectivity and thus transforms human beings into ‘absolute object[s]’.84 It therefore 
participates in the principles of human domination and exchangeability inherent in 
capitalist society. By treating the psychic life of suffering people as an interior space 
to be externally controlled, the logic of property ownership is replicated in the 
therapeutic encounter. Adorno attacks psychoanalysis specifically for its equation of 
healing with adjustment to the existing state of things. Patients are enjoined to align 
themselves with the reality principle, which only serves to uphold the alienation 
already immanent to capitalism.  
 
 In emphasising the relationship between human subjects and their historical 
circumstances, and by asserting that humans could actively intervene in history, 
Luria explicitly sought to differentiate his approach from the western ‘bourgeois’ 
traditions attacked by Horkheimer and Adorno. Ultimately, however, the affirmative 
relationship of psychology to existing reality identified by Horkheimer in traditional 
theory and Adorno in psychoanalysis was repeated in Luria’s project. Historical 
antagonisms were acknowledged by Luria in theory but, as we shall see, often 
disavowed in practice. This is not simply to state that Luria’s Marxist-Leninist 
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theoretical model was incompatible with his oppressive social reality, but might be 
deployed elsewhere to different effect. Instead, attending to the historical situation in 
which he worked indicates that his model was always-already flawed, as it was 
premised on an assumption that both social and psychic antagonisms would 
ultimately and inevitably be resolved.  
 
 Adorno and Benjamin are included in a canon of ‘Western Marxist’ thinkers. 
Martin Jay defines Western Marxism as a diffuse and undogmatic group of 
intellectuals open to non-Marxist schools of thinking and often critical of official 
Communist Party positions. He frames Western Marxism as the ‘negation of its 
official Soviet (or Eastern) counterpart. The latter has been turned into a doctrinaire 
ideology of legitimation by a tyrannical regime, whereas Western Marxism, nowhere 
in power, had retained the libertarian, emancipatory hopes of the socialist 
tradition.’85 In this thesis, Western Marxist thinkers function as antagonists to Soviet 
Marxism, acknowledging the violence and contradictions of history, without 
foregoing a revolutionary commitment to transforming the world. Žižek observes 
that the opposition of Western Marxist thinkers to Soviet Marxism was only 
infrequently made explicit, noting that thinkers of the Frankfurt School rarely 
engaged in any sustained manner with the phenomenon of Stalinism.
86
 In drawing on 
Adorno and Benjamin’s work I do not intend to treat the Soviet Union as 
indistinguishable from the capitalist bourgeois societies that their critiques were 
primarily aimed at. It is my contention, however, that Luria’s research was structured 
around certain key assumptions, inherited from a western ‘bourgeois’ philosophical 
tradition, that Benjamin and Adorno rejected or challenged: he retained a faith in 
progress, affirmed the existing conditions in which he lived, and, mostly importantly 
for the purposes of this thesis, implicitly assumed that dialectical development was 
an immutable law of both history and nature (specifically the nature of individuals), 
which resolved in a final moment of reconciliation: communism (occasionally 
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substituted for ‘civilization’) or adulthood respectively. The confrontation of Eastern 
Marxism with Western Marxism in this thesis could thus be understood as a 
confrontation between the comic and the tragic, between utopian optimism and 
utopian pessimism, between a positive and a negative dialectic.
 
   
 
In ‘Reconciliation Under Duress’ (1958), a rare example of an essay in which 
he explicitly attacked official Communist Party orthodoxy, Adorno articulated the 
paradoxical relationship between Marxist rhetoric and Soviet reality at stake in my 
discussion of Luria. The essay is a searing critique of the Hungarian philosopher 
György Lukács, who remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout the Stalin 
era. Adorno claims that ‘under the mantle of an ostensibly radical critique of society,’ 
Soviet Marxism had ‘degraded the philosophy it proclaimed to the level of a mere 
instrument in the service of its rule.’87 According to Adorno, ‘officially licensed’ 
Marxists like Lukács proclaimed their work dialectical, while producing thoroughly 
undialectical texts, which denied the persistence of oppression in Soviet society.
88 
 
Adorno insisted that in the Soviet Union the antagonisms and inequalities the 
revolution promised to sweep away continued but were disavowed by the officially-
sanctioned rhetoric: ‘the cleavage, the antagonism persists, and it is a sheer lie to 
assert that it has been ‘overcome’, as they call it, in the states of the Eastern bloc.’89 
Here Adorno is not only stating that Lukács was mistaken to declare that Soviet 
socialism had achieved a moment of final reconciliation devoid of tensions; Adorno 
is suspicious of reconciliation as such. Luria’s psychological theories, like Lukács’s 
readings of literature, assumed that historical and individual development were 
moving forwards to a final moment devoid of antagonism. Adorno’s works challenge 
this assumption. In a 1964 lecture on psychology Adorno declared that a theory 
premised on the ‘false identity of subject and object in a world of radical discord 
[…] blinds [people] to the unreconciled nature of life.’90 What Adorno would 
eventually term ‘negative dialectics’ is governed by the principle of non-identity. 
Unlike for Hegel (Marx, Lenin or Luria), for whom negativity constitutes one 
moment of a journey towards unity and completion (Absolute Knowledge, 
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communism, consciousness or adulthood), for Adorno negation is dialectics; 
contradictions are never resolved. He focused on dialectical relations as they 
continually unfolded rather than setting his sights on a final moment of future 
synthesis.  
 
 Unlike Adorno, however, who dismissed Lukács out of hand for his 
engagement with Communist Party doctrine, my approach is more sympathetic to 
Luria’s project. Adorno perceived, to borrow Susan Buck Morss’s formulation, ‘that 
actual past history was not identical to the concept of history (as rational 
progress).’91 In the case of the Soviet Union, however, he did not devote much 
energy to probing the implications of the tension between the two. This thesis 
attempts to examine the duress that Luria’s rhetoric of reconciliation existed in 
relation to; it not only sets ‘Eastern Marxism’ against ‘Western Marxism’, but also 
frames Luria’s work as a collision of historical materialism with the materials of 
history. By Horkheimer’s definition, Luria was a traditional rather than a critical 
theorist. Horkheimer noted that ‘[t]he identification […] of men of critical mind 
with their society is marked by tension, and the tension characterises all the 
concepts of the critical way of thinking.’92 Luria’s work overwhelmingly attempted to 
present a vision in harmony with his society. It is my intention to read his work 
critically in order to reveal the tension that nonetheless persisted.  
 
The third chapter of the thesis explicitly juxtaposes Luria’s developmental 
psychological writings with Walter Benjamin’s theories of childhood and reflections 
on his 1926-27 visit to Moscow. Elsewhere, Benjamin’s work implicitly informs my 
approach to history. Benjamin declared that the historical materialist approaches the 
past in order to surprise the present. History writing for Benjamin is a political 
endeavour addressed to now:   
[The] dialectical penetration and actualisation of former contexts puts the 
truth of all present action to the test. Or rather, it serves to ignite the 
explosive materials latent in what has been […] To approach, in this way, 
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'what has been' means to treat it not historiographically, as heretofore, but 
politically, in political categories.
93
  
 
The historical materialist fans 'the spark of hope in the past', to provoke a bright but 
destructive conflagration in the present.
94
 Though both dialecticians, Benjamin’s 
explosive vision of history was very different from Luria’s progressive model. 
Indeed, Benjamin’s critique of progress was partially aimed at ‘vulgar Marxism’ 
(and hence at ‘historical materialism’ in the conventional Soviet sense), whose 
celebration of technology and industrial production ‘recognises only the progress in 
the mastery of nature, not the retrogression of society.’95 As Adorno observed, 
Benjamin’s conception of history is ‘just as heretical when looked at from the 
position of Marxist practice, as it is critical of traditional historicism.’96 Benjamin 
noted, in a statement that recalls Horkheimer’s distinction between traditional and 
critical theory, that ‘the concept of progress bespeaks an uncritical hypostatisation 
rather than a critical interrogation.’97 This thesis follows Benjamin in identifying the 
regressive aspects of Luria’s progressive visions and similarly insists that 
digressions, deviations and detours are a generative and, indeed, necessary aspect of 
political transformation.  
 
Paths of Development: Thesis Structure 
 
Proceeding chronologically, my first three chapters discuss the two tumultuous 
decades following the October Revolution, with a closing chapter that considers the 
shattering impact of the Second World War on Luria’s research. The opening 
chapters all follow a similar movement, discerning in Luria’s publications an 
unresovled tension between  the progressive frameworks that inform them and the 
fraught historical situation in which the people they describe lived, a context that can 
be glimpsed in the transcripts those publications include.  These chapters observe in 
Luria’s writings a dialogical relationship between his broad theoretical 
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pronouncements and the empirical data that accompanies them. The key texts that 
form the basis of this argument are The Nature of Human Conflicts (1932), Cognitive 
Development (based on research conducted in 1931 and 1932) and Speech and 
Intellect among Rural, Urban and Homeless Children (based on research conducted 
in the early 1920s). These works follow a similar format: they include descriptions 
of experiments undertaken, transcriptions of responses to the experiments, and 
general theoretical analyses and conclusions. They also each dedicate sections to the 
analysis of specific psychological ‘types’ that Luria defined in opposition to 
‘advanced’ human consciousness (murderers, illiterate Central Asian women and 
uneducated street children respectively). Reading the transcripts those works contain 
I was struck that the responses Luria cites, which provide insights into the Soviet 
quotidian, often seemed to exceed or complicate his accompanying interpretations of 
the material. This PhD contends that it was only in Luria’s case histories The Man 
with a Shattered World (1972) and The Mind of a Mnemonist (1968) (discussed in 
the fourth chapter and coda) that he developed a form of scientific writing capable of 
fully attending to the utterances and experiences of the people he dedicated his 
career to observing, understanding and treating. These publications do not represent 
a shift in scientific practice so much as a shift in the stylistic presentation of his 
clinical material. Luria characterised this as a distinction between ‘classical’ and 
‘romantic’ science. By taking a ‘romantic’ approach to Luria’s more ‘classical’ 
writings, I hope to discern moments in which ‘the wealth of living reality’ can be 
glimpsed through the cracks of his general and occasionally reductive schemas.
98
 
 
 
 As its title indicates, Luria and Vygotsky’s Studies on the History of 
Behaviour: Ape, Primitive and Child, first published in the Soviet Union in 1930, 
explored three forms of related but distinct psychological development: evolutionary, 
cultural and individual.
99
 Informed by the logic of Luria’s research, this thesis is 
similarly structured around discrete paths of development. An interest in tracing the 
progression from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’ forms of thought united Luria’s seemingly 
diverse strands of work. At the apex of his mountain of development stood the 
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‘civilized’, educated, healthy adult. Luria, however, had little to say about this 
advanced figure. He could only discern its outline, as though it stood silhouetted in 
front of the glaring sun. Instead, Luria proceeded from the base in order to explain 
the route to the peaks. The ideal person to whom Luria’s work is tacitly addressed 
could only be conceptualised in opposition to a cluster of figures who departed from 
that ideal. The analysis of apes, children, ‘primitive’ people and people with mental 
illnesses or disabilities characterised much early twentieth-century psychological 
investigation, and Luria engaged directly with these global trends. Yet unlike his 
peers in the West, his approach was informed by Marxist-Leninist ideas. Luria’s 
understanding of human development, like the Marxist-Leninist account of history, 
assumed that life followed a prescribed course with qualitative transformations 
occurring at given stages. Vygotsky claimed that their ‘reverse’ approach to 
psychology was methodologically analogous to Marx’s economic mode of analysis 
in Capital: 
To understand the quitrent on the basis of the ground rent, the feudal form on 
the basis of the bourgeois form - this is the same methodological device used 
to comprehend and define thinking and rudiments of speech in animals on the 
basis of the mature thinking and speech of man.
100
 
 
The intention, for Marx, was to analyse highly developed bourgeois society in order 
to overthrow it. In contrast, Luria’s approach to the highest forms of human thought 
was affirmative. Luria was working in a post-revolutionary context in which the 
overthrow of capitalism had already been proclaimed; it is therefore ambiguous 
whether the ‘highest’ form he negatively described was an ideal communist subject 
located in the future or an already existing entity.  
 
 Luria’s writings contain two distinct understandings of history: sometimes 
history is understood as the environment enveloping the individual in the present, 
whereas at other moments he conceptualises individual development as an extrinsic 
miniature model which replicates the progressive development of history on a 
different scale. In an essay on the relationship between psychoanalysis and history, 
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Dominick LaCapra contends that it is inadequate for the historian of psychoanalysis 
to accept ‘the analogy between ontogeny and phylogeny or individual and society.’ 
Instead, he declares that ‘one must actively recognise that the analogy itself conceals 
the most basic interaction of psychoanalysis and sociocultural processes involving 
social individuals.’101 Similarly, the macrological historical framework that informed 
Luria’s work did not always map neatly onto his understanding of history as an 
individual’s immediate environment, life experiences and inherited culture. Luria 
treated human development as a recapitulation of both evolutionary and 
civilizational development, while simultaneously emphasising the contingent impact 
of contemporary experience on individuals. LaCapra notes in his discussion of Freud 
that ‘history in the ordinary sense often gets lost in the shuffle between ontogeny and 
phylogeny.’102 It is my hope that an analysis of Luria’s psychological theories and 
practices might provide a way of approaching the ‘basic interaction’ between his 
work and the society in which it was conducted, in order to bring history ‘in the 
ordinary sense’ into view.  
 
 In its treatment of Luria’s vast oeuvre my approach is intensive rather than 
extensive: each of my chapters began as an analysis of a single publication. Although 
the thesis moves chronologically and follows the overall arc of Luria’s career, it is 
not intended as a comprehensive overview of his life and work and says relatively 
little about the various institutions and disciplines with which he was involved. 
Instead, it focuses on four moments in his research that also correspond with pivotal 
moments in Soviet history, blasting ‘a specific life out of the era’, in the manner 
proposed by Benjamin.
103
 
 
 This thesis starts at the very beginning: historically it begins with the 1917 
October Revolution, which Luria also framed as the beginning of his own 
biographical journey. It also returns to the beginning of life itself. In 1925 Luria and 
Vygotsky co-wrote the introduction to the Russian translation of Sigmund Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Their short theoretical introduction, which 
stages the tensions between Marx and Freud that played out in post-revolutionary 
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Russia, is the focus of my opening chapter. In Freud’s seminal essay, he posited the 
existence of the death drive, which seeks to return to inorganic nature, an inanimate 
state prior to life. Despite Freud’s insistence on the inherent conservatism of the 
organism, however, Luria and Vygotsky declared Freud’s essay revolutionary and 
dialectical. Chapter 1 focuses on their reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle as a 
basis for understanding their attempt to create a politically radical psychology. Like 
Adorno’s work, Freud’s essay, with its emphasis on negativity and the continual and 
transformative antagonism of opposing forces, challenges Luria’s utopianism and 
thus provides a powerful counter-narrative to his psychological and political model. 
The propulsive relationship between life and death, assimilation and destruction, 
progression and retrogression that animates Beyond the Pleasure Principle, informs 
the argument of this thesis as a whole. As a theory of non-identity, Freud’s essay 
provides a counter meta-historical narrative to the Marxist-Leninist model espoused 
by Luria. The chapter concludes by discussing Luria’s The Nature of Human 
Conflicts, based on experiments conducted concurrently with his engagement with 
psychoanalysis, which contains a wealth of clinical material based on his pioneering 
experiments designed to assess responses to emotional stimuli. By providing insights 
into the concrete (and frequently distressing) experiences of Soviet people The 
Nature of Human Conflicts undercuts the abstract utopian argument made by Luria 
and Vygotsky in their critique of Freud and demonstrates that Luria documented 
psychic conflicts, antagonisms and tensions in practice even when he sought to 
overcome them in theory.          
 
 In 1931 and 1932 Luria led two expeditions to Soviet Central Asia. 
Conducted during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32), the experiments 
were conceived as an attempt to trace the cognitive effects of that state policy. Luria 
defined Uzbek society as culturally backward, but hoped to describe a process of 
psychic advancement, which he assumed would accompany the collectivisation of 
agriculture. As with his critique of psychoanalysis, this research affirmed progress. 
Chapter 2 confronts Luria’s engagement with the Stalinist project in order to 
examine whether his work replicated the oppressive tendencies of the society in 
which it was elaborated or whether its professed commitment to human liberation 
might have contained an emancipatory element.  
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 As an icon of the future, the child was central to Soviet ideology. Untainted 
by the bourgeois past yet still dependent on adults, the question of how to create a 
properly revolutionary childhood was a paradox faced by Soviet psychologists and 
educators. Chapter 3 contrasts Luria’s work on developmental psychology, which 
sought to build the child in the image of an ideal adult, with the work of Walter 
Benjamin, who framed childhood perception as revolutionary and disruptive in its 
own right.  
 
The Second World War marks a decisive turning point in this thesis. 
Benjamin did not survive the war. For Adorno, the combined catastrophes of 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima confirmed his bleak assumption that progressive 
understandings of history were inherently regressive. The ‘Great Patriotic War’, as it 
became known in the USSR, also had a decisive impact on Luria’s life and work. My 
final chapter, which discusses Luria’s work with brain-injured soldiers in the wake of 
the Second World War, argues that Luria was ultimately forced to contend with the 
unreconciled tensions occluded in his earlier work. In 1972 Luria published a case 
history of a patient he had been observing for nearly 30 years. The Man with a 
Shattered World tells the story of Zasetsky, a Red Army soldier in the Second World 
War who survived a bullet wound to his head. Chapter 4 considers the formal 
qualities of the case history and proposes that its self-consciously literary style 
allowed Luria to present the cognitive condition of his wounded patient in all its 
complexity without abandoning a commitment to rehabilitation and healing. 
Although still couched in the Marxist-Leninist language that informed his earlier 
work, Luria here accepts that full recovery is impossible and thus attempts to 
ameliorate rather than overcome or deny psychic disorderliness and human suffering. 
The Man with the Shattered World demonstrates the limitations of a particular world-
view in the face of a shattered world. This chapter treats Luria’s case history as an 
allegory for the Soviet experiment, but also as a text that offers some political hope 
for the future. I identify an incursion of the negative in Luria’s work which the pre-
war research projects examined in the preceding chapters attempted to downplay. 
This thesis concludes by noting a moment when history violently smashed through 
the utopian framework Luria had erected over the human subjects his work sought to 
describe. It is at this moment, I will argue, that Luria finally proposed a critical 
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rather than traditional approach to psychology, or, in his own terms, a romantic 
rather than classical approach.  
 
 The PhD ends by returning to the immediate post-revolutionary period with 
which it began. The Coda considers the friendship Luria maintained with the Soviet 
film maker Sergei Eisenstein from the mid-1920s until the director’s death in 1948. 
This concluding section follows the paths of their careers, discussing moments of 
convergence and divergence between Luria and Eisenstein in relation to the 
developmental movements around which this thesis is structured. It concludes with 
an analysis of Luria’s case history The Mind of a Mnemonist, the protagonist of 
whom Eisenstein also engaged with, contending that, unlike Eisenstein, Luria might 
ultimately be considered a thinker of non-identity.
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Chapter 1 
The Unconscious: Between Life and Death 
 
 
 
The Marxist method and the Marxist world-view form a unified system, but a 
system which, unlike others, never becomes rigid, but as a result of its 
dialectical method, is always dynamic within itself, always mobile and 
adapted to the constant movement and change taking place in nature and 
society.
1
 
  
 Wilhelm Reich, ‘Psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union’, 1929 
 
 
This kind of teaching is the refusal of any system. It uncovers a thought in 
motion – nonetheless vulnerable to systematisation, since it necessarily 
possesses a dogmatic aspect. Freud’s thought is the most perennially open to 
revision. It is a mistake to reduce it to a collection of hackneyed phrases. 
Each of his ideas possesses a vitality of its own. That is precisely what one 
calls the dialectic.
2
 
 
Jacques Lacan, ‘Overture to the Seminar’, 1953 
 
 
While not a single of the basic dialectical concepts has been revised or 
rejected by Soviet Marxism, the function of dialectic itself has undergone a 
significant change: it has been transformed from a mode of critical thought 
into a universal ‘world-outlook’ and universal method with rigidly fixed rules 
and regulations, and this transformation transforms the dialectic more 
thoroughly than any revision […] As Marxist theory ceases to be the organon 
of revolutionary consciousness and practice and enters the superstructure of 
an established system of domination, the movement of dialectical thought is 
codified.
3
  
  
 Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, 1971 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Wilhelm Reich, ‘Psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union’, Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929-1934 ed. by Lee 
Baxandall (London; Verso, 2012), pp. 75-90, pp. 78-79. 
2
 Jacques Lacan, ‘Overture to the Seminar’, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I Freud’s Papers on 
Technique 1953-1954, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans by John Forrester (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 1. 
3
 Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1971), p. 115. 
 44 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the perestroika era, discussions of Freudian ideas crept back into Soviet discourse 
for the first time since 1930, when psychoanalysis had been effectively banned and 
Freud pronounced persona non grata.
4 
 Works by Western Marxists informed by 
Freudian ideas were translated and discussed, Freud's collected works were 
published in Russian 1989 and Freudian terminology entered the dissident arsenal of 
ideas deployed to critique the crumbling communist state.
5 
 In the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, archives opened and historians and theorists were 
quick to place Soviet history on the couch, diagnosing the collective repressions, 
societal Oedipal complexes and group neuroses generated and sustained by decades 
of authoritarian rule. As Martin A. Miller discusses in Freud and the Bolsheviks 
(1998), psychoanalysis 'as a methodology to interpret the past'
 
played a crucial role 
in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6
 
 
Alexander Etkind’s Eros of the Impossible: History of Psychoanalysis in 
Russia, which charts the Russian engagement with Freud in the early twentieth-
century was first published in Russian in 1993. Etkind’s book, Catherine Merridale 
notes, was an instant success in post-Communist Russia ‘among a public eager for 
new information, controversy, and a fresh interpretation of Russia's long 
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enslavement’.7 Etkind does not confine himself to narrating the historical path 
charted by psychoanalysis in the Russian context, but uses his discussion of 
psychoanalysis as the springboard for launching a bold attack on totalitarianism, the 
seeds of which he sees littered across the landscape of elite Russian culture. Etkind's 
polemical account places psychoanalysis centre-stage in a drama involving a Russian 
intelligentsia he characterises as power-hungry and erotically-obsessed, and whom 
he takes to embody the innate flaws of the Russian character. Like a psychoanalyst in 
the consulting room, Etkind is concerned with excavating the past in order to 
understand the neurotic present, but his diagnosis precedes his analysis. As such, he 
risks reducing history to a series of signposts all pointing in the direction of the 
gulag.
8
 
 
 'Psychoanalysis claims to transform the very status of the historian's object,'
9
 
Jacques Derrida declares in Archive Fever (1995). Derrida argues that it would be 
not only ‘impossible’ but ‘illegitimate’ for historians of psychoanalysis to liberate 
themselves from Freudian discourse.
10
 For Derrida, psychoanalysis transforms 
history rendering exteriority untenable: 
To want to speak about psychoanalysis, to claim to do the history of 
psychoanalysis from a purely apsychoanalytic point of view, purified of all 
psychoanalysis, to the point of believing one could erase the traces of any 
Freudian impression, this is as if one claimed the right to speak without 
knowing what one's speaking about, without even wanting to hear anything 
about it.
11
 
 
But psychoanalysis also exists in history and in post-revolutionary Russia it was 
never the dominant paradigm for understanding human development. In 'On Marx 
and Freud', an essay completed for the First International Symposium on the 
Unconscious in Tbilisi in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1979 and 
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'intended for a Soviet public',
12
 Louis Althusser noted that one of the major affinities 
between Marxism and psychoanalysis is their antagonistic institutional development. 
The histories of both disciplines are characterised by 'implacable and inevitable 
dialectic';
13
 they exist in and through struggle, animated by a dialectical movement 
of constant 'attack-annexation-revision-scission'.
14
 The Soviet psychoanalytic 
community that emerged in the post-revolutionary period, contended with this 
process as both institutions were beginning to ossify into more rigid systems, albeit 
on very different scales.
15
 Although Soviet psychoanalysts were not alone in 
attempting to elaborate a Marxist approach to psychoanalysis,
16
 their state socialist 
context placed particular constraints on that project. Althusser noted that when 
adopting a psychoanalytic vocabulary ‘one is obliged to use the currency reigning in 
the country one is exploring and no other’.17 However, in the Soviet Union the 
reigning currency was Marxism; it was thus psychoanalysis which needed to pass 
through the Bureau du Change.  
 
 Alexander Luria played prominent role in the short-lived Soviet 
psychoanalytic community. He established a Psychoanalytic Society in Kazan in 
1921 and acted as secretary of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society in Moscow from 
1923 to 1927, remaining a member until the society’s activities came to a halt at the 
end of the decade. In 1932, Luria published a penitent article in which he distanced 
himself from his early interest in Freud. He criticised psychoanalysis in terms 
consistent with the prevailing discourse for being individualised, pessimistic and 
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irrational, and attacked Freud for straying from his clinical experiences.
18
 Mark 
Solms has argued that although Luria was forced by the caprices of the Stalinist 
regime to renounce his early affiliations with psychoanalysis, his work continued to 
be psychoanalytically oriented: ‘the apparent change in Luria's scientific direction 
initially amounted to little more than a change in terminology.’19 René van der Veer 
and Jaan Valsiner similarly indicate that Luria retained an interest in psychoanalysis 
throughout his career despite the official silencing of the subject in the USSR.
20
 
However, although Luria’s article was certainly motivated by the oppressive political 
climate, it would be misleading to claim that his psychological approach was ever 
primarily psychoanalytic. His engagement with Freud, even at its most publicly 
laudatory, always combined psychoanalysis with other theoretical models and read it 
through a Marxist lens. The institutional development of Soviet psychoanalysis, its 
relation to the nascent communist state and Luria’s place within the movement is 
already well-documented. This chapter focuses less on the relationship that played 
out between Freud’s ideas and the Soviet political establishment than on the potential 
theoretical implications of Luria’s engagements with psychoanalysis for Marxist 
thought. Luria insisted that psychoanalysis was compatible with the goals of the 
revolution. This chapter will interrogate that claim through a discussion of Luria’s 
alignment of the Freudian death drive with the dialectic, and through a consideration 
of the relation of his theoretical arguments to the historical situation then unfolding 
in the Soviet Union.  
 
 In 1925, Luria co-wrote the introduction to the Russian translation of Freud's 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle with Lev Vygotsky. Luria and Vygotsky’s text stages 
the tensions between Marxist and Freudian conceptions of historical and individual 
development that arose when Soviet psychologists attempted to reconcile 
psychoanalysis with Bolshevik ideology. The grandiose themes of Freud’s seminal 
essay - which explores the relationship of the ontogenetic to the phylogenetic, the 
prehistoric to the contemporary, the organic to the inorganic - resonated with 
revolutionary concerns. Yet despite extolling Freud as a revolutionary thinker, the 
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essay strained to align psychoanalysis with Marxism. The authors hailed the 
dialectical qualities of the text but questioned how the ‘stormy progression of the 
historical process’ could be explained, if there exists, as Freud argued, an innate 
biological compulsion to return to an inanimate state.
 21
 Luria and Vygotsky 
recognised that Freud’s theory ‘breaks with teleological concepts’ but the alternative 
model they proposed, informed by a Marxist-Leninist understanding of revolutionary 
change, paradoxically failed to retain the elements of Freud’s theory that they praised 
for being dialectical.
22
 This chapter, written in cognisance of what eventually befell 
the revolutionary project, asks whether a radical political project might draw on 
Freud’s insights, rather than rejecting them as Luria and Vygotsky did. 
 
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud first introduced the 
possibility of the existence of the death drive (Todestriebe), identifying ‘an urge 
inherent in organic life to restore an original state of things.’23 Confronted with a 
profusion of patients shaken by traumatic dreams in the wake of the First World War, 
Freud had a theoretical as well as therapeutic problem. He had previously asserted 
that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish, but the unpleasurable repetition he 
encountered in traumatic dreams contradicted this claim. The death drive emerged 
from the violence of twentieth-century history. The First World War also precipitated 
the October Revolution. Like Eros or the life instincts, the Soviet project to 
transform the world was imagined as something propulsive, constructive and future-
oriented but, in practice, this relentless forward motion was always haunted by the 
past and dependent on violence, a reality the state-sanctioned narrative disavowed. 
This chapter will attempt to demonstrate the limitations of Luria and Vygotsky’s 
reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but not with the intention of dismissing 
their utopian commitment to the possibility of creating a more equitable world. 
Instead, by situating their engagement with psychoanalysis in its stormy historical 
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context, I hope to prise open a space between meta-history and history to suggest 
that Freud’s theorisation of the death drive might not have been as antithetical to 
communist political goals as Luria and Vygotsky argued. 
 
Alexander Luria and the ‘Disturbances in Russia’ 
 
Two months after the storming of the Winter Palace in Petrograd, Russian 
psychoanalyst Sabina Spielrein wrote to her former analyst and lover Carl Jung from 
Moscow, where she had briefly returned from Vienna, outlining the difficulties 
involved in organising Russian psychoanalytic activities and translations: 'because of 
political events in Russia the ground is not ready for scientific matters.'
24 
 Seven 
years later, in his address to the Eighth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 
Salzburg in April 1924, Ernest Jones declared: 'On account of the disturbances in 
Russia, it was extraordinarily difficult to collect data and to give a connected report 
of the progress of psychoanalysis in different parts of the country'.
25
 But despite, and 
even partly because of the tumultuous political situation in Russia, an ‘active, 
creative, and vigorous’26 psychoanalytic community existed in the decade following 
the October Revolution of 1917, a community in which Luria played a major role.   
 
In 1918, a year after the revolution, Luria entered Kazan University which, 
seven years later, would be renamed after its most famous alumnus: Lenin. Luria 
claims that his family, who were part of the city's Jewish intelligentsia, were 
‘sympathetic to the revolutionary movement [though] not directly involved in it’.27 
But indirect involvement with the revolution was inescapable: ‘The Revolution freed 
us, especially the younger generation, to discuss new ideas, new philosophies and 
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new social systems […] The content and the style of our lives changed almost 
immediately.’28 The revolution dramatically interrupted routine existence; in its 
immediate aftermath food was scarce, money worthless, industry stagnant. 1918 was 
a tumultuous year in Luria's native city, a crucial strategic site in the ongoing Civil 
War in which Bolshevik victory was still far from assured.  During the summer, the 
White Army occupied Kazan, forcing the Bolsheviks into retreat. Any Reds 
remaining were shot on sight. On September 10th, the Red Army stormed the city 
and the Whites fled across the Volga.
29 
Leon Trotsky, who led the attack on Kazan, 
depicted that victory as a major turning point in the Civil War. The day after the Red 
Army's triumph, he delivered a rousing speech in the city's main theatre, declaring: 
'We value science, culture, art, and want to make them accessible to the people, 
along with all their institutions – schools, universities, theatres and the rest [...] 
Precisely for that it was that we fought under the walls of Kazan.'
30
 Even in the midst 
of war, academic and cultural pursuits were explicitly situated at the heart of the 
revolutionary project. 
 
‘I began my career in the first years of the great Russian Revolution. This 
single, momentous event decisively influenced my life and that of everyone I 
knew’31 - Luria may not have taken up arms and thrown himself into the front lines 
of battle but he depicted his early academic career as being tied to the revolutionary 
moment, which had already begun to have a concrete impact on the cultural 
institutions mentioned by Trotsky.
32
 At Luria’s university there were new admissions 
policies, shifts in curricula and changes of staff. Quotas that restricted the number of 
Jewish students permitted to attend university were abolished. Courses continued 
intermittently if not uninterruptedly. Professors unable to adapt to the demands of the 
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new regime often allowed students to lead discussions. Luria admitted to having ‘no 
idea of the real causes of the Revolution’ nor any knowledge of Marxist theory at 
this time. Instead he described the revolution as a vividly experienced yet nebulous 
‘atmosphere’ of ‘general excitement’33 – chaotic, hopeful, experimental. Kristin 
Ross's characterisation of Marx’s understanding of the Paris Commune might be 
fruitfully applied here: the significance of the revolution was felt 'in its displacement 
of the political onto seemingly peripheral areas of everyday life – the organisation of 
space and time, changes in lived rhythms and social ambiances.'
34
 Luria recalled: 
My friends and I immediately threw our whole beings into the new 
movement because we recognised the opportunities that it offered. My 
enthusiasm came more from a strong emotional, romantic feeling toward the 
events of the time than from any deep intellectual appreciation of their social 
roots […] Instead of cautiously groping for a foothold in life, we were 
suddenly faced with many opportunities for action- action that went far 
beyond our tiny circle of family and friends. The limits of our restricted, 
private world were broken down by the Revolution, and new vistas opened 
before us. We were swept up in a great historical movement.
35
 
 
Luria was drawn to utopian socialism and to discussions of ‘politics and the shape of 
the future society.’36  In this lively and confused period of intellectual eclecticism 
Luria notes that he 'developed a lasting aversion to psychology'.
37
 He found nothing 
'alive' in the dry, academic works of Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Edward 
B. Titchener and other 'classical' Western European experimental psychologists: 'the 
boredom they inspired... is quite beyond fathoming.'
38
 It was at this moment that he 
first encountered Freud, in whose writing he found an antidote to the 'lifeless, 
impersonal [...] boring, oppressive vacuous' forms of psychology that dominated the 
university's syllabus; Freud’s work was equal to the vitality of the revolutionary 
moment. In 1922 Luria, then only 19 years old, organised a psychoanalytic 
discussion group in Kazan, writing to Freud personally to inform him that 'a new 
organisation had appeared in the world, the Kazan Psychoanalytic Circle.' Freud 
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responded, addressing the young Russian enthusiast as 'Herr President', and 
authorising Luria to translate his work into Russian.
39
 
 
The Kazan Psychoanalytic Society was thus founded, with Luria acting as 
secretary. Luria's report in the Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytic 
Association from 1923 lists twenty two members, mostly medical practitioners and 
students, who 'interest themselves in the theoretical problems of psychoanalysis and 
in its application to the mental and social sciences as well as to therapeutics.'
40
 The 
group met at least twice a month in its first year. Discussions included analyses of 
specific cases, dream interpretations, the relationship of psychoanalysis to other 
psychological schools, and summaries of specific works by Freud (including 'On 
Narcissism' and 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego').  
 
Luria's talks primarily functioned to situate psychoanalysis within the 
broader discipline of psychology in Russia, including discussions of reflexology and 
neurology. He presented only one explicitly psychoanalytic paper entitled 'The 
Psychoanalysis of Costume', which focused on the symbolic function of gender 
difference in dress. The abstract included in the bulletin indicates that he analysed 
women’s costumes in carnivals and dances, and men’s in armies and revolutions as 
‘symptoms’ of gender difference: ‘the dress of women are of a sexual-passive nature, 
but in man the motives are sexual[ly] (and social[ly]) active.’41  Interestingly, Luria’s 
emphasis on essential gender difference and the ‘primitive motives’ underlying 
social rituals is in marked contrast to his later engagements with psychoanalysis, 
which, as we shall see, tended to emphasise the changeability of human nature and 
the historical contingency of cultural forms, perhaps an indication of how swiftly the 
newly minted Marxist-Leninist vocabulary began to circulate.
42
 
 
Although Luria found Freud's writing inspiring, he was reading him  
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alongside an eclectic array of other authors, not only psychologists but neo-Kantian 
philosophers, anarchists, historians and poets. Luria presented psychoanalysis as one 
approach among many devoted to 'the analysis of personality (as a whole)'.
43
 The 
Kazan Psychoanalytic Society declared an interest in combining psychoanalytic 
techniques with other approaches; it was far from uncritical of the psychoanalytic 
method. At a meeting on November 23
rd
 1922, for example, doubts were raised as to 
the applicability of psychoanalytic categories to literature and folklore. Another 
debate focused on childhood sexuality and the question was raised in discussing 
Freud's 'Group Psychology' whether sexuality was an appropriate paradigm for 
considering collective dynamics, a question of particular urgency in the nascent 
Soviet Union.
44
 
 
Luria held a position as a typographer at this time, which allowed him to 
print and disseminate his early writings. Paper was a scarce resource in post-
revolutionary Russia and Luria resorted to printing some of his works on the 
discarded wrappings from a local soap factory.
45
 As well as various journals and 
reviews, he undertook to print and bind a single copy of a small book he had written 
entitled Psychoanalysis in Light of the Main Trends in Modern Psychology. In 1923, 
Luria met Otto Schmidt whose wife Vera had trained as a psychoanalyst in Vienna. 
Otto, an archetypal Soviet polymath was a mathematics professor, a celebrated polar 
explorer, and also worked as director of the State Publishing House. He arranged for 
a short print run of Luria’s book to appear. An Institute for Psychoanalysis had 
opened in Moscow in 1921, making the Soviet capital the first place outside of 
Vienna and Berlin where it was possible to train as a psychoanalyst. Luria and some 
of his colleagues from Kazan were subsequently invited to merge with the Moscow 
society to form the Russian Psychoanalytic Society.  
 
History and its Vicissitudes: Psychoanalysis in NEP-era Moscow 
 
Luria moved to Moscow in 1923 where he became Scientific Secretary of the 
Russian Psychoanalytic Society. Enthusiasm for psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union 
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in the early 1920s was not merely tolerated by the fledgling communist government 
but, as both Etkind and Miller's secondary accounts of the history of Soviet 
psychoanalysis discuss in detail, actively engaged with by ‘the highest echelons of 
power’.46 Although Luria himself was not to join the Communist Party until the 
1940s, the leadership of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society in the 1920s consisted 
almost entirely of Bolsheviks, many of whom were ‘enchanted by the possibilities 
thrown open for the scientific transformation of life’.47 Psychoanalysis was 
vigorously debated in prominent Bolshevik journals and extensive translations of 
Freud and other psychoanalysts were published by the state-funded press. In 1923, 
2000 copies of Freud’s Introductory Lectures were sold in Russia.48 As Miller states, 
‘no government was ever responsible for supporting psychoanalysis to such an 
extent, before or after.’49 Members of the Trotskyist ‘left opposition’ were 
particularly prominent in the psychoanalytic community and Etkind suggests that the 
demise of the psychoanalytic community in Russia may not be unrelated to the 
expulsion of the left opposition in 1928.
50
 State level support for psychoanalysis 
certainly did not spell a wholesale acceptance of Freud’s ideas, however, which were 
frequently vehemently criticised and psychoanalysis was far from dominant in the 
psychological community.
51
 Instead, this brief episode demonstrates the 
heterogeneity of early Soviet psychology, the prevailing atmosphere of 
experimentation that followed in the revolution’s wake and the proximity of the 
Bolshevik elite to Western European intellectual debates.  
 
  On 26
th
 October 1932, when the collectivisation of agriculture was underway 
and Freud’s ideas were no longer officially in circulation in Russia, a meeting of 
writers was convened at the home of Maxim Gorky in Moscow to discuss the fate of 
Soviet literature at which Stalin is famously said to have raised his glass to writers, 
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‘the engineers of human souls.’52 The house in which this meeting took place had 
previously been the site of a very different experiment in human psychology. The 
Russian Psychoanalytic Society took up residence in this grand residential building 
in 1921, a recently constructed art nouveau mansion confiscated from the 
industrialist Stefan Riabushinsky, later assigned to Gorky (whose museum the 
building still houses today). The building's shifting function provides an insight into 
the vicissitudes of Russian history: the psychoanalytic society occupied the space 
during the period of the New Economic Policy or NEP (1922-1928), in the confused 
interval between mercantile capitalism and Stalinism.   
 
 In the aftermath of the revolution, the state expropriation and re-purposing of 
buildings was common-place: churches became living spaces, banks became 
scientific institutes, synagogues became workers' clubs, nightclubs became film 
studios. The statues on imperial pedestals were swiftly replaced with improvised 
models of revolutionary figures; streets and squares were renamed; housing 
reallocated. Luria later recalled with a hint of irony that even the most mundane 
spatial re-configurations seemed to herald a dramatic re-configuration of daily 
existence [byt]: ‘we moved the furniture around [...] and I remember quite well how I 
myself was convinced, as I dragged chairs up the stairs, that we were actually 
reorganising our work and creating a new foundation for Soviet psychology.’53At the 
Psychoanalytic Society, Luria's 'splendid office, with silk wallpaper', where he 
chaired the group’s bi-weekly meetings, was on the first floor. 54 On the ground floor 
Vera Schmidt ran a psychoanalytic children's home called 'International Solidarity'.  
 
 The building, completed in 1906, was designed to imitate nature. Mosaics, 
murals and stained glass windows depicted reptiles, flowers and dragonflies, while 
ceilings, floors and banisters were designed to look like stalactites, pond surfaces, 
branches and lichen.
55
 The architecture also incorporated motifs of traditional 
Russian church architecture (Plate 1.1). One student recalled feeling tiny and out of 
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place in such salubrious surroundings.
56
 The lavish decor of the building was at odds 
with the material hardship of the period and its organic and religious elements out of 
synch with the prevalent images of the socialist future as industrialised, automated 
and secular. 
 
  Like the grand bourgeois building that housed it, the Moscow Psychoanalytic 
Society also evinced an interest in nature and origins at odds with the dominant 
political discourse.
57
 Despite the building’s citations of natural and religious history, 
however, it was nonetheless emphatically modernist in style: 'in this single 
architectural space, experimentation, mythology and ritual existed side by side.'
58
 
These contradictory qualities of the building, which looked simultaneously to the 
past and the future, were shared by the Psychoanalytic Society, which attempted to 
combine the future-oriented momentum of Marxism with a Freudian approach that 
emphasised the existence of unchanging biological instincts. As the emphatically 
Marxist name of Schmidt's children's home indicates, the Russian Psychoanalytic 
Society adopted a hybrid approach to Freudian theory suited to its Soviet context. 
The kindergarten's ideological name was adopted in acknowledgment of its 
benefactors: threatened with closure in 1922 after the People's Commissariat for 
Education expressed concern that the institution encouraged inappropriate childhood 
sexual expression, a visiting representative from the German Miner's Union stepped 
in to provide 'material assistance and ideological support' to the institution.
59
 The 
name was not completely alien to the institution's goals, however. Schmidt explicitly 
situated the activities and approach taken by the children's home in its revolutionary 
context: 'The interest for educational issues, particularly for community education 
[...] increased significantly during the events of the last few years in Russia.'
60
 In 
addition to the children’s home, the Russian Psychoanalytic Society also included a 
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training programme, an outpatient clinic, and a publishing arm. A 1924 bulletin lists 
the Society’s ‘various sections dealing with medicine, education, sociology, and 
analysis as applied to art.’61 The analyst-analysand dyad was never central to 
Russian psychoanalytic practice.
62
 Schmidt claimed that the lack of trained 
psychoanalysts in Moscow forced them to improvise
63
, but it was also politically 
significant that the activities carried out by the society emphasised group activities 
over individual therapeutic sessions and the analysis of children over the analysis of 
adults.
64 
 
 
 
Luria himself never trained as a psychoanalyst, carrying out his 
administrative duties as secretary alongside a full-time research position at the 
Moscow Institute of Psychology. The topics of his lectures at the society indicate 
that he incorporated psychoanalytic approaches with discussions of conditioned 
reflexes and motor reactions (which, as we shall see, dominated his research at his 
day job).
65
 On March 26
th
 1925, for instance, Luria delivered a paper on ‘Affect as 
an Unabreacted Reaction’, which combined a discussion of Freud’s theories of 
sexual inhibition with observations on Ivan Pavlov’s experiments with dogs.66  
 
 Despite its evident eclecticism, the idiosyncratic approach to psychoanalysis 
taken in Soviet Russia was followed with interest by clinicians in Vienna. In October 
1923 the Schmidts returned to Moscow from Vienna where they reported that Freud, 
Otto Rank and Karl Abraham had given useful advice on running the children's 
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home: 'In particular, the question of collective education and psycho-analysis (the 
fate of the Oedipus complex under conditions of collective education) was 
discussed.’67 The psychoanalytic establishment may have been open to the novel 
experiments occurring in Moscow but meanwhile the Soviet establishment was 
growing increasingly hostile to Freudian thought. The question of the incompatibility 
of psychoanalysis with Marxism refused to disappear. In 1926, a paper was 
presented to the Russian Psychoanalytic Society which asked: ‘Does psychoanalysis 
contradict dialectic [sic] materialism?’68 We can only speculate what answer the 
speaker gave to this question, but Soviet writers were increasingly publishing texts 
which unequivocally answered in the affirmative. 
 
 Luria’s characterisation of the immediate post-revolutionary period as a 
period of chaotic hopefulness agrees with the image of feverish optimism described 
by Richard Stites in Revolutionary Dreams (1989). Stites discusses the wild 
proliferation of utopian visions that burst forth following the October Revolution, 
celebrating the diversity of these hopeful, often eccentric experiments; their 
spontaneity, their ‘blazing colour’,69 and their penetration into all corners of material 
and mental life. Despite the incredibly bleak conditions of the present, people across 
the huge expanse of the new Soviet Union were looking forward, in a rich variety of 
ways, to what the future might become. Stites defines the period from 1917-1930 as 
one of those rare moments in history when a large number of people actually 
try to break the mould of social thinking that sets limits to mankind's 
aspirations, that defines 'human nature' in a certain unchangeable way, that 
speaks in realistic, prudent and ultimately pessimistic tones to the enthusiasts 
of the world in order to curb their energies and their fantasies.
70
   
 
Stites not only conveys the hectic buoyancy of post-revolutionary Russia, he whole-
heartedly embraces it. However, his narrative, which ends abruptly in 1930, draws a 
neat distinction between the pluralistic experimentation of the 1920s and the ‘savage 
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butchery’ of the Stalin-era.71 Although in one sense the Soviet engagement with 
psychoanalysis, which also ended in 1930,
72
 fits with Stites’s periodisation, the 
content of psychoanalytic debates complicates Stites’s argument because discussions 
of Freud in the post-revolutionary period grappled with the problems that Stites 
presents as the revolution’s most laudatory attributes. Enthusiasts of the world were 
forced to contend with the possibility that human nature might not be as changeable 
as they would like, and to consider the potential dangers of unleashing energies and 
fantasies. The ‘relative laxity’ of the period may have enabled the public discussion 
of psychoanalytic ideas, but those discussions frequently challenged rather than 
embraced the utopian ideas that form the basis of Revolutionary Dreams.
73
 Freud 
noted of the Soviet project in his 1933 lecture 'On the Question of a 
Weltanschauung':  
It hopes that in the course of a few generations so to alter human nature that 
people will live together almost without friction in the new order of society, 
and that they will undertake the duties of work without compulsion. 
Meanwhile it shifts elsewhere the instinctual restrictions that are essential in 
society; it diverts the aggressive tendencies which threaten all human 
communities to the outside [...] But a transformation of human nature such as 
this is highly improbable.
74
  
 
Luria rejected Freud’s insistence on the eternal and primitive elements of the 
unconscious as incompatible with revolutionary politics, but in so doing he also 
dispensed with the psychoanalytic emphasis on the necessary existence of opposing 
drives within human life, elements that may not have been as incompatible with a 
revolutionary future as Luria assumed.  
 
Alexander Luria, Lev Vygotsky and the Identity of Opposites 
 
In the decade immediately following the October Revolution what a Marxist science 
or psychology would entail was fiercely debated, and a range of conflicting 
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approaches developed.
75
 As Joseph Wortis notes in an overview of the heated 
debates in Soviet psychology that followed in the revolution’s wake: 
The Soviet Union is sometimes depicted as a monolithic giant permanently 
embedded in fixed Marxian dogma. A reading of Soviet psychiatric literature, 
however, does not convey the impression of a rigid application of fixed 
formulas. The tempo of change and development, the periods of trial and 
error, the reversals of policy and the constant atmosphere of experiment and 
growth are nowhere more apparent than in the fields of Soviet psychology 
and psychiatry.
 76 
 
Yet despite the liveliness and occasional vehemence of the discussions, the 1920s 
saw the gradual emergence of a 'new lexicon and a new polemical style' which 
clustered around a common core of ideas and thinkers.
77
 As Loren Graham states: 
'No other revolution in history contained a radical epistemological and cognitive 
system to the same degree.'
78
 Luria’s Marxist vocabulary should be understood in 
this context. Luria admitted that he was unfamiliar with the writings of Marx and 
Engels at the time of the revolution.
79
 As such, it seems that the understanding of 
dialectics he adopted was drawn from Soviet discursive formations, which still 
fluttered like snow around him but were beginning to settle. Luria and Vygotsky’s 
Introduction to Beyond the Pleasure Principle was published in 1925, the same year 
as V.I. Lenin’s Conspectus of Hegel’s Book ‘The Science of Logic’ and Friedrich 
Engels’ Dialectics of Nature, which went on to function as programmatic definitions 
of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union.
80
 In Lenin’s notes he states:  
Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The 
reflection of nature in man’s thought must be understood not ‘lifelessly’, not 
‘abstractly’, not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the 
eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their 
solution.
81
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Lenin insists that dynamism, contradiction and breaks in continuity are integral to 
dialectical thinking which is always ‘living, conditional, mobile.’82 But this 
movement and conflict is ultimately not eternal or endless at all: the dialectic, like 
the sentence quoted above, ends with a solution. Lenin draws attention to the closing 
of Hegel’s Logic which resolves in ‘absolute unity’.83 He declares: ‘Dialectics is the 
teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they 
become) identical.’84 For Lenin, dialectical contradiction has an end point: 
communism. 
 
 Luria’s early writings are littered with phrases and concepts drawn from the 
emerging Soviet vernacular. In 1924 Luria delivered a speech at the Moscow 
Psychoanalytic Society. The resulting paper ‘Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic 
Psychology’ was later included in K. K. Kornilov’s collection Psychology and 
Marxism. Here Luria argues for the compatibility of psychoanalysis with Marxism. 
He declares that psychology should treat its object, 'as something constantly 
changing, ceaselessly in movement'.
85
 This movement he insists does not proceed 
evenly or in one direction but 'sometimes experiences leaps, breaks, discontinuities, 
as it were, and most often unfolds in a series of shifts or swings from one extreme to 
the other rather than proceeding uninterruptedly.'
86
 This progression might be 
characterised by flux, might advance jerkily, might encounter obstacles along the 
way, but it still advances inexorably forwards and will eventually reach its final 
destination where contradictions dissolve. In V. N. Voloshinov's 1927 critical tract 
Freudianism: A Critical Essay (a text some scholars now attribute to Mikhail 
Bakhtin),
87 
 Voloshinov differentiates psychoanalysis from previous psychological 
schools for its understanding of human development: 
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Mental life for the old psychologies was all “peace and quiet”: everything put 
right, everything in its place, no crises, no catastrophes; from birth to death a 
smooth, straight path of steady and purposive progress, of gradual mental 
growth, with the adult's consciousness of mind coming to replace the child's 
innocence. This naïve psychological optimism is a characteristic of all pre-
Freudian psychology.
88
 
 
Luria was far less critical of Freud than Voloshinov, but ironically his work displays 
many of the traits Voloshinov denigratingly associates with pre-psychoanalytic 
Western bourgeois psychology. In Luria’s paper, although crises and catastrophes dot 
the road, development never veers off course. The cumulative and constant 
progression that Voloshinov praises psychoanalysis for combatting persists in Luria’s 
writing, which similarly betrays an optimistic faith that life will proceed purposively 
and eventually reach a peaceful resolution. However, Luria’s insistence on the final 
identity of opposites and the possibility of overcoming the past was difficult to 
reconcile with psychoanalysis.  
 
 As the title of his speech indicates, even when discussing psychoanalysis 
directly, Luria’s terminology remained firmly within the parameters of Soviet 
discourse. By ‘monistic’ Luria intends to express that psychoanalysis does not isolate 
the psyche from the human body, its activities and its environment, but considers 
human mental life as one aspect in a complex, dynamic, material system. Here again, 
he is close to Lenin, who defined ‘monism’ as the ‘materialist elimination’ of 
‘idealist’ Cartesian mind-body dualism.89 This Luria sees as being harmonious with 
Marxism, which draws a 'firm line between itself and a static, metaphysical view of 
things that tends to see phenomena as discrete, isolated, unchanging essences, not as 
processes.'
90
 Luria’s emphasis is on the environmental impact of the world on the 
individual, something he expresses in explicitly Marxist terms: 'the human mind is a 
product of the brain and, in the last analysis the effect of the social environment and 
the class relations and conditions of production underlying it.'
91
 He castigates 
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mainstream psychology for its alignment with idealist philosophy, favouring instead 
a materialist approach. 
 
 Psychology for Luria must be both biological and sociological; it must 
consider consciousness as something historically determined, rather than essential 
and eternal. Psychoanalysis, he claims, is the only school of psychology that meets 
these criteria, that devotes itself to studying ‘the whole individual, his behaviour, 
inner workings, and motive forces [...] instead of "extrasocial" man in general, 
studied in abstraction from the social conditions forming him.’92 For Luria, it is 
psychoanalysis’s emphasis on the interrelation between mind, body and the ever-
changing environment that distinguishes it from other approaches to the mind. Both 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, Luria claims, aim to look ‘beyond the surface of things 
to their real roots’,93 delving into the unconscious is for Luria a practical and 
materialist approach, firmly grounded in a belief in the primacy of history.  
 
  In attempting to underline the affinities between Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, however, Luria inadvertently hits on their incommensurability. Luria 
insists that the goal of Marxism is ‘to study the world so as to be able to change it; 
and this activist, practical orientation runs like a life-line throughout its system.’94  
For Luria, this necessitates that ‘man be studied as an integral biosocial organism’ 
(the approach he aligns with psychoanalysis), insisting that only then will it be 
possible to ‘exert a moulding influence' on people.95  He is so focused on 
psychoanalysis’s supposedly ‘monistic’ understanding of the psyche, that he 
completely overlooks the innate instinctual conservatism that Freud insists upon, 
substituting it with optimistic faith in the perfectibility and plasticity of human 
nature. 
 
 On this point, Lev Vygotsky, whom Luria met in 1924, is more attentive to 
the tensions between Marxism and psychoanalysis. Vygotsky was briefly a member 
of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society in the mid-1920s, but remained far less 
involved in the psychoanalytic community than his younger colleague. He delivered 
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two talks at the State Psychoanalytic Institute in Moscow: in 1924 he spoke on the 
subject of the ‘Application of the Psycho-analytic Method in Literature’ discussing 
the ambivalent quality of artworks and in March 1927 he delivered a paper on ‘The 
Psychology of Art in Freud’s Works’.96 Unlike Luria, who emphasises the dynamism 
of psychoanalysis, Vygotsky perceives that the psychoanalytic prioritising of eternal 
unconscious instincts is insufficiently historical, giving too much weight to sexuality 
and early childhood experience: 'Communism and totem, the church and 
Dostoevsky's creative work, occultism and advertising, myth and Leonardo da 
Vinci’s inventions – it is all disguised and masked sex and sexuality and that is all 
there is to it.'
97
 He remarks scornfully of Freud’s essay on Da Vinci that it is, ‘as if 
psychoanalysis had a catalogue of sex symbols, and these symbols remained the 
same at all times, for all peoples.’98  It is crucial here to emphasise the second part of 
this sentence over the first: although Vygotsky is critical of the psychoanalytic 
emphasis on sexuality, his main concern is not the sexual nature of Freud’s symbols 
but their immutability. From a Marxist perspective, his main problem with 
psychoanalysis is that it is 'not dynamic, but highly static conservative […] It 
directly reduces the higher mental processes - both personal and collective ones – to 
primitive, primordial, essentially prehistorical, prehuman root, leaving no room for 
history [...] everything is reduced to the same source.'
99
   
 
 Vygotsky explicitly addressed the short-comings of Luria's essay in 'The 
Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology' (a manuscript written in 1926). He 
attacks the 'methodological unscrupulousness and eclecticism'
100
 of writers like Luria 
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who overlook 'very flagrant, sharp contradictions',
101
 in order to synthesise Marxism 
with psychoanalysis. Such 'monstrous combinations' result in 'naïve transformations 
of both systems'.
102
 Luria ignores the bourgeois roots of Freud’s theory and 
overlooks ‘the centre’ of the psychoanalytic system: sexuality.103  Vygotsky's 
criticisms of Luria are echoed in Voloshinov's Freudianism. Voloshinov agrees with 
Luria that a Marxist approach to psychology demands a consideration of the 'whole 
personality' but questions Luria's claim that psychoanalysis achieves this. According 
to Voloshinov, a historical materialist psychology must consider individuals as they 
exist in dialectical interaction with the world, whereas psychoanalysis isolates and 
atomises individuals.
104
   
 
 Despite Vygotsky's insistence that psychoanalysis is fundamentally 
incompatible with Marxism, unlike Voloshinov, he does not argue that Marxists 
should therefore turn their back on psychoanalytic concepts altogether. On the 
contrary, he claims it is precisely the methodological shortcomings of psychoanalysis 
that make it a fertile ground for Marxists. He recognises the complexity and richness 
of Freud's theory, crucially acknowledging that it 'avoids becoming a system'.
105
 Just 
as Marx succeeded in turning Hegel on his head, Vygotsky claims that 
psychoanalytic concepts must be imported into an existing framework, tested 
according to its principles and integrated into the architecture of its system. 
Vygotsky’s claim that psychoanalysis might be compatible with materialism had 
been publicly expressed by Trotsky who wrote to Pavlov in 1923, suggesting that the 
psychologist’s theories of conditioned reflexes might be fruitfully combined with 
psychoanalysis. The letter was subsequently printed in Pravda.
106
 In their co-written 
introduction to Beyond the Pleasure Principle Luria and Vygotsky attempted to 
effect this importation.  
 
Sabina Spielrein and the Search for a Superman 
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Before turning to a discussion of Luria and Vygotsky’s Introduction to Freud’s essay, 
however, it is worth taking a step backwards to consider that the death drive has a 
pre-revolutionary Russian pre-history. In a footnote towards the end of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle Freud acknowledges the ‘instructive and interesting’ though 
ultimately ‘unclear’ contribution of Russian psychoanalyst Sabina Spielrein to his 
understanding of the destructive impulses inherent in sexuality.
107
 Although both 
Freud and Carl Jung (who was Spielrein’s analyst and lover) were rather churlish in 
their public acknowledgment of Spielrein, emphasising the neurotic content of her 
writing over its theoretical merits, the influence of her work on Freud’s essay is 
palpable. Spielrein recorded in her diary in September 1910 that Jung had 'listened 
[...] with rapture' to her ideas for a 'new study on the death instinct', encouraging her 
to develop her theories.
108
 These theoretical discussions between Spielrein and Jung 
took place in an erotically-charged atmosphere; her narration of their intensely 
intellectual romance, which she describes as a 'savage passion',
109
 constantly frames 
sex in relation to death: 'I do believe I am capable of destroying myself with cyanide 
in the presence of my idol'.
110
 After finishing the paper she writes to Jung that it 
seems clear to her 'why coitus so often appears in dreams as dying.'
111
  
 
 ‘Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being’ (first published in German 
in 1912) introduces some of the concepts that Freud eventually went on to elaborate 
eight years later. Spielrein imagined the essay as her and Jung's son, 'the product of 
our love'.
112
 In it she asks why the most intensely pleasurable experiences are often 
accompanied by ‘a feeling of resistance, of anxiety, or disgust’.113 For Spielrein, 
creation is always accompanied by destruction; sex is always accompanied by death. 
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Not only is birth a violent and painful experience, but the act of conception is also a 
moment of self-annihilation. Although she accepts Freud’s understanding of pleasure 
and the necessary avoidance of unpleasure, she ventures beyond in her suggestion 
that ‘the personal psyche is governed by unconscious impulses that lie deeper and, in 
their demands, are unconcerned with our feeling reactions [...] In our depths, there is 
something that, as paradoxical as it may sound, wills self-injury.’114 The essay 
conceives of a tension between collective and personal psyches, two antagonistic 
tendencies, the former of which desires transformation, while the latter ‘strives for 
self-preservation in its present form (inertia)’.115 Despite its name, what Spielrein 
calls the collective psyche has less in common with Jung's conception of the 
collective unconscious as a trove of ancient archetypes, than it does with Freud’s 
reality principle: it is the outward-facing, social form of the psyche which keeps in 
check personal urges and impulses. 
 
  According to Derrida, Freud's conception of the death drive, 'coincides 
almost literally with several Nietzschean propositions,'
116  
a proximity so close that 
Freud refuses to acknowledge the debt. By contrast, Spielrein's essay explicitly relies 
on Nietzsche. She discusses his use of images of destruction in relation to love and 
knowledge – 'The Will to Love: that is to be willing to die!'117 Her reading of 
Nietzsche's conception of the superman is tied to the destruction necessitated by 
procreation. His proclamation: 'Man is something to be overcome [...] in order for 
the superman to appear', she reads as the necessity to destroy the self (conceive) in 
order to create something new (give birth). The superman, she contends, can only 
attain its 'greatest vitality' through violent destruction; it is born of a struggle.
118
 She 
acknowledges that for Nietzsche eternal recurrence demands the return not only of 
the highest form of life, the superman, but also of the lowest, the 'smallest man'. 
Although Nietzsche's thought is preoccupied with the 'highest affirmation of life', his 
thought bears within it a 'simultaneous contradiction'; the superman can never rid 
itself of this 'dreaded element', the 'abysmal thought' of the low.
119
 The ambivalence, 
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tension and contradictory qualities that Spielrein identifies in Nietzsche's work have 
obvious parallels with the death drive as Freud went on to conceive of it. 
Advancement for both Freud and Nietzsche is always accompanied, indeed 
paradoxically propelled by, an eternal compulsion to go backwards. 
 
 Spielrein returned permanently to Soviet Russia in 1923, joining the 
Psychoanalytic Society in Moscow at the same time as Luria.
120
 Etkind makes much 
of Spielrein’s overlap with Luria and Vygotsky at the Psychoanalytic Society and the 
State Psychological Institute, speculating on the influence she must have exerted on 
them. He wistfully imagines two provincial young men in thrall to a dazzling 
woman, before concluding that Vygotsky’s ideas might thus be understood as being 
‘much closer to psychoanalysis than to Marxism [...] more deeply connected to a 
Freudian understanding of parental roles than to the infinitely politicised concepts 
that were referred to as the Marxist study of the environment.’121 In his early 
publications Vygotsky was fond of citing the closing lines of Leon Trotsky's 
Literature and Revolution (1924) which foresaw the emergence of ‘a higher social 
biological type, or, if you please, a superman' under communism, indicating some 
overlap with Spielrein’s Nietzschean concerns.122 Nietzsche's works were removed 
from Soviet People's Libraries in 1923 but private publishers (which were still 
permitted during the NEP period) continued to print his works.
123 
Spielrein's 
Nietzchean preoccupations, not only draw on common Germanic motifs, but also 
chime with the concerns of early twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia on both 
sides of the revolution.
124
 Etkind cites Nietzsche as the main inspiration for Soviet 
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notions of perfectibility; for conceiving of the human as something that could be 
fundamentally changed.
125
  
 
 There are, however, crucial differences between Trotsky (Vygotsky) and 
Nietzsche (Spielrein). For Nietzsche, the possibility for the ascendance of a 
‘superman’ is premised on the re-instatement of a slave society. He claims that the 
mediocrity of the herd can only be overturned by a return to the social structures of 
the ancient world.
126
 Indeed, in his 1900 essay ‘Something on the Philosophy of the 
‘Superman’’, Trotsky explicitly decried the authoritarian and elitist tenor of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy.127 Spielrein notes that for Nietzsche 'the highest also 
contains the lowest', that both the superman and the 'smallest man' will always 
recur.
128
 In Trotsky’s vision, on the other hand, the transformation is collective; all 
people will ascend to a higher level: ‘Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser 
and subtler […] The average human type will rise to the level of an Aristotle, a 
Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise.’129 Although he 
borrows the term 'superman' from Nietzsche, Trotsky repurposes it, importing it into 
a Marxist framework and emptying it of its originally oppressive characteristics.  
 
 Luria and Vygotsky approached Freud in a similar manner. Etkind describes 
their physical proximity to Spielrein but fails to analyse the theoretical distance 
between their respective arguments about psychoanalysis. For although Luria and 
Vygotsky were sympathetic to and interested in Freud, their works explicitly 
attempted to make Freudian theory compatible with Marxism. The NEP period may 
have been more open than the Stalin-era that was to follow but the fierce debates that 
Luria and Vygotsky actively participated in were already intensely politicised. The 
influence of Spielrein on her younger colleagues can only be speculated upon but an 
analysis of Luria and Vygotsky's reading of Freud’s essay reveals a reliance on an 
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orthodox Marxist-Leninist understanding of historical progression quite alien to 
Spielrein's eroticised, Nietzschean conception of the death instincts.  
 
Life after Death Drive: Luria and Vygotsky Read Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
 
‘The Soviet Union is a besieged fortress, and those who hold this fortress are 
keeping a close check on all imports, including scientific ideas.’130 In the summer of 
1929 the communist psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich spent two months in Moscow. In 
his essay ‘Psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union’ (1929) he reflected on the 
‘contradictory impressions’ gained during his stay in the Soviet capital.131 Reich 
describes encountering a psychological community hostile to psychoanalysis as a 
world-view but amenable to certain Freudian concepts deemed materialist, 
particularly the notion that sexual energy might be sublimated into collective work 
on behalf of the revolution.
132
 This is consistent with Luria’s recollection of the 
appeal of psychoanalysis in the early 1920s:  
Many of Freud's ideas seemed speculative and somewhat fantastic to me, but 
the study of emotional conflicts and complexes using the method of 
associations seemed promising. Here, I thought, was a scientific approach 
that combined a strongly deterministic explanation of concrete, individual 
behaviour with an explanation of the origins of complex human needs in 
terms of natural science.
133
  
 
Nonetheless, psychoanalysis, Reich reports, was attacked for placing too much 
emphasis on sexuality, for prioritising the individual over the collective and for being 
insufficiently practical. A year later the Soviet psychoanalytic experiment was over.  
 
Reich was soon rejected by both psychoanalytic and communist 
establishments: his work was denounced in the German Communist Party press in 
1932 and he was officially expelled from the International Psychoanalytic 
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Association in 1934.
134
 In the preceding years, between 1928 and 1932, Reich 
participated in a discussion group consisting of members of the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society convened by Freud. Richard Sterba, who attended the events, 
later recalled a discussion between Reich and Freud concerning the situation in 
Russia. Sterba guessed that the conversation took place in 1929 or 1930, around the 
time of Reich’s trip to the Soviet Union. Reich was said to have insisted that the 
Oedipus complex was historically contingent; that the abolition of the family would 
entail an abolition of the Oedipus complex. Such a radical reordering of social life, 
Reich declared, was already underway in Soviet Russia.
135
 Freud is reported to have 
responded: 
Nobody knows whether this [transformation] is at all possible. However, 
theoretically it is most improbable. Besides, Reich's proposals are completely 
unpsychological. Economic changes (in the Marxist sense) without 
psychology will not suffice. One also must always consider the influence of 
the past.
136
 
 
Freud’s comment on the past here indicates a fundamental discrepancy between the 
two thinkers. Reich assumed that a transformation of external social conditions 
would immediately transform the internal psychic conditions of people born in that 
context; that changes in the monetary economy would change libidinal economies in 
turn. But for Freud the past survives. In Reich’s account an individual’s past 
stretches back no further than their birth, whereas Freud insisted that the past is both 
more distant and more tenacious.  
  
 This theoretical divergence is explored in Reich’s essay 'Dialectical 
Materialism and Psychoanalysis' (1929), first published in the Russian language 
journal Under the Banner of Marxism. In this essay, Reich expresses his reservations 
with Freud’s conception of the death drive as introduced in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, alluding to the confused reception of Freud’s new speculative theorisation 
of the drives by the psychoanalytic community, which upon its initial publication in 
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German was greeted with bemusement, discomfort and even hostility.
137
 Reich 
describes the tension between life and death as a relationship of assimilation to 
dissimulation: Eros or the life instincts construct and combine whereas the death 
drive decays and decomposes. He calls this dynamic ‘wholly dialectical’.138 Reich 
was, however, troubled by the death drive’s ‘idealistic and metaphysical’ qualities, 
which have, he argued, ‘no obvious material foundation.’139 He therefore proposes a 
materialist re-working of the death drive. Rather than following Freud’s assertion 
that the death drive precedes the pleasure principle, Reich claims that it is instead 
formed in response to it: ‘The destructive instinct, in my view, is a later, secondary 
formation of the organism, determined by the conditions under which the self-
preservation and sexual instincts are satisfied.’140 The death drive is reinvented as a 
product of experience, rather than a pre-existing, more primal instinct. This allows 
Reich to make the claim that the transformation of society through revolution would 
entail the transformation of humanity. He aligns the reality principle with capitalist 
society: 
the reality principle as it exists today is only the principle of our society […] 
the reality principle of the capitalist era imposes upon the proletarian a 
maximum limitation of his needs while appealing to religious values, such as 
modesty and humility […] All this is founded on economic conditions; the 
ruling class has a reality principle which serves the perpetuation of its 
power.
141
 
 
Reich thus re-imagines the opposition between life and death instincts as one 
between inside (psyche) and outside (social), which he says is ultimately resolvable. 
Reich assumes that a revolution in social and psychic life would be capable of 
erasing all that came before.   
 
 Four years before Reich published this discussion of the death drive, Luria 
and Vygotsky wrote their Introduction to Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Although 
they did not share Reich’s interest in sexuality, Luria and Vygotsky similarly mapped 
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the Freudian conflict between 'conservative biological' tendencies and 'progressive 
sociological'
142
 influences onto a Marxist conception of the tension between subject 
and environment. They characterised the tension between the pleasure principle and 
the reality principle as 'the whole dialectic of the organism'.
143
 Freud’s theory is 
translated to become a theorisation of environmental adaptation; the internal pleasure 
principle is regulated by the external demands of the reality principle. As in Reich’s 
essay, this reading demands a neat dichotomy be drawn between internal and 
external and between the biological and the social, which glosses over the 
complexities of Freud’s essay. Luria and Vygotsky substitute the reality principle for 
reality, setting up a neat subject-object relation that does not have a counterpart in 
Freud’s text.  For Freud, the reality principle might be formed as a shield against 
external stimuli, but it is an internalised aspect of the organism. Conversely, by 
erecting a neat division between inside and outside, Luria and Vygotsky were able to 
suggest it might be possible to escape the conservatism of the instincts Freud insists 
upon. In a bold utopian move, they attempt to look beyond the reality principle. For 
them, the capacity for change lies in the external material environment. Luria and 
Vygotsky do observe that Freud’s insistence on the conservative character of the 
instincts could lead to the conclusion that his ‘concepts are permeated with the 
psychology of hopeless pessimism'.
144
 Yet they throw this potential accusation ‘out 
of court’,145  attempting to find a way past it by claiming that transforming external 
conditions could ultimately result in a fundamental transformation of human 
psychology:   
The only forces which make it possible to escape from this state of biological 
conservatism and which may propel us toward progress and activity, are 
external forces, in our terms, the external conditions of the material 
environment in which the individual exists. It is they that represent the true 
basis of progress, it is they that create the real personality and make us adapt 
and work out new forms of psychic life.
146
 
 
Luria and Vygotsky's attempt to bypass the conservatism of the instincts here 
conforms to what Jacqueline Rose, presumably unaware of this early Soviet 
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intervention, identifies as a tendency that runs throughout the history of Marxist 
readings of Freud: 
The alternate discarding or reification of the unconscious has been the 
constant refrain of the Freudian left […] historically, whenever the political 
argument is made for psychoanalysis, this dynamic is polarised into a crude 
opposition between inside and outside – a radical Freudianism always having 
to argue that the social produces the misery of the psychic in a one-way 
process, which utterly divests the psychic of its own mechanisms and drives. 
Each time the psychoanalytic description of internal conflict and psychic 
division is referred to its social conditions, the latter absorb the former, and 
the unconscious shifts in that same moment – from the site of a division into 
the vision of an ideal unity to come.
147
 
 
By equating Eros with the social and the death drive with the biological, they also 
skate over the lasting implications of the death drive, the major theoretical 
contribution of Freud’s essay. They fail to look beyond the pleasure principle at all. 
Beyond for Freud, indicates something behind, beneath and before - ‘more primitive, 
more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle’148 – whereas they are 
looking somewhere ahead, above and after into a bright yet ephemeral emancipated 
ideal unity to come. 
 
 Luria and Vygotsky describe the on-going tension between life and death as 
being 'responsible for the distinctive 'spiral' development of the human being.'
149
 
Spirals litter the pages of Soviet discussions of dialectical development. As Lenin 
states in ‘On the Question of Dialectics’, first published in 1925 in the journal 
Bolshevik: ‘Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, 
which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral.’150 The image of the spiral 
gestures towards the negation of the negation, a process that simultaneously 
overcomes and preserves the past, dragging it forwards and thus transforming it in 
the process. In Capital, Volume I Marx argued that capitalism would lead to 
socialism through a process of negation.
151
 Luria and Vygotsky proclaim that they 
intend to take a similar approach to psychoanalysis, identifying the ‘materialistic 
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buds’ sprouting from Freud’s ‘bourgeois’ theory.152 Engels explains the concept of 
the negation of the negation in Anti-Dühring by way of a similar biological metaphor 
(which recalls the metaphors employed by Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit). 
Engels imagines a grain of barley, which, when planted in suitable soil undergoes a 
change and germinates: ‘the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its 
place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain’.153 This 
plant then goes on to produce further grains of barley, ‘and as soon as these have 
ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the 
negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but 
ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.’154 This quantitative improvement might also, he claims, 
become a qualitative improvement. Here he uses the example of flowers, which can 
through the ‘gardener’s art’ produce not only more but improved seeds. Lenin 
describes the interaction with the past implied by these kinds of processes as an 
‘apparent’, rather than an actual, ‘return to the old.’155  
 
 The Freudian compulsion to repeat does superficially have a correlate in the 
negation of the negation. Paradoxically, for Freud, the organism’s move away from 
the most primitive instincts is propelled by repressed instincts which seek to repeat 
themselves in the present, but, crucially, are never satisfied. The repetition is always 
a faint echo of the original – ‘no sublimation will suffice to remove the repressed 
instincts persisting tension’ – for there is always a gap between ‘the pleasure of 
satisfaction demanded and that which is actually achieved’.156 Transference and 
sublimation are repetitions that are never identical to the original repressed event. 
For Freud, the transformation, however, moves in the opposite direction to that 
described by Engels: both quality and quantity are diminished, rather than enlarged 
and improved. This inevitable disappointment might occasion forward propulsion, 
but it is never entirely liberated from the past. Indeed, Freud challenges the entire 
notion of progress as improvement altogether, stating that 'it is often merely a matter 
of opinion when we declare that one stage of development is higher than another', 
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arguing instead that ‘all that is most precious in human civilization’ is simply the by-
product of repressed instincts.
157
 In his 1930 essay Civilization and its Discontents, 
Freud’s discussion makes clear that the kinds of biological metaphors employed by 
Engels do not adequately capture the temporality of the unconscious: 
 The embryo cannot be discovered in the adult. The thymus gland of 
childhood is replaced after puberty by connective tissue, but is no longer 
present in itself; in the marrow-bones of the grown man I can, it is true, trace 
the outline of the child’s bone, but it itself has disappeared, having 
lengthened and thickened until it has attained its definitive form.
158
 
 
The unconscious resists such metaphorical description because it is characterised by 
simultaneity rather than succession; it preserves ‘all the earlier stages alongside of 
the final form’.159 Luria and Vygotsky’s model of advancement is closer to Engels’s 
than Freud’s, as their understanding of progress is premised on a past that transforms 
at each stage of development, rather than persisting, however buried and directly 
inaccessible, in its original form.  
 
 Vygotsky likens the transition from childhood to adolescence to the 
caterpillar's transformation into a butterfly. This qualitative transition, he insists, 
combines creation with destruction, life with death: 'The complex merging of 
processes of dying and being born interwoven one with the other.'
160
 Despite his 
general hostility to psychoanalysis, Vygotsky does acknowledge the importance of 
Freud's conception of the death drive here. This he frames as a question of 
negativity. Yet he claims that to conceive of death negatively, as the inverse of life as 
'an empty hole, a gaping spot’, is the problem with most traditional biological 
accounts of death.
161
 Freud's theory is valuable for recognising the positive value of 
death: 'death is a fact that has its positive sense as well, it is a special type of being 
and not merely non-being. It is a specific something and not absolutely nothing.'
162
 
Here Vygotsky invokes Engels’s discussion of the Hegelian conception of death in 
The Dialectics of Nature: ‘life is always thought of in relation to its necessary result, 
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death, which is always contained in it in germ. The dialectical conception of life is 
nothing more than this […] Living means dying.’163   
 
 This acknowledgment of the productive co-existence of life and death is not 
reflected in Luria and Vygotsky’s introduction to Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
however. Despite recognising that the tension between life and death prompts 
development, they refuse to accept the existence of a regressive drive, which 
effectively eliminates that opposition. For Freud, the death drive is compelled 
backwards - ‘to restore an earlier state of things.’164 There is ‘no universal instinct 
toward higher development’.165  Freud also insists that the sexual instincts are 
‘difficult to 'educate'’, and explicitly comments in The Future of an Illusion 
(translated into Russian in 1930) that ‘the limitations of man's capacity for education 
set bounds to the effectiveness of [...] a transformation in his culture’.166  These 
stubborn and intractable, backward looking yet utterly untamed qualities are 
anathema to Luria and Vygotsky’s political vision. In Freud’s account civilization is 
built on repression; the compulsion to repeat is thus paradoxically what propels 
civilization forwards. The apparent existence of a progressive tendency in life is the 
result of the dualistic structure of the instincts. The 'marked opposition' between life 
and death is responsible for the impelling thrust Freud’s essay delineates, which he 
describes in the following terms:
167
 
It is as though the life of the organism moved with a vacillating rhythm. One 
group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach the final aim of life as swiftly 
as possible; but when a particular stage in the advance has been reached, the 
other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and thus 
prolong the journey.
168
  
 
Luria and Vygotsky imply that biology is subservient to external forces, that new 
forms of society could fundamentally re-configure humanity and overcome the 
inertia of the instincts. They fail to note that for Freud the interaction between the 
organism and the external world generates change, and that the propulsive result of 
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this interaction is due to the co-existence of contradictory trajectories. The instincts 
may be immutable and the unconscious without temporality, but the organism Freud 
describes is not therefore impervious to change. Luria and Vygotsky’s attempt to 
politically radicalise Freud drains it of the thrusting tension between opposing 
drives, precisely the element of the text they praise for being dialectical in the first 
place. They replace dualism with monism and are left with a stagnant dialectic 
curiously devoid of tension.  
 
 For Freud, life emerged out of inorganic matter and strives to return there. 
This does posit a time of reconciliation: the time before life began. The death drive, 
he writes, 'was brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance'.
169
 
Freud’s understanding of death as inorganic nature, his speculative vision of a 
universe preceding life as such, should not, however, be confused with the death 
drive; the death drive is not identical with death. Death precedes and succeeds life, 
whereas the death drive and life instincts are mutually constituted and coextensive. 
The death drive, governed by the Nirvana principle, might be impelled to reduce 
tensions but its interaction with life counter-intuitively produces them. Freud 
describes the emergence of the death drive by way of a biological analogy. He 
imagines a tiny cell which, in order to survive, must form a protective shield against 
external stimuli. The death drive is born of the non-identity of living organisms with 
their inorganic surroundings. In forming this mediating layer, Freud states that the 
organism’s ‘outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, 
becomes to some degree inorganic.’170 In order to survive, life is coated in a layer of 
death. Like the internalised death drive of which it is a precursor, this inorganic 
‘crust’ functions to protect life rather than foreshorten it. For Freud, as long as there 
is life there is antagonism. Death itself might be inert but as a drive inherent to 
organic existence it generates friction and produces change. Although Freud claims 
there is an innate urge to return to inanimate nature, this is coupled with the desire to 
die one’s ‘natural death’. The life instincts thus paradoxically perform the function 
of 'myrmidons of death', chaperoning the organism through the dangerous external 
world.
171
 The death drive is not a suicidal tendency but instead impels the organism 
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to take a series of long detours in order to safely reach its final predetermined 
destination. As Derrida observes in his forensic analysis of Freud’s discussion of the 
death drive in The Postcard, life in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is understood as 
‘an accident of death.’172 Freud's insistence that death is internal to life explains why 
organisms resist the urge to die immediately; why the death drive takes 'the 
deceptive appearance of being forces tending towards change and progress, whilst in 
fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new.'
173 
For Freud, the changes that occur in living things are conditioned by the stasis of the 
inorganic; the apparently progressive tendencies of living things are a product of 
their desire to return to an original quiescent state. Ultimately, this inert state is less 
significant than the paths that the organism takes to get there. Dying means living.  
 
 
  The potentially dialectical qualities of Freud's text therefore reside in the 
'sharp distinction' between life and death instincts and the opposition of construction 
and destruction that they embody: 'one constructive or assimilatory and the other 
destructive or dissimilatory'.
174
  The death drive negates. For Freud, as for Hegel, 
'tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts [the Subject] into 
Being’; beings paradoxically contain and are conditioned by both being and non-
being.
175
 In their discussion of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Luria and Vygotsky 
sketch out a development that transforms dialectically at every stage, but they drain 
this movement of negativity and thus point to a moment of final reconciliation, 
implicitly positing the emergence of a final communist society without continuing 
tensions, contradictions and negations.  Instead of imagining a reconciled moment 
prior to life (death as inorganic nature) Luria and Vygotsky’s discussion of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle situates that moment in the future (life under communism). 
This implied vision of the future thus emerges as closer to Freud’s image of death 
than to the death drive; communism is envisaged as a final product rather than an 
ongoing process. The historical textures of the unfolding present are thus 
subordinated to an idealised moment to come. Beyond the pages of their text, 
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however, the historical realities of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia already pulled 
against their framework for understanding psychological and historical development.  
 
History and Human Conflicts 
 
Derrida visited the Soviet Union in 1990. His reflections on the experience of 
visiting Moscow are framed in relation to the history of travelogues of the Soviet 
Capital. According to Derrida, these narratives are distinct from the genre of travel 
writing in that they represent 'something quite other than a trip to a particular country 
or a determined culture' but instead constitute a quest for universal meaning, for the 
Absolute.
176
 The USSR is, he says, 'a properly political name. I know of no other 
example of a comparable phenomenon in the history of the world.'
177
 To travel to 
Soviet Moscow was thus not only to journey to a foreign city but to seek a mythic 
ahistorical space, a space purged of anachronism. Shortly after this visit, and after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, he delivered the lecture Spectres of Marx, declaring 
that the collapse of state socialism signalled the end of a particular understanding of 
history - the end of a faith in the Absolute. In its wake time was left in tatters: ‘time 
is disarticulated, dislocated, dislodged, time is run down, on the run and run down, 
deranged, both out of order and mad. Time is off its hinges, time is off course, beside 
itself, disadjusted.'
178
  But if the Soviet Union was an idea it was also a place. 
Derrida acknowledges 'an interval between a logic of the concrete universal (the 
incarnation of a cause in the singular history of a 'chosen fatherland') and a logic that 
abstracts the universal from all national particularity.'
179
 Derrida begins his essay 
'Fort/Da', invoking the child's game described by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, and analysed by Derrida in The Postcard. For Freud, the game is cited as 
an example of unpleasurable repetition, the repetitive logic of which Derrida claims 
also structures Freud’s argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In Derrida’s 
essay on Moscow, the ‘fort’ (gone/away) and ‘da’ (here again) represents the interval 
between abstract and concrete spaces: 'The 'over there' is the future of the absolute 
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'here' towards which this voyage tends.'
180
 Derrida perceived that the idea of history 
that the Soviet Union claimed to have incarnated was always in tension with lived 
reality. In practice, as the example of the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society suggests, 
the Soviet Union was never purged of anachronism. The example of Luria’s research 
activities, in contrast to the neat progressive narratives that animate his theoretical 
engagements with Freud, also bear this out.  
 
  Horace Kallen, who visited the Soviet Union in 1928, recalled meeting Luria 
in his ‘dingy room’ in which he and his wife ‘slept and cooked and ate and worked’, 
preparing their meals on a primus stove whilst earning subsistence level wages.
181
 
Kallen remarked upon the irony that those people upon ‘whom avowedly the new 
Russia depends for a happy and prosperous future’ were forced to live in such 
insalubrious conditions, reflecting that this gap between future promise and lived 
reality explained ‘why whatever Moscow gayety one encountered seemed so 
forced.’182 As Freud later commented in ‘On The Question of a Weltanschauung’ 
(1933): 'In just the same way as religion, Bolshevism too must compensate its 
believers for the sufferings and deprivations of their present life by promises of a 
better future in which there will no longer be any unsatisfied need.'
183
 
 
 As Kallen and Freud both perceived, Soviet enthusiasm for communism was 
tied to the promise of a future to come and not commensurate with the privations of 
everyday life. But not everyone was capable of focusing their gaze hopefully on the 
distant horizon. Although by Freud’s definition, violence and aggression could be 
understood without moving beyond the pleasure principle, he does suggest, like 
Spielrein, that an analogy exists between the ‘great opposition’ of life and death 
instincts and the similarly polarised relation between love and hate.
184
 Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle asks whether sadism and masochism might be considered as 
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‘displaced’ examples of a death instinct.185 The notes of the Moscow Psychoanalytic 
Society attest to the psychic impact of the harsh present. On May 13 1926, for 
instance, a paper was delivered in Moscow discussing the case of a patient who had 
burnt herself to death: ‘The writer thought that in this case—that of a girl whom an 
obsessional impulse drove to commit suicide by burning—illustrates the isolated 
operation of the destructive instinct.’186 The speaker insisted that this was an 
‘isolated’ incident, however, implying that the operation of a destructive instinct 
should not be interpreted as a universal phenomenon.  
 
 Luria’s Nature of Human Conflicts: Emotion, Conflict and Will (1932), based 
on experiments conducted at the State Institute of Experimental Psychology between 
1923 and 1930 and dedicated to Kallen, provides a troubling insight into the violence 
and confusion of the period. No book based on this research was published in 
Russian, suggesting that by the time Luria came to write up his research the insights 
it contained were too troubling to see the light of day. Luria’s theoretical frameworks 
may have adhered to the party line but the world he observed failed to do so (this 
discrepancy would cause him more serious problems in the 1930s, as Chapters 2 and 
3 discuss). He described the book in a letter to his friend Sergei Eisenstein as a work 
on ‘criminals, examinations, internal neuroses and other dishonourable types.’187 
Although the research upon which the book is based overlapped with Luria’s 
engagement with psychoanalysis, his methodology owed more to Pavlov than to 
Freud.
188
  
 
 The first set of experiments discussed by Luria were conducted with students 
waiting to undergo examination as part of the Communist Party’s 1924 purge 
(literally cleansing [chistka]) of students in the higher schools. This intended to 
eliminate counter-revolutionary ‘bourgeois’ forces from educational institutions, 
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resulting in the expulsion of 18,000 students from Russian institutions.
189
 Students 
were interrogated on their class and academic backgrounds and their political 
convictions before the commission decided whether to expel them from the 
institution. Here the transition to a shiny and pure communist society is shown to be 
hampered by murky hangovers from the pre-revolutionary era. Luria and his team 
plucked people directly from the examination queues in the hope of gaining an 
insight into the psychic impact of this situation. His results focus on the physical 
agitation and excitability of the subjects. He presented them with a series of words 
and found that those most closely pertaining to the anticipated interrogation - 
including ‘examination’, ‘to surrender’ and ‘commission’ - evoked the most extreme 
physical responses.
190
 Luria defined the examination as a traumatic site in which it 
was possible to observe how ‘affect ruptures the organised course of associative 
processes.’191 The purge is shown to have a ‘disorganising’ impact on people’s 
thought processes, reducing them to a state ‘ordinarily foreign to the cultured 
adult.’192 This Bolshevik policy is explicitly declared to have a regressive impact on 
the minds of the students, dragging them back to a more ‘primitive’ level. Luria here 
describes an inverse trajectory to that imagined in his Introduction to Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. He draws conclusions which directly contradict the optimistic 
progressive assumptions animating his and Vygotsky’s critique of Freud.  
 
 Luria then goes on to discuss results obtained during a series of experiments 
conducted with criminals, mostly murderers, whom he assessed shortly after their 
arrests. We hear of a man who killed his wife in ‘order to obtain use of her things’,193 
a woman who pays a neighbour 18 roubles to smash her husband’s skull open and 
deposit his body in a pond, a man killed with a sledge-hammer whose blood 
splattered body is found abandoned in the snow, and the half-dressed body of a 
woman with a crushed head shoved into bin by a man who, after seducing her, 
suspected her of picking his pocket. The most bizarre case Luria describes dates 
from 1927 when a corpse in a basket was delivered to the main railway station in 
Moscow. After its discovery the husband of the murdered woman received an 
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anonymous note containing a baggage coupon informing him where ‘he might 
obtain his wife’.194 In this instance, as no-one had confessed to the crime, Luria 
interviewed four suspects and the results of his experiments were used to make a 
conviction.  
 
 As in the purge commission experiments, he proceeded by recording 
reactions to a series of words, concluding that those which directly referred to the 
circumstances of the murder provoked the most pronounced responses. For example, 
in the case of the woman found half-naked in a bin the words ‘garbage’ and ‘dress’ 
most agitated the respondent.
195
 His experiments are primarily designed to facilitate 
confession. As with the students awaiting examination, Luria declares the psychic 
state of the criminal as a regression to an earlier stage of development.
196
  Luria 
relays these brutal acts in a detached matter-of-fact tone but it is possible to discern 
in Luria’s sparse descriptions of the murders the poverty and privations of NEP-era 
Moscow that formed the backdrop to these incidents. The strange and violent acts 
described in the book involve mistrust between neighbours, sexual aggression and 
material want. They certainly do not seem to portend the emergence of a new kind of 
human, free from violent impulses.  
 
 Luria has no interest in probing why people committed murder but only in 
whether they committed a murder. In the procedure devised by Luria, in the absence 
of a verbal confession, the criminal’s body gives the game away. His discussion of 
these cases thus focuses on the capacity for concealment, understood as a deliberate, 
conscious process. Luria’s discussion is based on the assumption that the criminal is 
primarily concerned with concealing their actions from the police, he does not 
engage with psychoanalytic understandings of repression or resistance. He has no 
interest in what motivated these gory acts, nor in their long-term psychic impact on 
the individuals accused of committing them. Furthermore, his emphasis on motor 
responses implies that a transparent relationship exists between body and mind, 
experience and memory. Luria’s model for understanding human behaviour allows 
him to observe agitation and distress but not to interpret or ameliorate it. In contrast 
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to those, like Solms, who claim that Luria’s work retained a psychoanalytic bent 
even after his public dismissal of Freud, these experiments indicate that Luria’s 
engagement with psychoanalysis was always piecemeal and selective even before he 
was forced to renounce it completely. 
 
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud differentiates between a ‘naive 
theory of shock’ that treats trauma as ‘direct damage to the molecular structure,’ and 
the psychoanalytic approach which seeks to understand ‘the effects produced by the 
breach in the shield against stimuli and by the problems that follow in its train.’197 
Luria’s ‘naive’ analysis of excitation differs from Freud’s in that he does not address 
himself to these effects and problems. His understanding also lacks any 
consideration of cathexis and binding, of the transformations in energy that occur 
when an organism’s barriers are breached. By drawing on Freud’s theories Luria may 
have been able to interpret rather than merely describe the violent actions and 
experiences of the people upon whom he experimented. In his clinical work in the 
1920s, Luria did not deny the brutality of Soviet life but he made no attempt to 
discern its origins or mitigate its consequences. In this respect, Freud was far more 
attentive to the impact of history on human psychology.  
 
 The Nature of Human Conflicts lacks the overarching meta-historical 
framework that informed Luria’s engagements with Freud discussed in this chapter. 
It therefore side-steps the uncomfortable question of how to reconcile these 
examples of regression and aggression with his framework for understanding the 
progressive movement of history. Instead, a similarly progressive model of 
development is transferred from the historical on to the individual, which allows 
Luria to acknowledge regressions as isolated deviations from a normative trajectory. 
Yet Luria’s analysis of individual development has implications for his 
conceptualisation of historical development elsewhere, for the individuals he 
describes, by his own oft-repeated definition of human psychology, were not external 
to history. As he unequivocally states in ‘Psychoanalysis as a System of Monisitc 
Psychology’: ‘Marxism sees the individual as an inseparable element of and an 
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active force in history.’198 The utopian assumptions that animate his discussions of 
Freud, which insist that the instinctual conservatism Freud identifies are merely the 
‘vestiges’ of a particular social system, is complicated by the individual cases 
described in The Nature of Human Conflicts.
199
 In their introduction to Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle Luria and Vygotsky concluded by remarking that ‘[b]ourgeois 
science is giving birth to materialism’.200 In practice, however, Luria failed to 
overcome the gap between ‘substance and spirit’ that he identified with the bourgeois 
approach.
201
  
 
Limping to the Future 
 
History is the unity of continuity and discontinuity. Society stays alive, not 
despite its antagonism but by means of it.
202
 
 
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics 
 
On 19
th
 January 1918 Sabina Spielrein wrote to Jung and told him of the following 
dream: 
I no longer dream of prison, but of new houses, airy and spacious, surrounded 
by many green meadows. Once I dreamed that the Gazette de Lausanne 
contained the following cartoon in colour: in the foreground a German 
general, forceful, furiously determined, energetic, and behind him the 
Russian […] with his army, just like Christ, full of idealism and goodness. 
The Russian soldiers were listening to him, but not one of them stirs. The 
caption read “Why the Russians lost”. I woke up laughing, because the 
cartoon was most telling, and said to myself, “Do you know why the 
Russians lost? Because they believed too much in human goodness and other 
ideals and therefore dreamed instead of acting.”203 
 
Spielrein's generation dreamed of new houses, airy and spacious, but many found 
themselves in prison or worse. Spielrein’s brother, the prominent industrial 
psychologist Isaac Spielrein, was killed in Stalin’s purges. She and her daughters 
were shot by Nazi occupying forces in her home town Rostov-on-Don in 1942. The 
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Bolsheviks attempted to act on the dream of a better world. Yet, as we have seen, a 
stark discrepancy between dream and reality persisted, a discrepancy which 
continues to animate the discussions of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
 
 In The Future of an Illusion Freud declared his argument was not intended as 
a comment on the ‘great experiment in civilization’ occurring in Russia. He was 
nonetheless clear that ‘every civilization must be built up on coercion and 
renunciation of instinct’, and dismissive of those who would argue that ‘a re-
ordering of human relations’ might overcome the necessarily repressive character of 
civilization.
204
 As he noted in a letter in the late 1920s: 
In spite of all my dissatisfaction with the present economic system I have no 
hope that the road pursued by the Soviets will lead to improvement. Indeed 
any such hope that I may have cherished had disappeared in this decade of 
Soviet rule.
205
 
 
Despite Luria and Vygotsky's optimistic insistence on the transformation of human 
nature, the oft-repeated Soviet injunction to make sacrifices in the present in order to 
reap the eventual benefits of the bright Communist future has a clear correspondence 
to Freud's reality principle, which demands the 'temporary toleration of unpleasure as 
a step on the long indirect road to pleasure'.
206
 Reflecting on the 'Soviet experiment', 
Freud noted: 'We have been deprived by it of a hope – and an illusion – and we have 
received nothing in exchange.'
207
 Yet shorn of its illusions perhaps there is still some 
hope to be gleaned from beneath the wreckage of the Soviet experiment. 
 
 In the conclusion of his discussion of psychoanalysis, Vygotsky recalls 
Freud’s final image from Beyond the Pleasure Principle: ‘What we cannot reach 
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flying we must reach limping…The Book tells us it is no sin to limp.’208 Vygotsky 
claims that it is possible to observe beneath the limping movement of Freud’s essay, 
the possibility of flight; a vigorous new theory might lurk within the maimed 
structure of psychoanalytic thought. He claims that it took a genius (Marx) to turn 
Hegel's idealism 'on its head, that is, to sever the methodological truth (dialectics) 
from the factual lies, to see Hegel, limping, was approaching the truth.’209 Such 
ingenuity, Vygotsky suggests, might similarly transform Freud. However, Vygotsky's 
desire to transform the limping movement of Freud's theory into unencumbered 
flight captures the contradiction at the heart of his and Luria's approach to Freud: 
they extol the dialectical qualities of psychoanalysis while simultaneously banishing 
them, attempting to substitute the uneven rhythm of the limp for the homogeneous 
equilibrium of flight. This banishes the truly dialectical element of Freud's text: its 
negativity. Instead, it might be desirable (or at least necessary) to retain arduous and 
irregular rhythm of the limp.  
  
 In a recent discussion of the composition and theoretical genesis of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, based on analysis of a hitherto unexamined early draft of 
Freud’s essay, Ulrike May suggests that one of the major motivations for conceiving 
of the existence of the death drive was Freud’s increasing preoccupation with the 
limits of psychoanalytic practice. May reads Beyond the Pleasure Principle as ‘a 
theoretical turning point, at whose core lies a new conceptualisation of the efficacy 
of psychoanalysis’.210 In her compelling account the death drive emerges from 
Freud’s struggle to reconcile theory with practice. This chapter has identified a gap 
between the progressive theoretical framework proposed by Luria in his readings of 
Freud and his clinical observations of the same period. Unlike Freud, however, Luria 
did not revise his theoretical model on the basis of his empirical observations. 
Perhaps doing so would have enabled him to develop a theory committed to 
revolutionary practice that was also capable of acknowledging its limitations and 
failures, perhaps even of acknowledging the potentially generative capacities of the 
oppositions, negations and regressions that animate Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
                                                 
208
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in Psychology’, p. 261. 
209
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After all, Freud did not simply abandon psychoanalytic work in the face of his 
increasing ‘therapeutic pessimism’.211  
                                                                                                                                          
210
 Ulrike May, ‘The Third Step in Drive Theory: On the Genesis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle,’ 
Psychoanalysis and History, 17, 2 (2015), 205-272, p. 219. Thanks to Matt Ffytche for sharing this 
article with me prior to its publication.  
211
 May, p. 219. 
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Chapter 2   
The ‘Primitive’: Between Emancipation and Domination 
 
 
 
The beginner who has learned a new language always translates it back into 
his mother tongue, but he assimilates the spirit of the new language and 
expresses himself freely in it only when he moves in it without recalling the 
old and when he forgets his native tongue.
1
 
  
 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852 
 
New times demand new people. In the Soviet Union, new people are coming 
into being.
2
 
 
Langston Hughes, A Negro Looks at Central Asia, 1934  
 
Humanity imagines there is nothing in the desert, that it is merely somewhere 
boring and wild where a sad shepherd lies half-asleep in the dark above a 
muddy sunken plain on which human tragedies once unfolded - and that even 
these have now run their course […] Here by the Amu-Darya, however, as 
well as in Sary-Kamysh, there existed an entire, difficult world, caught up in 
a destiny of its own.
3
 
 
 Andrei Platonov, Soul, 1935  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ in Karl Marx/Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 11 (New York, NY; International Publishers, 1979), trans. by Clemens Dutt, pp. 
99-197, p. 104. 
2
 Langston Hughes, A Negro Looks at Central Asia (Moscow International Publishers, 1934) p. 40 
cited in Kate A. Baldwin, Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between 
Black and Red, 1922-1963 (Durham, NC; Duke University Press, 2002), p. 95. 
3
 Andrey Platonov, Soul, trans. by Robert and Elizabeth Chandler and Olga Emerson, with Jane 
Chamberlain, Olga Kouznetsova and Eric Naiman (London; Harvill Press, 2003), pp. 46-47. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1931 and 1932, Alexander Luria led two psychological expeditions to Soviet 
Central Asia. He hoped to trace the changes in thought he assumed would 
accompany the social alterations wrought by the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932), 
the Soviet Union’s ‘second revolution’.4 Luria hoped that this moment of rapid 
social upheaval would provide him with the material to support his theoretical 
insistence on the historical contingency of human thought. He described his 
experiments as  
a statement of the fundamental shifts that had occurred in human 
consciousness during a vigorous realignment of social history – the rapid 
realignment of a class society and a cultural upheaval creating hitherto 
unimagined perspectives for social development.
5
 
 
The experiments set out to show that thought structures were tied to material  
conditions, framing psychology as a ‘science of social history’.6 Moreover, Luria  
intended to show that increased literacy levels, new forms of collective labour and  
exposure to modern technology not only changed but improved people’s thought  
processes, introducing the capacity for abstract thought and thus prompting an ascent  
to a more advanced cognitive stage:   
studying not only the peculiarities of psychological processes but, what is 
more important, the very dynamics of the transition from the more 
elementary psychological laws to the more complex processes […] connected 
with socialistic growth.
7
  
 
Vygotsky, who was involved in the conception of the project but too ill to travel with  
the group, heralded the study as an unprecedented investigation of ‘historical  
phylogeny’, in which a cultural transformation that would ordinarily occur over  
many generations could be witnessed on the ontogenetic level, in the lifetime of an  
individual.
8
 
                                                 
4
 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London; Penguin, 1968), p. 296. 
5
 A.R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, trans. by Martin Lopez-
Morillas and Lynn Solotaroff (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 19. 
6
 Luria, Cognitive Development, p. 12. 
7
 A.R. Luria, ‘The Second Psychological Expedition to Central Asia,’ Journal of Genetic Psychology, 
44 (1934), pp. 255-259, p. 255. 
8
 Vygotsky to Luria, August 1 1931, cited in Elena Luria, Moi Otets: A.R. Luria [My Father: A.R. 
Luria] (Moscow; Gnosis, 1994), p. 61. The historically unprecedented character of the experiments 
(and, implicitly, the First Five Year Plan) is echoed in a letter Luria sent to Horace Kallen, see, Luria 
to Kallen, October 28 1931, Cincinnati, OH, American Jewish Archives (AJA), Horace Kallen 
Papers, MS-1, Box 19, Folder 18. 
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 Luria’s expeditions, funded by a range of state-run institutions, were part of a 
flow of experts from a range of disciplines who travelled from Russia’s Western 
metropolitan centres to remote parts of the Soviet Union as emissaries of the 
revolution.
9
 The Central Asian expeditions were Luria's most explicitly political 
endeavour; an attempt to demonstrate the cognitive benefits of collectivisation.  Yet 
despite his declared allegiance with the grand Stalinist project, Luria's work in 
Central Asia was denounced in the Soviet Union. David Joravsky characterises the 
attacks on Luria as part of the ‘vituperative spirit of the 1930s.’10 Luria’s research 
papers were taken for examination by The Culture and Propaganda Department of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Kult’prop) as part of a larger 
inspection of the Institute of Psychology in Moscow. Following the investigation, he 
was accused of ‘all mortal sins’ including racism, colonialism and an over reliance 
on ‘bourgeois’ Western theories.11 Luria reflected that this was part of a project to 
discredit him as a scientist committed to the Soviet cause. He wrote to the People’s 
Commissar for Education to plead his case, explaining that the judgments against 
him had been based on research in its ‘raw form’ and interpreted without any 
understanding of the methodologies or intentions of the project.
12
  This was to no 
avail: the experiments were  declared harmful to the construction of a national 
culture in Uzbekistan. In the words of one ideologue: 
This pseudo-scientific, anti-Marxist and class-hostile theory in practice leads 
to the anti-Soviet conclusion that the policy of the Soviet Union is being 
accomplished by people and classes who think primitively, who are incapable 
of any abstract thinking, which, it goes without saying, is utterly at odds with 
reality.
13
   
 
As Raymond Bauer discusses, the wild accelerationist pace of the First Five Year  
Plan was accompanied by a new intolerance for any acknowledgement of a gap  
                                                 
9
 On state-funded artistic projects undertaken during the First Five Year Plan, see Maria Gough, 
‘Radical Tourism: Sergei Tret’iakov at the Communist Lighthouse’, October, 118 (2006), 159–178. 
On ‘communist missionaries’ from other disciplines, see ‘The Conquerers of Backwardness’, Yuri 
Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University 
Press, 1994), pp. 187-300. Luria’s expeditions were backed by the People's Commissariat of 
Education of the Uzbek Socialist Republic and the Government of Uzbekistan. See, Luria, 'Second 
Psychological Expedition…’, p. 255. 
10
 Joravsky, Russian Psychology: A Critical History (Oxford; Blackwell, 1989), p. 365. See also, 
Alexei Kozulin, Psychology in Utopia: Toward a Social History of Soviet Psychology (Cambridge, 
MA; MIT Press, 1984), p. 110. 
11
 E. Luria, Moi Otets, p. 67 
12
 E. Luria, Moi Otets, p. 67 
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between the imperfect present and the communist future. Although Luria was  
enthusiastically attempting to trace positive changes in consciousness, his  
experiments still described communism as a work in progress, whereas  
psychologists’ findings were now expected to describe the already realised ideal  
Soviet subject.
14 
 
 
  The eventual suppression of this research should not, however, obscure the  
extent to which Luria and his team were active and enthusiastic participants in the  
Soviet project. Indeed, despite describing the ‘backwardness’ of Uzbek people who  
had not yet been exposed to the new forms of life being ushered in by the First Five  
Year Plan, Luria insisted that dramatic changes in thought processes could already be  
observed in Central Asia. He declared the situation ‘a genuine revolution in  
cognitive activity’,15 describing a psychic upheaval as transformative as the political  
shifts to which it was tied. Luria wrote excitedly to the American anthropologist  
Melville Herskovits in 1932: 
We have in the USSR extremely interesting and happy conditions to study 
the process of very deep and very quick changes in the psychological 
processes of the periphic [sic] nations. The process of collectivization of 
economic forms and industrialisation, the socialistic reconstruction of life 
does involve real changes in the mind.
16
 
 
Paradoxically, however, Luria conceived of the imposition of a particular mode of  
life and thought as a form of liberation.  For Luria, the transition to abstract thinking  
did not represent a process of assimilation but of emancipation. Only by developing  
the capacity to think abstractly would Uzbek people be capable of actively shaping  
historical development, but if psychology, as Luria claimed, is a science of social  
history then these utopian notions should be understood in the fraught and  
increasingly brutal historical context in which his experiments were conducted. In  
                                                                                                                                          
13
 Razmayslov, ‘O Kulturno-istoricheskoi teorii’ Vygotskogo i Luriia’ [‘On the Cultural-Historical 
Theory of Vygotsky and Luria’] Kniga i proletarskaia revolutsiia, 4 (1934), 82-84 cited in Joravsky, 
p. 365, p. 367. 
14
 See, Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University 
Press, 1952), pp. 107-114. The shift in psychology that accompanied the onset of the First Five Year 
Plan had counterparts across disciplinary fields. As Loren Graham declares: ‘The greatest change in 
scientific establishment of the Soviet Union occurred in the years of the Cultural Revolution, 1928-
31’. Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 93. 
15
 Luria, Cognitive Development, p. vi. 
16
 Luria to Herskovits, April 19
 
1932, Chicago, Northwestern University Archives (NUA), Mellville J. 
Herskovits Papers,  General, 1906-1942, Box 13, Folder 4, 1931-1935. 
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the 1920s, as discussed in Chapter 1, Luria’s theoretical frameworks were already  
unable to account for historical reality. This contradiction became starker in the  
period of the First Five Year Plan when brutality of the Soviet regime increased.  
 
In Negative Dialectics Theodor Adorno describes the antagonism between  
consciousness and the existing state of things in the following terms:  
The power of the status quo puts up facades into which our consciousness 
crashes. It must seek to crash through them […] Where the thought 
transcends the bonds it tied in resistance – there is its freedom.17  
 
This statement captures a tension inherent in Luria's research project in Central Asia. 
On the one hand, he presented abstract thinking as something that enabled people to 
smash through the barriers that constitute the status quo. Yet his research practices 
and assumptions about Uzbek culture undermined these proclamations by operating 
with and even helping to construct these facades. Drawing on Lenin, Luria described 
human psychology as a ‘reflection’ of social reality.18 This chapter will trace the 
history of these psychological experiments to ask whether Luria’s research provides 
a mirror image of its Stalinist context or whether his conceptual framework might 
have been capable of crashing through the glass.  
 
Psychology as Social History 
 
There is a marked dissonance between the time in which Luria wrote his report on 
the expeditions to Central Asia (published in Russian in 1974 and in English in 
1976) and the time in which he conducted the experiments.
19
 Following the 
expeditions, short bulletins appeared in contemporary English-language journals,
20  
but due to the suppression of this research in the Soviet Union, a book-length 
account of the experiments did not emerge for more than forty years. Luria 
                                                 
17
 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton (New York, NY; Continuum, 1973), p. 
17. 
18
 See, V.I. Lenin, ‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism’ (1908), Collected Works, vol. 14 (London; 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), p. 137. 
19
 For the Russian original see, A.R. Luria, Ob istoricheskom razvitii poznavatel'nykh protsessov [On 
the Historical Development of Cognitive Processes] (Moscow; Nauka, 1974). 
20
 See, Luria, ‘Psychological expedition to Central Asia’ Science, 74 (1931), 383-384, Luria, 
'Psychological 
Expedition to Central Asia,' Journal of Genetic Psychology, 40, 1 (1932), 241-242, Luria, 'The second 
Psychological Expedition to Central Asia', Science, 78 (1933), 191-192, Luria, 'The second 
Psychological Expedition to Central Asia', Journal of Genetic Psychology, 44 (1934), 255-259. 
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concludes that text with the pronouncement: 'In the past forty years, a backward 
remote region has become an economically and socially developed part of our 
socialist state.'
21
 The political moment of Brezhnev stagnation, when communism 
seemed stable and assured, was a stark contrast to the years of rapid and violent 
change ushered in by the First Five Year Plan, during which the experiments were 
conducted.  
 
The contemporary accounts of Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka, who  
accompanied the second expedition to Central Asia in 1932, capture some of the 
enthusiasm he encountered in the Soviet Union. Upon arrival in Moscow a grand 
reception was thrown where Sergei Eisenstein's paean to collectivisation, The 
General Line was introduced by the director, who had recently returned to Russia 
from a sojourn in the West. Luria had written to Eisenstein in Hollywood to inform 
him of the insights gained on the first expedition, framing the research as a major 
breakthrough: ‘Just think: what we assumed to be natural psychological processes 
(such as perception, comparison, association) are now revealed to be HISTORICAL, 
built in various stages of development! This is a big shift in psychology.’22 In 
Moscow, Koffka claims that the atmosphere among the Soviet psychologists was 
'extremely lively and optimistic. One seems to feel the joint effort of everybody 
proud of what has been achieved, and is being done, now, and planned for the 
future.'
23 Koffka’s notes on the 1932 expedition bluntly state that he was informed by 
an Uzbek representative in Moscow: ‘Nothing achieved by force.’24 It is, however, 
unlikely that Luria and his colleagues were oblivious to the brutal means by which 
collectivisation was achieved.
25
 Indeed, affirmation of the necessity of violence was 
often voiced in official Communist Party documents and in the press. Luria’s own 
biography attests that he was soon to experience the uncompromising wrath of the 
                                                 
21
 Luria, Cognitive Development, p. 164. 
22
 Luria to Eisenstein, July 7 1931, Moscow, The Russian State Archives of Literature and Art 
(RGALI), Sergei Eisenstein Papers, 123-2-11301/2-69.  
23
 Molly Harrower, Kurt Koffka: An Unwitting Self-Portrait (Gainesville, FL; University Presses of 
Florida, 1983), p. 146. Harrower was Koffka’s research assistant. This volume includes their 
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 Akron, Ohio, Archives of the History of American Psychology (AHAP), Kurt Koffka Papers, Box 
M379, ‘Lectures Misc’. 
25
 Thanks to Tatiana Akhutina, a former student and collaborator of Luria’s, for making this 
observation when I presented an early version of this material at the International Society for Cultural 
 96 
 
regime first-hand. This might be difficult to reconcile with the atmosphere of 
excitement and optimism Koffka described but it is precisely the coexistence of 
enthusiasm with violence that this chapter will attempt to confront.  
 
Uwe Gielen and Samvel Jeshmaridian have attacked Luria's experiments in  
Central Asia for their complicity with Stalinism, insisting on the importance of 
acknowledging that Luria and Vygotsky ‘lived in an era when millions of people 
starved to death, were sent to labour camps, were murdered’.26 In advancing this 
argument the authors cite statistics from a single source: Robert Conquest's 
controversial Harvest of Sorrow. This book not only deals with regions of the Soviet 
Union that Luria did not visit
27
 where famine was most acute and peasant resistance 
most intense, but was published before the post-Soviet ‘archive revolution’ and 
subsequently revised by the author himself.
28
 Glen and Jeshmaridian’s article relies 
on juxtaposing de-contextualised numbers and harrowing descriptions of the famine 
induced by collectivisation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan with explicitly ideological 
statements by Luria and Vygotsky.  
 
The authors are correct to observe that the psychologists’ relation to Soviet  
history has been overlooked by most Western secondary literature. However, by 
reducing the nuances and textures of that history to the worst excesses of Stalinism 
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they do little to illuminate the nature of that relation. Instead, their analysis imagines 
Stalinism as a phenomenon so extreme and monolithic that it defies human 
comprehension, which thus seals it off from proper scrutiny. Slavoj Žižek’s 
discussion of the limitations of ‘totalitarianism’ as a hermeneutic tool is apposite 
here:  
[T]he notion of ‘totalitarianism’, far from being an effective theoretical 
concept, is a kind of stopgap: instead of enabling us to think, forcing us to 
acquire a new insight into the historical reality it describes, it relieves us of 
the duty to think, or even actively prevents us from thinking.
29
 
 
Žižek’s remarks suggest that in order to think through the period of the First Five 
Year Plan it is necessary to prise history open and probe its contradictory contents.  
Moshe Lewin identifies this confrontation with contradiction as one of the  
fundamental problems faced by historians of the Stalin era: 
That a progressive ideology, initially intended to enhance human freedom 
and to create higher forms of community, came to serve a police state is one 
of the peculiarities of the period and an important phenomenon to study.
30
 
 
This is not a comfortable endeavour. However, to make sense of Luria’s project and  
its relation to Stalinism, as Alexei Kozulin observes, we must take his commitment  
to the Soviet cause seriously.
31
 Susan Reid has convincingly demonstrated in the  
field of the visual arts, that Western narratives of Soviet intellectuals as a  
‘browbeaten bunch’ meekly kowtowing to the Soviet authorities, fail to account for  
the animated and committed attempts to engage with and implement state policy in  
different fields.
32
 Neither is it helpful to suggest, as Gielen and Jeshmaridian risk  
doing, that support for collectivisation was simply equivalent to the advocation of  
mass murder.  
 
  Attending closely to the historical situation in which Luria conducted his  
experiments makes it possible to explore the uncomfortable tension between  
emancipation and domination, enthusiasm and violence inherent in his project.  
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Gielen and Jeshmaridian claim that Luria’s Marxist convictions ‘blinded’ him to the  
inhumanity of Stalinism, implying a neat disjunction between abstract concepts and  
concrete reality in which the former serve to blot out the latter. But they fail to  
discuss the theoretical questions at stake in Luria’s own research which explicitly  
foregrounded the relationship between the abstract and the concrete. They take  
Luria’s positive proclamations about the First Five Year Plan as evidence of his  
complicity with Stalinism without examining in any detail the methodologies and  
approaches he adopted in Central Asia. Yet it is here that the tension between  
domination and emancipation played out.  
 
Luria is alleged to have telegrammed Vygotsky from Samarkand saying 
simply: ‘The Uzbeks have no illusions!’ The story goes that this message, which 
Luria intended as a summary of his research findings, was intercepted by Soviet 
authorities and interpreted as a condemnation of collectivisation.
33
 Regardless of the 
veracity of this anecdote, the statement does encapsulate how Luria characterised 
Uzbek thought. Ironically, the lack of illusions that Luria identified in Uzbek people 
was precisely what he hoped could be overcome through the transition to the 
socialism. For Luria, illusion, fantasy and imagination were all crucial components 
of advanced thinking. In a letter to the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler in the 
wake of the 1931 expedition he noted: ‘illusions seem to be a function of a culturally 
highly developed psyche’.34  
 
 Luria saw the development of ‘higher’ forms of thought as the fundamental  
psychological question. In Central Asia, Luria intended to trace the transition from 
concrete to abstract thought which he assumed would accompany the social and 
economic changes taking place. This transformation was for him indicative of 
cultural progress, as he assumed that ‘a person capable of abstract thought reflects 
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 99 
 
the external world more profoundly and completely’.35 Luria’s interest in abstract 
thinking was shared by numerous psychologists of the period. Abstraction, similarly 
defined as the ability to classify and order information into pre-determined 
categories, was also central to the work of the German neurologist Kurt Goldstein, 
for example. Anne Harrington argues that Goldstein’s discussions of the capacity for 
abstract thinking in the 1920s and early 1930s, which he viewed as integral to human 
freedom, were imbued with a particular culturally-specific political meaning: ‘a 
reflection of his own liberal hopes for Germany.’36 In Luria’s work abstract thinking 
was also linked to freedom, and the two authors shared a connection to the German 
idealist and romantic traditions discussed by Harrington, but Luria did not couch his 
discussions in the liberal rhetoric of choice favoured by Goldstein. Instead, Luria’s 
writings tethered the capacity for abstract thought to communist hopes for the Soviet 
Union.     
 
According to Luria, abstract thinking allows people to classify objects on the 
basis of an object’s general features, which made it possible for people to think 
beyond the confines of their immediate experiences:  
The appearance of verbal and logical codes enabling one to abstract the  
essential features of objects and thus assign these objects to general  
categories […] and permits conclusions to be drawn from given premises  
without having to resort to immediate graphic-functional experience.
37
 
 
The transition from concrete to abstract thinking, which he also described as a  
transition from the sensory to the rational, is, he declares: ‘a phenomenon that the  
classics of Marxism regarded as one of the most important in history.’38  Typically,  
Luria’s reference to the ‘classics of Marxism’ is unspecific. However, although he  
does not mention Lenin by name, Luria’s conception of abstract thinking is  
consistent with Lenin’s discussion of scientific abstraction outlined in his  
‘Conspectus on Hegel’s Logic’:  
Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract […] does not get away 
from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of a law of 
nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, 
not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely. 
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From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice,—such 
is the dialectical path of cognition of truth, of cognition of objective reality.
39
 
 
For Luria, as for Lenin, abstracting from nature does not drive a wedge between 
people and the world but allows them to understand it more fully.  
 
 Luria’s celebration of abstract thinking was combined with a scientific 
methodology that also operated with abstractions: his methodology relied on 
ordering, classifying and categorising. This chapter contends that by assigning 
Uzbek people to pre-determined general categories, Luria’s work did not succeed in 
reflecting their nature more deeply, truly and completely in the manner he intended. 
In attending to the ambivalent qualities of Luria’s research the argument of this 
chapter is similarly ambivalent, oscillating between sympathy with Luria’s intentions 
and criticism of his methodologies. In contrast to Gielen and Jeshmaridian’s 
unqualified condemnation, this approach is an attempt to trace the uncomfortable 
contradictions that characterised Luria’s project rather than seeking to resolve them.  
  
Revolution as Evolution 
 
'The awareness that they are about to make the continuum of history explode is 
peculiar to the revolutionary classes in the moment of their action', proclaims Walter 
Benjamin in his Theses on the Philosophy of History.
40
 A new calendar was 
introduced after the French Revolution. Calendars, Benjamin claims, do not march 
blindly forwards without a backward glance; they contain the past in the form of 
recurring holidays, which commemorate significant historical events. Clocks, on the 
other hand, are 'monuments of a historical consciousness', which, Benjamin argues, 
has not been acknowledged since the July Revolution, when several clock-towers in 
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Paris were simultaneously and spontaneously shot at, symbolically shattering the 
apparently inexorable and ordinarily inaudible tick-tock of historical progress.
41
  
 
  Following the October Revolution, the Soviet Union switched from the  
Gregorian to the Julian calendar, thus synchronising itself with the Capitalist world.  
New commemorative holidays and national rituals were quickly introduced. In the  
years of the First Five Year Plan a special calendar reform committee was set up,  
which advocated adopting a new 'Red' calendar counting 1917 as Year Zero.
42
 A new  
working week was introduced in factories to maximise productivity, with workers  
scheduled to work overlapping shifts with irregular rest days to ensure production  
never halted.
43
 Stalinist time may have flowed evenly in one direction but, like a  
racing heart-beat, the tempo dangerously increased.  
  
  Susan Buck-Morss distinguishes between two conflicting temporalities at  
work in the time of the revolution: avant garde (the time of art) and vanguard (the  
time of politics).
44
 While the former was intent on smashing time, destroying  
tradition and interrupting the continuum of history, the latter was concerned with  
propelling the masses forwards into a better future. In harnessing itself to the state,  
she argues, art lost its radical force:  
art was no longer to inspire imagination in a way that set reality into question 
but, rather, to stage affirmative representations of reality that encouraged an 
uncritical acceptance of the party's monopolistic right to control the direction 
of social transformation.
45
 
 
When outlining the goals of their experiments, Luria explicitly adopted a  
developmental framework compatible with the ‘vanguard’ temporality of the  
Communist Party. This unidirectional understanding of historical progress sat  
uneasily alongside his discussions of the temporal horizons he claims were opened  
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up by the transition from concrete to abstract modes of thought accompanying such  
progress, which have more in common with the transformative and discontinuous  
temporality of the avant garde. According to Luria, Uzbek people were not not being  
passively carried up the steps of pre-existing universal time into the modern present.  
Instead, through education and social transformation, they would acquire the ability  
to actively create an as yet undetermined future, which might still open up the  
possibility of setting these very temporal structures into question, declaring: 
Consciousness is the highest form of reflection of reality: it is, moreover, not 
given in advance, unchanging and passive, but shaped by activity and used 
by human beings to orient themselves to their environment, not only by 
adapting to conditions but in restructuring them.
46
  
 
 In planning the Central Asian expeditions, Luria identified the simultaneous 
co-existence of groups at various ‘stages’ of development.47 A loosely Marxist 
conception of history as advancing teleologically through a series of economic 
stages, was combined with the Leninist conviction that such development could be 
artificially accelerated, conforming to what Francine Hirsch describes as ‘state-
sponsored evolutionism’.48 Vygotsky wrote an essay on the expeditions, which 
resounded with phrases snatched from the approved repertoire, in which he declared:  
Instead of the colonial approach to the cultural development of backward 
peoples adopted […] in the capitalist world, this proposes completely new 
conditions for the development of a single socialist culture in different 
national forms.
49
 
 
Luria similarly declared that collectivisation would propel supposedly 'backward' 
people swiftly forwards, to make a ‘leap of centuries’.50 This was consistent with the 
Stalinist rhetoric that sought to make the USSR ‘national in form, socialist in 
content’ and also kept pace with the breathless tempo that characterised the era.  
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 Following a strictly class-based analysis was not possible in the Soviet 
Union, particularly in places like Central Asia without a sizeable urban industrial 
proletariat. This issue animated debates in the Kremlin and also impacted Luria's 
research. He chose to focus on five groups of people, all of whom were viewed as 
potential beneficiaries of Soviet power (categorised by the state as ‘bedniaks’ or poor 
peasants), rather than those designated class enemies: 
1. Illiterate ‘ichkari’ women in remote villages 'who were not involved 
in any modern social activities' (The term ‘ichkari’, meaning 
women’s quarters, was used to refer to veiled women secluded within 
the home) 
 
2. Illiterate peasants, living in remote villages who were in no way 
involved with socialized labour and maintained the old economic way 
of life 
 
3. Women who attended short-term courses in the teaching of pre-school 
children (with no formal schooling and almost no training in literacy) 
 
4. Active kolhoz (collective farm) workers and young people with 
considerable experience in planning production, distributing labour, 
and taking stock of output but barely literate  
 
5. Women students admitted to teaching school after two or three years 
of study.
51
  
 
Koffka’s notes reveal that he interviewed an even broader range of participants, 
including miners and cooperative workers.
52
  These categorisations take into account 
a range of interlocking factors including occupation, educational level, gender, age 
and place of residence. Koffka’s notes also discuss the Uzbek counterparts that were 
sought for figures demonised in the Russian context: ‘bai’ (or rich man) became a 
synonym for ‘kulak’, ‘dehqon’ for ‘krest’ian’ (peasant), mullah for priest.53 The 
bagginess of the terms used to categorise groups of people (both by Soviet officials 
and Luria’s team of researchers) is an example of the multifarious ways in which the 
concrete continued to trouble the abstract.  
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 Luria followed the Communist Party line, conceiving of his work in 
explicitly anti-imperialist terms and insisted that psychological propensities were not 
biologically determined.
54
  Luria’s rejection of biological essentialism was, however, 
coupled with a continued emphasis on cultural superiority framed in terms of 
historical development; a hierarchical framework that undermined his professed 
egalitarianism. Despite defining itself as anti-imperialist, his progressive framework 
for understanding Uzbek society bore comparison to the frameworks employed by 
Western anthropologists, whose work he drew on heavily.
55
 Luria frequently drew 
crude parallels between Uzbekistan and other supposedly ‘backward’ places, 
including other regions of the USSR as well as communities in Africa.
56
 For all his 
self-proclaimed attentiveness to cultural specificity his emphasis on the 
interchangeability of ‘backward’ places understood cultural difference in terms of 
temporal development. 
  
 Johannes Fabian makes the sweeping claim that anthropology, borrowing 
from evolutionary theory (that was contemporaneous with its emergence as a 
discipline), naturalises time, removing it from history. For the anthropologist, 
relations between places are understood as relations between times; spatial dispersal 
is transformed into temporal sequence. Such schemas appear inclusive and universal, 
but are founded on hierarchical separation. Anthropological time, true to its colonial 
origins, transforms horizontal difference in space into the vertical difference of time, 
thus justifying a logic of domination. Rendering space as time, according to Fabian, 
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allows anthropologists to veil their qualitative judgments behind an apparently 
neutral, universal and natural abstract structure. Although there were specific ideas in 
the Soviet context about where ‘backward’ traits originated and how they might be 
eradicated, the projected dichotomy Fabian identifies between ‘progress, 
development, modernity,’ on the one hand, and ‘stagnation, underdevelopment, 
tradition’ on the other, is evident in Luria’s attitudes to Central Asia which similarly 
applied temporal frameworks to coeval societies.
57
 In a similar vein, Gayatri 
Spivak’s discussion of the 'violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary 
inscription', which treats its objects of investigation as a deviation from an ideal 
might also be applied to Luria’s research (although in Luria’s case the ideal was 
situated in the future).
58
 Despite insisting that no way of seeing is ‘a natural and 
inevitable achievement of the human mind', Luria's understanding of difference 
displayed precisely the 'ferocious standardising benevolence'
59
 Spivak describes: by 
distributing humanity across one developmental slope, his analysis was implicitly 
value-laden. For Luria, to borrow Yuri Slezkine’s phrases: 'otherness was understood 
as nothing but backwardness’,60 ‘difference implied hierarchy’.61 For Luria, Uzbeks 
were not simply different but in some sense 'worse'. In The Domestication of the 
Savage Mind, Jack Goody praises Luria’s work in Central Asia for drawing the 
conclusion that logic is based on ‘highly artificial assumptions’, but Goody 
overlooks Luria’s assumption that even if there was not necessarily a more ‘natural’ 
solution to the problems posed in the experiments there was still a ‘better’ one.62 
Luria placed Uzbek people, culturally if not biologically, lower on the rungs of a 
single developmental ladder.  
 
  Luria and Koffka’s personal accounts are pervaded by conflicting notions of  
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time. Luria writes that ‘the masses had lived for centuries in economic stagnation  
and illiteracy’,63 suggesting that Soviet intervention would not merely speed up the  
progress of history but introduce history as such for the first time.
 
Uzbeks were  
imagined to inhabit the past, but this past was apparently static, timeless. Upon  
arrival in Central Asia, Luria described an arid, monotonous and desolate landscape  
populated with Uzbek people with ‘immovable faces’ and ‘motionless’ eyes.64   
Psychologically, meanwhile, Uzbek people were said to exist in a perennially frozen  
now, incapable of conceptualising the future. In conformity with Edward Said's  
seminal analysis, Luria treats 'the Orient' itself as 'an ideal and unchanging  
abstraction' outside the dynamics of history.
65
 As Frantz Fanon noted of the French  
attitude to Algeria: the local people, 'the veiled women, the palm trees and the  
camels make up the landscape, the natural background' to the properly historical  
presence of the European.
66
  
 
  Orientalist tropes abound in Luria’s personal impressions of Uzbekistan, all  
ancient ‘whimsical’ music, exotic smells and bustling bazaars which he compares to  
Baghdad.
67
 Koffka's private letters indulge in similarly sentimental flourishes,  
adopting the idiom of the colonial adventure story, castinghimself as the intrepid  
traveller boldly penetrating 'that vast expanse of night and scent, of softness and  
mystery', an exotic and eroticised feminine landscape lying supine before him.
68
 He  
described one of his guides as ‘quite medieval’ and penned a poem in English for  
inclusion in the expedition's newspaper, which wistfully reflects on the inscrutability  
of the steppe.
69
 Koffka also expresses disappointment that Uzbekistan does not  
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consistently conform to his ideal romantic stereotype of the East, opining: 
Often in my youth had I dreamed of a journey to the East, of lying in the 
harbour of Port Said, the gate to all wonders of Asia. This was different. No 
proud ships, no glamorous Eastern port; a very commonplace car in a drab 
landscape of stunted firs and sand.
70
 
 
Although these experiments were conceived as part of a project to celebrate and 
encourage modernisation and rapid change, Koffka expresses dissatisfaction that 
Uzbekistan is too familiar, insufficiently trapped in a mystical, imagined past.  
 
 Luria’s interest in Central Asia continued throughout his life. In 1964 he sent 
Jerome Bruner a postcard of a Medieval mosque from a holiday in Samarkand 
saying he was enjoying the ‘city of dreams’.71 Luria frequently presented Western 
visitors with traditional gifts from Central Asia
72
 and his Moscow apartment was 
decorated with hand-woven Uzbek carpets.
73
 Koffka’s research assistant Molly 
Harrower recalled that on a visit to the USA in 1960 Luria insisted that she dress up 
in the traditional Uzbek outfit they had sent to her from the 1932 expedition.
74
 Luria, 
however, was more positive than Koffka about the changes that had occurred in 
Central Asia, noting in a postcard to Horace Kallen in 1932 that ‘old Asian art and 
new forms of life’ are combined in a ‘wonderful mixture’.75 In his travel notes he 
similarly observed with pleasure a conversation that lasted into the night combining 
‘the call to prayer, pillows and socialism.’76  
 
 These distinctions between Luria and Koffka’s impressions are significant. 
Stalinist rhetoric in the years of the First Five Year Plan emphasised ethnic 
particularity rather than total homogeneity (Plates 2.1-2.4).
77
 Stalin declared in 1929 
                                                                                                                                          
69
 Harrower, p. 150. 
70
 Harrower, p. 157. 
71
 Luria to Bruner, May 16 1964, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Archives (HUA), 
Jerome Bruner Papers,  HUG 4242.5 General Correspondence 1964-65. 
72
 For example, on October 27 1967 Bruner wrote to Luria declaring: 'The camel has arrived!’ (a gift 
Luria had sent from Central Asia). HUA Jerome Bruner Papers, HUG 4242.5 General 
Correspondence 1964-65. 
73
 E. Luria, Moi Otets, p. 57. 
74
 Molly Harrower, ‘A.R. Luria: A Personal Remembrance’, AHAP, Molly Harrower Papers, Box 
3212, folder 23. 
75
 Alexander Luria to Horace Kallen,  August 12 1932 (from Andijan, Uzbek SSR), AJA, Horace 
Kallen Papers, MS-1, Box 19, Folder 18. 
76
 E. Luria, Moi Otets, p. 61. 
77
 See, Yuri Slezkine, ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted 
Ethnic Particularism’, Slavic Review, 53, 2 (1994), 414-452. 
 108 
 
that fostering distinct national identities was central to the goals of the revolution: 
‘on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations new, socialist nations are arising and 
developing, and they are more solidly united than any bourgeois state.’78 However, 
as Terry Martin discusses, the process of ‘indigenisation’ [korenizatsiia] in practice 
involved the promotion of certain aspects of national culture alongside an attack on 
many fundamental practices: ‘Promoting “national culture” meant aggressively 
promoting national identity, while undermining distinctive beliefs and social 
practices.’79 The calculated promotion of national identity through folklore, national 
dress, cuisine, classic literary works and ‘progressive’ historic events resulted in a 
phenomenon Martin describes as ‘Stalinist primordialism.’80 Unlike in Orientalism 
as defined by Said, this involved the valorisation of approved symbolic markers of 
national identity alongside a programme of radical social transformation, including a 
campaign against religion. Francine Hirsch similarly emphasises the differences 
between the left-wing folkloric impulses of Soviet reformers and their far-right 
German contemporaries. While German ethnographers focused on the primitive and 
eternal qualities of Germanic groups, in the Soviet Union traditional works were 
adapted to include distinctly socialist elements. Hirsch mentions an Armenian folk 
song about electric lighting, fairy tales about Lenin, Turkmen rugs embroidered with 
Stalin’s face and folk dances that dramatised collectivisation.81 The traditions of 
Central Asian nations may have been assumed to have no history of their own but 
they were not understood as being eternally immutable now that history had been 
introduced. Instead, tradition was framed as a dynamic aspect of a continually 
evolving historical society that would eventually be overcome. Luria’s contradictory 
depiction of Central Asia, which simultaneously celebrated tradition and progress, 
was in keeping with this state discourse. This difference in attitude between Luria 
and Koffka - with the former emphasising change and the latter permanence - was 
also reflected in their experimental approaches and conclusions. 
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Gestalt, Universality and the Historical Nature of Human Consciousness 
  
The fundamental difference between the Gestalt approach and Luria's was the latter's 
insistence on the primacy of social factors in determining thought processes. Luria 
attacked Gestalt psychology for making universalising claims about human thought 
processes on the basis of experiments conducted with people from a very limited 
demographic (primarily university educated and Western).
82
 He argued that the 
Gestalt approach to psychology risked suffocating the richness of particularity under 
a homogeneous conceptual blanket.   
 
 In a Preface to a Russian translation of Koffka, published shortly after the 
Central Asian expedition, Vygotsky clearly outlines his reservations with Koffka's 
work, claiming that in attempting to understand humans and apes using a single 
principle, Koffka neglects to probe what distinguishes human thought processes 
from those of animals. Vygotsky deems Gestalt theory too generalised, as it crucially 
'ignores the historical nature of human consciousness'.
83
 Koffka characterises 
development as natural and uniform, but, according to Vygotsky, human problems 
refuse to be straight-jacketed in this manner, offering 'fierce resistance to the 
naturalistic attempt to interpret them [they] attempt to tear the cover of this single 
undifferentiated Gestalt to pieces.'
84
 The differences between the two psychological 
approaches persisted in the conclusions that emerged from the experiments in 
Central Asia. Both Luria and Koffka presented uneducated Uzbek people with 
various optical illusions intending to assess their perception of perspective. Luria 
concluded that respondents failed to respond to these tests, whereas Koffka asserted 
that responses were consistent with results obtained in the West; Luria emphasised 
cultural specificity and Koffka universality.
85
  According to Koffka, the Uzbeks did 
have illusions; he attributed all exceptions to the ‘suspicious’ attitude of the 
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participants, rather than to their cognitive abilities per se. For Koffka, thought 
structures do not differ in form between different cultures but only in content. 
 
 Luria’s methodological approach ostensibly reflected his sensitivity to the 
cultural specificities of the people he was interviewing and differentiated his 
approach from Koffka’s, who relied more heavily on standardised Western tests. His 
intention was to make the experimental situation as ‘natural as possible’ by 
establishing an informal, ‘unaggressive’ and ‘friendly’ atmosphere.86 Interviews were 
designed so that they would not interrupt habitual activities and mostly conducted ‘in 
the relaxed atmosphere of a tea house […] or in the camps in the fields and mountain 
pastures around the evening camp fire’.87 Luria describes how his team would begin 
by engaging people in a ‘long, leisurely chat’ before gradually introducing the 
questions that comprised the experimental protocol.
88
 Conversations with women 
were conducted by female Uzbek psychologists in the home, where men were 
forbidden from entering. Luria was also alert to the limitations of using standardised 
tests developed in a Western context: ‘Tests developed and validated in other 
cultures repeatedly produced experimental failures and invalidated our proposed 
study.’89 The issue of standardised testing was very prominent in Soviet 
psychological debates. Aron Zalkind rejected testing in Central Asia in 
characteristically bellicose fashion, declaring:  
[I]t is obvious that it is not that the children are imbeciles, but that the tests 
given to these children were imbecilic. Can we really ask questions devised 
on the basis of the socioeconomic and cultural experience of our own or 
Western capital cities? Can we really apply them to children of national 
minorities who live under completely unique conditions of the class struggle, 
of climate, culture, and everyday life?!
90
 
 
As such, the content of Luria’s experiments were adapted to their Uzbek context. 
 
 Despite these efforts, however, Luria did concede that, ‘no matter how 
natural we tried to make it and how much we prepared’, the encounters were not 
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always amiable and communication was not always easy.
 91
 All conversations were 
conducted in Uzbek through a translator and each psychologist was also 
accompanied by an assistant who sat away from the conversation in order to record 
people’s responses as inconspicuously as possible. Not only was the conversation 
mediated, but Luria’s commitment to creating a ‘natural’ atmosphere wilfully 
overlooks the historical situation of the encounter where any translation from Uzbek 
into Russian implied a power relation.
92
   
 
 In his diary, Luria noted with bewilderment that he and his team were often 
met with hostility and resentment by the people they were attempting to investigate. 
Luria observed that the mountain shepherds were particularly confused and resistant 
to questioning and claimed that Kirghiz women angrily implored the psychologists 
not to bewitch their children.
93
  Luria’s experiments indicated that Uzbek people 
were reluctant to make suppositions about things beyond their immediate 
experience. One protocol involved presenting people with the following syllogism: 
‘In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Nova Zemlya is in the Far 
North and there is snow there. What colour are the bears there?’ Respondents refused 
to infer anything from these words, stating bluntly: ‘I don’t know; I’ve seen a black 
bear’ or ‘We always speak of what we see; we don’t talk about what we haven’t 
seen.’94  The hostility he encountered might be understood by pairing his own 
definition of Uzbek consciousness with a consideration of the historical situation 
within which the encounters took place: unlike white bears, white Russian 
intellectuals were not unfamiliar to Uzbek people. Perhaps, the hostile reactions of 
Uzbek people to the psychologists had a basis in the historical experience of Russian 
imperialism and communism, rather than being the result of psychic ‘backwardness’, 
as Luria implied. In his recent analysis of Soviet policies in Central Asia, Douglas 
Taylor Northrop describes party documents of the period based on similar 
assumptions to Luria’s. Northrop contends that 
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Uzbek Muslims were not primitive or ignorant, as party writers thought: 
decades of tsarist rule in Central Asia had shaped quite rational opinions 
about who Russians were and what they wanted, and ten years of  Bolshevik 
rule had added further notions about Communists, who mostly were seen as 
alien atheists and city folk.
95
  
 
Uzbek people had their own assumptions and historically-formed prejudices about 
Russian people.  
 
 In Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935), a text that he began writing while 
convalescing from a fever in Central Asia,
96
 Koffka imagines an encounter between 
a white person and a Chinese or Papuan person in native dress. Both people, he says, 
will experience the other as strange. Although the other person seems to belong to 
the category ‘person’, the definition of which has been established by previous 
experience, he or she also departs from that definition. Koffka claims that if such 
encounters happen regularly then the category ‘person’ might be expanded to include 
people with different characteristics. He notes, however, that this resolution is 
unlikely. Instead, he argues, it is more frequently the case that  
the class schema remains unaffected and determines the characteristic of the 
individuals who, although they raise the claim to belong to it, deviate from it 
in certain striking aspects. The class schema, then, forms a sort of 
framework; what does not conform to the standard, appears as inferior. The 
stranger is the barbarian; he is inferior in every respect, simply because he is 
different from the type; he is less intelligent, less honest, less sensitive, and 
so forth.
97
  
 
For Koffka, thought structures originate in experience but once established are 
tenacious and resistant to change. He insists that the schemas of thought between 
different groups of people are opaque to one another; they are identical in structure if 
not in content. This, however, assumes that the encounters between different groups 
of people are not influenced by historically produced structural inequalities as, for 
example, in a colonial situation. Instead, he describes a situation of mutual and 
symmetrical incomprehension that cannot account for the domination of certain 
groups over others. Transposed into the Soviet context this observation does not 
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account for the asymmetrical power relations between Russian and non-Russian 
people.  
 
 Aesthetic judgment, Koffka continues, relies on a process of discrimination 
similar to that of the encounter between two foreigners; artworks are judged in 
relation to a pre-existing schema. He goes on to give an example from his 
experiences in Central Asia. In Samarkand, he reports, people are incapable of 
discerning the relative quality of an artwork. This inability to discriminate between 
works, he claims, is due to the Islamic ban on images: Uzbek people were not 
historically exposed to pictures and thus developed no means of discriminating 
between them. This was disrupted by the revolution: ‘with the old political order the 
religious order collapsed also, pictures were introduced and as a part of the new 
order were in themselves something good.’98 Instead, he claims, for Uzbek people 
‘every picture is desirable […] one sees the streets lined with photographers who 
have the most atrocious backgrounds, canvases painted in the most vulgar manner 
and representing ugly objects, against which the patrons stand to have their 
photographs taken.’99 The language Koffka employs here is heavily value-laden - 
‘atrocious’, ‘vulgar’, ‘ugly’ - redolent of his disdain for Uzbek culture. He assumes a 
lack of exposure to certain aesthetic principles results in worse rather than different 
tastes. Within the space of two paragraphs Koffka identifies how cultural prejudice 
operates before going on to betray his own negative assumptions about Uzbek 
perception in precisely the terms he had just outlined: as ‘barbarian’, ‘inferior’, ‘less 
intelligent, less honest, less sensitive’ than his own. Koffka acknowledges that 
people with different experiences operate using different schema, but he does not 
entertain the possibility that competing ways of carving up reality are of equal 
validity; he undermines his professed interest in the universal. He thus 
simultaneously acknowledges and disavows the historical processes by which 
judgments come to seem self-evident.  
 
 In Distinction, his sociological analysis of the relationship between taste and 
class in post-war France, Pierre Bourdieu discusses how aesthetic judgment, the 
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process of differentiating between objects, participates in a system that consolidates 
differences between subjects. According to Bourdieu, power structures are 
reproduced through systems of classification: ‘People’s image of classification is a 
function of their position within it.’100 In Bourdieu’s account subjects both classify 
and are classified but the process of classification is forgotten. Bourdieu provides a 
compelling account of how people’s most mundane practices participate in 
maintaining existing social relations, positing taste as a crucial site of power: 
‘classificatory systems are […] the stake of struggle between the groups they 
characterise and counterpose.’101 His argument is premised on an assumption of 
human psychological parity that Luria’s research in Central Asia challenged. 
Bourdieu, like Koffka, assumes that classificatory systems rely on subjects who 
classify in the same manner but order things differently, whereas Luria set out to 
prove that the capacity to generalise was itself related to people’s social position.  
 
 Analysing how Uzbek people classified objects was one major strand of the 
psychological research conducted in Central Asia. Luria conducted experiments with 
geometric shapes. When presented with a series of shapes, he found that people with 
some formal education would use abstract categories (circle, triangle, square etc.), 
whereas illiterate people would name them according to objects encountered in their 
everyday lives (plate, beads, kettle stands etc.).
102
 This would then influence how the 
subjects would group things together. Presented with three different sized rectangles, 
for example, one respondent designated them: a star, a door and a canal.
103
 When 
asked whether the three shapes had anything in common, they responded that they 
did not as stars, doors and canals have nothing to do with one another in the real 
world. Illiterate people would only concede to group objects together by concrete 
situation: having identified two shapes as a glass and a bowl, one person replied that 
they could be placed together as they could both be used in a kitchen (Plates 2.5 and 
2.6).
104
 A similar pattern was found in experiments with colours: illiterate people 
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would liken colours to objects they encountered in their daily lives (pig’s dung, sky, 
pistachio, decayed teeth, cotton in blossom etc) and resisted the experimenters’ 
suggestion that these might be grouped by brightness or saturation: ‘they shook their 
heads in perplexity and failed to complete the task’.105 In another experiment, when 
asked to exclude one object from a group of four, illiterate people grouped objects by 
situation rather than category: ‘Words […] were used not to codify objects into 
conceptual schemes but to establish the practical interrelations among things.’106 Of 
course, this still describes a mode of classification but for Luria this form of 
‘situational thinking’ does not require that people make generalisations based on the 
‘essential feature of objects’.107 Luria does not classify this mode of classification as 
classification as it is not ‘advanced’ (i.e. abstract) but understood as contingent on 
the vagaries of individual experience (i.e. not ‘essential’ but subjective). For Luria, 
literacy was the key factor which determined whether people organised objects 
conceptually rather than concretely; it was a prerequisite for ‘advanced’ forms of 
thought. 
 
Language and Thought 
 
Luria related some changes in thought to new collective forms of labour, claiming, 
for example, that collective farm workers were able to address 'pressing problems of 
social life', and arguing that the data gathered on the expedition 'adequately confirm 
that the mental life of these subjects changed radically because of collective social 
labour.'
108
  Such statements, however, appear with relative infrequency in his 
conclusions. In practice, as Walter Ong observes, his conclusions mostly hinged on 
literacy, although he failed to ‘systematically encode his findings expressly in terms 
of orality-literacy differences’.109  
 
 Luria concluded that the more literate the person, the more abstract their 
thought processes. Indeed, as R.A. Houston’s work demonstrates, Luria’s 
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assumptions about literacy seem consistent with Western European understandings 
dating back to the Early Modern period: 
Historically, literacy tends to be associated with the development of abstract 
thought, broadening of the mind through vicarious experience, the 
intensification and extensification of intellectual exchange, personal 
independence of thought and action, economic development […] Illiterates, 
on the other hand, are allegedly more restricted in their thought patterns, 
intellectually impoverished, culturally backward, isolated, inert, almost 
pathological.
110
 
 
Ong claims that Luria's conclusions are reached despite rather than because of 
Luria's ‘elaborate Marxist scaffolding’.111 Certainly, Luria would have disputed this, 
but his methodology contradicts his theoretical pronouncements here. Luria’s 
experiments set out to prove the hypothesis that literacy allowed people to think 
beyond their immediate material circumstances, implying that becoming literate has 
an intrinsic emancipatory potential.
112
 His analysis overlooks two major factors: 
what language people were becoming literate in and what qualified a person to be 
considered ‘literate’.113 Despite his persistent declarations to the contrary, Luria 
treats language as precisely the kind of universal structure that he identifies and 
critiques as a key limitation of the Gestalt approach to psychology, ignoring the very 
cultural and social specificities that his work so frequently claims to be alert to. 
Although Luria conceives of literacy as something introduced historically, he treats 
language as an a priori structure which exists outside of time and space. But 
languages in the Soviet Union were volatile and, importantly, there were many 
different languages to choose between. Literacy was a highly-charged political issue. 
  
  The Soviet Campaign to Eradicate Illiteracy (Likbez) was profoundly  
ideological, pivotal to the consolidation of Soviet power and the attempt to create  
new Soviet people with specific national identities. The Extraordinary Commission  
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for the Liquidation of Illiteracy saw literacy as a key component in the building of  
socialism, a propagandistic mission was combined with a more practical belief that  
new forms of industry demanded literacy; that increased literacy would lead to  
greater productivity.
114
 In the vast, multilingual Soviet Union establishing a set of  
codified national languages was a major element in the project of creating distinct  
national groups, national in form, socialist in content.
115
  Many languages and  
dialects were spoken in imperial Turkestan. The Uzbek SSR came into being in 1924  
as part of the National Delimitation of the Central Asian Republics. The Soviet  
authorities, drawing on research by teams of mostly Russian ethnographers, imposed  
Sart (an Uzbek dialect from Samarkand) as the national language, standardising and  
codifying spelling, vocabulary and grammar to create new national norms. At the  
time of the revolution, Uzbek was written in various Arabic scripts. In 1928 the  
Soviets replaced Arabic with the Latin alphabet, a policy related to the drive to 
eradicate Islam in the region.
116
 Uzbek spelling was codified in 1929.
117
 Luria’s  
assertion that the ability to standardise, classify and taxonomise were essential to  
historical progression was consistent with these state policies, which were framed as  
progressive and proceeded through standardisation, classification and  
taxonomisation. 
 
  Literacy levels reportedly soared from 3.8% in 1926 to 52.5% in 1932.
118
 In  
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practice, however, the linguistic situation in Uzbekistan remained heterogeneous and  
education chaotic. Most teachers were brought in from Russia and could not speak  
the local language.  Russian therefore continued to function as the primary language  
of instruction at institutes of higher education. Even native teachers struggled to  
master the new language rules fast enough to teach them effectively.
119
 Luria does  
not discuss how or why people were educated in any detail. Indeed, although he  
states that experiments were conducted in Uzbek, it is unclear from reading his  
findings in which language his experimental subjects were being taught to become  
literate. Koffka's records of the 1932 expedition describe the extent to which  
language in Soviet Central Asia was far from a neutral, universal structure. His notes  
from a meeting with the Minister of Education from the People’s Commission for  
the Enlightenment of the People convey some of the disorganisation of the  
educational system in this period, with instruction in a mixture of languages  
(predominantly Russian).
120
 He also expressed doubt about the statistics that he was  
quoted on literacy levels, as he met so few literate people.
121
 Luria’s discussion of  
literacy fails to account for the cognitive impact of this chaotic linguistic reality.  
 
Furthermore, Koffka’s private correspondence indicates that aside from  
Uzbek or Russian, Soviet citizens in Uzbekistan were expected to become fluent in 
the new language of Bolshevism.
122
 Many loan words entered Uzbek from Russian 
in the 1920s, which almost exclusively pertained to the new social structures and 
technologies introduced by the Soviet regime.
123
 The content of reading materials 
available in state run reading rooms and schools were also ideologically focused, 
including editions of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, newspapers and translations of 
approved authors. Instructional texts were produced with titles such as: ‘What is a 
Kolkhoz?’ ‘What is a Soviet?’ and ‘The Party is Guiding Us.’124 Koffka remarked 
upon the amazing 'uniformity of outlook' between the various educated people he 
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encountered on his trip, noting their shared lexicon, historical narrative and 
ideological outlook:                                                             
The uniformity of intellectual and emotional outlook is one of the strongest 
memories I carried away from my six weeks' visit to the Soviet Union [...] To 
have built this wall in a relatively short time is one of the greatest 
achievements of the Soviet government.
125
                         
                        
Koffka’s wall metaphor recalls Adorno’s description of the facade constructed by the 
status quo but Koffka was ambivalent about the relationship of consciousness to this 
structure. He was struck by the oppressive qualities of this tendency, but notes that 
these strangely homogeneous utterances were all the more surprising as they seemed 
to be made in earnest, not out of fear; ‘honest yet uniform.'126 Although Koffka was 
hesitant to conclude that all Soviet people thought and felt in the same way, he did 
note that the people he encountered were not selected on purpose to impress and 
convert him. On the night train to Tashkent, for example, he met a group of 
passengers from various Soviet Republics and backgrounds who spontaneously 
‘toasted each other and the world revolution.'127 Here his scientific observations, 
which hinge on the universality of underlying thought structures, contrast with his 
personal narrative, which emphasises how different he feels from his Soviet 
counterparts (both Russian and Uzbek).
128
 Koffka's informal observations indicate 
how language and thought processes in the Soviet Union were becoming socialist in 
content, providing a new schema for evaluating the world.  
 
  Luria's cross-cultural experiments were preceded by a series of experiments 
undertaken by a group of psychologists investigating children in remote Siberia. 
Unlike the results of the Central Asian experiments, which went unpublished for four 
decades, detailed reports of the Siberian findings appeared contemporaneously, in a 
special issue of the journal Pedology in 1929. These reports provide an insight into 
the pressing political concerns of the moment that are more muffled in Luria's later 
accounts, where he dispassionately presents socialism as a fait accompli.
129
 The 
psychologists conducting research in Siberia were concerned with analysing how 
educational policies impacted on thinking. Many of their conclusions and 
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methodologies similarly hinged on literacy and new forms of social life, but they 
also indicate the political urgency of conveying the meaning of particular concepts 
and institutions.  One psychologist notes approvingly that 89% of children from the 
Tungus tribe recognised Lenin's portrait and 'correctly' declared that he 'did 
everything'.
130
 This acquaintance with the face of the former Soviet leader, they 
noted, was the work of the cooperative who acted like missionaries distributing his 
image: 'We found the portraits of leaders hanging in many yurts.'
131
 This, however, 
only served to underline the distinction between visual and verbal forms of 
understanding: ‘Knowing what a clock looks like (95%) was no guarantee that the 
Tungus knew our units of time.’132 Similarly, recognising Lenin, it transpired, did not 
translate into an understanding of more abstract concepts like 'the Soviet Union' or 
'Communism':
133
 
The children had a very vague notion of the USSR. Only a few even (20%) 
were familiar with the name, and of them only 5% (schoolchildren and 
students at the literacy centre) were able to say what 'USSR' meant […] The 
Tungus children had no notion about the Revolution, the Communist Party, 
the Komsomol, the Pioneers, or the trade unions. Only 4% of schoolchildren 
knew what the Communists or the Pioneers or the Komsomol were. Most of 
the children had no notion of the Red Army. Only 7% (the schoolchildren) 
said that the Red Army was necessary.
134
       
                 
Another experiment concluded similarly that most children were: ‘still not fully 
aware that they had common interests with all the other workers in the Soviet 
Union.'
135
 A psychologist who conducted experiments with adults was even more 
concerned: 'None of the adults could say what Moscow represented; they did not 
know, and could not explain, what Soviet power wanted, and they did not even know 
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their regional centre, Verkhneudinsk'.
136
 These people were not able to discuss places 
they had not personally visited, let alone define theoretical terms or newly 
introduced Soviet institutions.  
 
  Luria followed similar methods, asking people to define concepts like 
‘freedom’.137 He reports that an illiterate 18 year old woman from a remote village 
responded by saying: ‘I’ve heard that women have got their freedom, but that’s all I 
know. It means that landowners repressed them before but now they’ve escaped from 
their misery.’138 This response indicates some rote-learned familiarity with the 
official Soviet narrative but suggests that the word ‘freedom’ remained devoid of 
meaning, akin to the capacity to identify a clock without being able to tell the 
time.
139
  Luria was more approving of the response of a kolkhoz worker who had 
completed a ten-week agricultural course. When asked ‘what is a cooperative?’ the 
man asserted that shops were once run by merchants who sold goods to peasants at 
high prices but are now run by the government in the people’s best interests and 
concluded by noting that cooperatives make people part of a community.  Luria 
asserted that this person demonstrated a complex and independent understanding of 
emerging social forms: ‘Defines in far more detail concept introduced by social 
system; makes greater use of abstract categories; clarifies one concept by means of 
another.’140 For Luria, education was not understood as a method for pouring a 
particular body of knowledge into a passive receptacle but created a new kind of 
subject capable of actively engaging with complex ideas. However, it is unclear 
whether Luria would have been equally as approving if the educated kolkhoz worker 
had responded by giving a detailed and eloquent critique of a cooperative. Luria 
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asserted that abstract thinking allowed people to think outside the parameters of their 
everyday experiences, but his research conclusions suggest that he was less 
concerned with encouraging people to question their immediate surroundings than 
with developing the capacity to comprehend particular structures.  
 
Constructing the Communist Home 
 
Stephen Kotkin observes that Stalinism was never merely 'a set of institutions, a 
group of personalities, or an ideology', but a whole culture:  
a cluster of powerful symbols and attitudes, a language and new forms of 
speech, new ways of behaving in public and private, even new styles of dress 
[…] an ongoing experience through which it was possible to imagine and 
strive to bring about a new civilization called socialism.
141
   
 
Kotkin's forensic inspection of Stalinism, Magnetic Mountain, treats the newly built 
'Socialist City’ Magnitogorsk as a microcosm of Soviet society, probing the 
encounter between quotidian activities and the grand ideological rhetoric of the 
revolution, occurring at the same moment that Luria and his team were attempting to 
trace the effects of rapid transformations occurring in Central Asia. Kotkin's 
approach is explicitly Foucauldian
142
 and tallies with Foucault's definition of 'order' 
as: 
The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its language, its 
schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy 
of its practices – establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical 
orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.
143
 
 
Foucault described his early publications on the incarceration and classification of 
the insane as histories of the excluded, of ‘the Other – of that which, for a given 
culture, is at once interior and foreign’.144  In contrast, The Order of Things was 
conceived of as ‘the history of the Same’, an attempt to analyse the strangeness and 
arbitrariness of the apparently inviolable ways the world is carved up, classified and 
understood. Luria's experiments in Central Asia were not only an attempt to trace 
                                                 
141
 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 14. 
142
 Kotkin claims to have undertaken his 'study of power on the micro-level' following discussions 
with Foucault in California in the early 1980s and the book is dedicated to Foucault's memory, 
Magnetic Mountain, p. xviii. 
143
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London, Routledge; 2002), p. xxvi. 
144
 Foucault, Order of Things, p. xxvi. 
 123 
 
how ‘the Other’ was being transformed into ‘the Same’, but participated 
enthusiastically in the Stalinist project of eradicating difference through the 
imposition of certain normative abstract categories.  
 
 Crucially though, and this is perhaps what separates the Soviet project from 
other contemporaneous imperial powers, the 'order' being imposed was not a taken-
for-granted, pre-existing, stable entity. The new Communist 'home' was still under 
construction. Certainly Luria betrayed many of the prejudices of the existing 
dominant culture, but that culture was itself volatile. Luria was also learning to 
master a particular vocabulary for interpreting and changing the world. Kotkin 
follows Foucault who set out to uncover culture's 'deepest strata', in the hope of 
restoring ‘to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its 
flaws’,145 but the cultural soil in the Soviet Union had not yet acquired this immobile 
appearance.  
 
 The unstable character of the Soviet present is captured in Luria's 
correspondence with the American anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits. Herskovits 
wrote to Luria in 1932 to inquire about the Central Asian expeditions, in the hope 
that it would shed light on his own research into African American communities in 
the USA. Herskovits describes his work into 'New World Negroes' as addressing 
'how people from one civilization take over aspects of another'.
146
  As he states in his 
1928 book The American Negro, the African American ‘must solve the business of 
living in the culture that is not his own. How can he do it? He must learn to adjust 
himself to his cultural environment if he would survive.’147 Herskovits characterises 
assimilation as a one-way process, in which the practices of one culture are simply 
replaced by those of the dominant culture without, however, eliminating social 
hierarchies based on racial prejudice.  
 
 The parallel Herskovits attempted to draw was not directly applicable to the 
Soviet context where no static established culture yet existed; the transformation in 
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Central Asia was part of a transformation expected of all Soviet citizens, Luria and 
his team of researchers included. The question of adjusting to a cultural environment 
in order to survive was to become an almost universal concern in the context of 
Stalin’s Soviet Union. Koffka noted he felt equally foreign among the Russian 
scientists as among the Uzbek peasants: ‘they are different people. Different from 
me, I mean, that, even without the language difficulties, I do not feel quite at home 
with them.'
148
 Of course, Luria still held that some were more equal than others, but 
unlike the hegemonic relation described by Herskovits, in which one oppressed 
culture disappears into the pre-existing culture of the oppressor, the question of the 
transformation required by Uzbek people was one of degree. Rather than referring to 
an already established order of things, the world Soviet citizens were being 
assimilated into was an abstract projection. The chaos, privations and flux of the 
present was anchored in the promise of a future yet to come.  
 
 Luria was quick to differentiate his work from Western studies which 
described the narrower world-view of ‘primitive’ communities as an inherent 
deficiency of certain racial groups.
149
 Despite drawing on their research, Luria 
differentiated his approach from Western anthropologists on the basis that their 
accounts of ‘primitive’ societies lacked any ‘causal analysis’:150 they presented 
backwardness as an inherent and immutable aspect of the culture being studied 
rather than as something historically determined and therefore eradicable. However, 
although Luria’s research intentions were consistent with the broad campaign against 
biological determinism launched during the First Five Year Plan,
151
 as he did not 
publish his findings immediately, the bitterly ironic outcome was that accusations of 
racism formed a major part of his denunciation. In 1935 he wrote to Herskovits to 
ask for advice on ‘studies concerning the problem of racial differences in 
intelligence, and all what is [sic] published and sed [sic] by important men contra the 
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fascistic ideas on racial inequality. We should be glad to show that such ideas are 
mere [sic] political and have no important scientific background.’152 Written in 
uncharacteristically messy handwriting and poor English, this letter hints at the 
pressure Luria was under to demonstrate the invalidity of racial determinism.  As 
part of his defensive response to criticisms, Luria explicitly differentiated his work 
from Nazism in a 1933 article attacking German fascist science. There he asserted 
that his psychological experiments proved the assumptions of German scientists 
wrong, but concluded by noting that investigations conducted by experts were 
unnecessary to demonstrate that thought processes are not biological: the revolution 
was proof enough. Liberating people from capitalism and ‘colonial tsarist 
oppression’ had a demonstrative impact on thought, testifying to the possibility for 
all people, regardless of their race or ethnicity, to participate in the revolution.
153
    
 
 Langston Hughes, who travelled in Soviet Central Asia in 1933, did see a 
parallel between Central Asian people and African Americans, but unlike Herskovits 
he explicitly differentiated the USA from the Soviet Union. After visiting a film 
school where illiterate nomads were being taught to operate film cameras Hughes 
reflected on how ‘impregnable Hollywood had been to Negroes,’ noting that black 
people were not even encouraged to operate cinema projectors, whereas in the Soviet 
Union he witnessed ‘coloured people being taught by white men’, a pedagogical 
process he perceived as empowering rather than paternalistic. He distinguishes this 
understanding of the process occurring in Central Asia from that of his companion 
Arthur Koestler (who went on to write one of the most influential accounts of the 
totalitarian subject Darkness at Noon): ‘To Koestler, Turkmenistan was simply a 
primitive land moving into twentieth-century civilization. To me it was a coloured 
land moving into orbits hitherto reserved for whites.’154 
 
 Luria presented education in Soviet Central Asia as a similarly benevolent 
endeavour. However, Luria and Vygotsky explicitly asserted that the civilized and 
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educated adult was ‘much more powerful’ than the ‘primitive’ person.155 The 
rationale for this argument was the belief that abstract thinking allowed humans to 
exert more of an impact on their external environment. Like Hughes’s descriptions 
of Central Asia, they do not foreground the power human beings exerted over one 
another in that context. That Luria’s research in Central Asia was denounced for its 
insufficient political commitment demonstrates that mastering shared categories in 
order to operate within the terms of the dominant narratives was not a guaranteed 
defence against the concrete power of the state. After all, the Stalinist Terror that 
was eventually to unfold was remarkable for murdering the very people who had led 
the revolution. Luria explicitly conceived of his work in relation to Stalinist 
frameworks and was also denounced in those terms, but his experiments describe 
encounters with people who did not recognise those structures.  
 
 In her analysis of Hughes’s engagements with Soviet Central Asia, Kate A. 
Baldwin focuses on his preoccupation with unveiling Muslim Uzbek women, which 
he employed as a metaphor for understanding his own African-American male 
subject position, building on W.E.B. Du Bois’s description of racial inequality as a 
‘veil’ in The Souls of Black Folk (1903).156 Hughes, like Luria, was an outsider in 
Central Asia who did not speak the local languages.  As such, his treatment of 
unveiling was primarily symbolic; he sought to identify with Muslim Uzbek women 
rather than to discern his distance and difference from them. The veiled Muslim 
woman was also a central figure in Luria’s research. Both Luria and Hughes 
understood unveiling Uzbek women in relation to their own conceptions of an ideal 
‘emancipated’ subject. However, Luria’s research, unlike Hughes’s accounts, 
contains transcriptions of interviews with Uzbek women themselves, whose voices 
threaten the ideal model he attempted to impose on them.   
 
Unveiling Primitive Psychology 
 
In 1925, Vygotsky and Luria wrote the introduction to the Russian translation of  
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Sigmund Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. They praised the text for its 
boldness, but were unable to accept the conservatism of the instincts insisted upon 
by Freud. They likened Freud’s discovery of ‘a country beyond the pleasure 
principle’, to Columbus’s discovery of America; Freud may have found this place 
but, they claimed, he has yet ‘to produce an exact geographical map of the new 
continent or colonise it.’157 This imperial metaphor likens their approach to the 
colonial invader seeking to subdue, ‘modernise’ and domesticate the unconscious, to 
rid it of primitivism and impose a new system of command. Unlike Freud who 
insisted on the persistence of the primitive in the timeless unconscious, and thus as 
an inexorable part of civilization, Vygotsky and Luria conceived of primitivism as 
something fundamentally eradicable, a temporal stage to be overcome and left 
behind. This attitude also applied to supposedly primitive people.
158
  
 
 In his introduction to Cognitive Development Luria declared bombastically: 
‘When the socialist revolution eliminated dominance and submission as class 
relations, people oppressed one day enjoyed a free existence the next. And for the 
first time they enjoyed responsibility for their own future.’159 In practice, however, 
his research conclusions do not bear this out. Not only was the pace of change 
slower than this statement suggests but the parameters for understanding dominance 
and submission in Luria’s studies were not exclusively framed in terms of class 
struggle.  
 
 The study’s focus on women was, however, consistent with Soviet policies in 
the region. In Central Asia, Soviet authorities targeted women as what Gregory 
Massell has called a ‘surrogate proletariat’, identifying Muslim women as an 
exceptionally oppressed group. Douglas Taylor Northrop even goes so far as to 
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claim that in Uzbekistan ‘women’s emancipation ultimately came in many ways to 
exemplify the entire Bolshevik Revolution.’160  In order to go about emancipating 
this group of revolutionary allies, an image of female inferiority within Muslim 
society was constructed by mostly Western revolutionary elites.
161
 In 1927 a ‘hujum’ 
(assault or attack) was launched intended to liberate women from the oppressive 
traditions identified by Bolshevik ideologues, including family and kinship relations, 
property laws, religious practices, domestic roles and divisions of labour. Koffka’s 
notes from his introductory meeting with Uzbek Communist Party officials clearly 
foreground the issue of gender: ‘Position of women: truly oppressed. Excluded from 
all culture […] Now principle of equality, social and political.’162 Luria writes that 
‘[t]he Islamic religion helped to maintain women’s lack of rights,’ singling out their 
seclusion within the home and their veil-wearing as evidence of oppression.
163
 
Muslim women were positioned between the modern communist future and the 
traditional religious past with the veil (paranja) acting as the preeminent symbolic 
site in this ideological tussle (Plate 2.7). This was a contradictory position: 
uneducated Muslim women were simultaneously seen as the most socially repressed 
(and therefore the most revolutionary) but concomitantly the most psychically 
backward (and therefore the least revolutionary). Enter: the revolutionary vanguard. 
As I go on to discuss in detail in Chapter 3, this Leninist political strategy is 
predicated on an inequality between the oppressed and the emancipator, in which the 
latter threatens to replicate the position of the oppressor it seeks to overthrow. 
 
 In ‘Algeria Unveiled’ (1957), Frantz Fanon traces the ever-shifting status of 
veiling as a political strategy in colonial Algeria and during the struggle for 
independence.
164
 In the early 1930s, French colonial administrators in Algeria 
focused on the veil as a symbol of oppression in an analogous manner to their Soviet 
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contemporaries. Fanon discusses how both veiling and unveiling went on to be 
adopted as political gestures of resistance at various moments in the revolution: 
Muslim women unveiled in order to disguise themselves as ‘allies’ of the Europeans 
but at a later point in the conflict veils were reassumed in order to conceal weaponry. 
Fanon’s discussion of the vagaries of veiling is alert to the subtle shifts of history 
which Luria so often failed to apprehend. For Fanon, veiling in itself is neither 
inherently oppressive nor liberatory; what is paramount is the rejection of the 
coloniser: ‘The phenomenon of resistance in the colonised must be related to an 
attitude of counter assimilation, of maintenance of a cultural, hence national, 
originality.’165 All values imposed by the coloniser must be rejected ‘even if these 
values objectively be worth choosing.’166 As Adrienne Edgar argues, the Soviet 
Union’s policies in Central Asia had more in common than with the modernising 
regimes of Ataturk’s Turkey and Reza Shah’s Iran than with, for example, those 
implemented in British India. Unlike in neighbouring Muslim countries, however, 
Soviet power in Uzbekistan was perceived as an alien, external force. Hence, 
according to Edgar, resistance to the policies was far more severe. This suggests, in 
line with Fanon’s analysis, that the rejection of certain policies intended to liberate 
Uzbek women was done so not on the basis of their content but at least in part 
because they were imposed by a foreign governing body.
167
 Though heralding the 
elimination of dominance and submission, the Soviet project, spearheaded by 
Westerners like Luria, could not avoid re-inscribing them.   
 
 In the face of a widespread violent backlash against unveiled women by 
Muslim men, the period during which Luria conducted his research saw a retreat 
from some of the more radical policies of the ‘hujum’.168 Unveiling may have 
symbolically ushered an Uzbek women into an abstract liberated collective but in 
practice an isolated unveiled woman in an Uzbek village risked concrete violence. 
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Thousands of women were murdered by local men, a wide-spread phenomenon that 
the Soviet administration did little to halt.
169
 Just as Luria’s criticisms of 
psychoanalysis overlooked the antagonisms and violence of NEP-era Moscow 
(discussed in Chapter 1), so the rhetorical promise of liberation crashed up against 
the violent realities of Soviet Uzbekistan. 
 
 Throughout Luria’s reports, illiterate ‘ichkari’ women are shown to score the 
lowest on psychological tests as their ‘immediate physical experience abounds’.170 
Luria characterises them as having a passive attitude. Yet it is these women who are 
described as the most intractable and resistant to the psychologists’ suggestions. 
Transcriptions of interviews reveal that the encounters were far from passive but 
sites of contestation, in which the women being interviewed obstinately refused to 
adopt the thought processes of their interlocutors. When asked to place two skeins of 
wool in different shades of orange together, for example, ‘ichkari’ women were 
reported to reject the suggestion the skeins had anything in common: ‘“It can’t be 
done”, “None of them are the same, you can’t put them together”, “They’re not at all 
alike” or “This is like calf’s dung, and this is like a peach.”’171 Asked to respond to 
the syllogism concerning the existence of white bears in the Far North (cited above), 
the women interviewed ‘refused to accept the major premise’, ‘replaced the 
inferential process by considerations of their own’ or ‘introduced general, rumour-
based opinions about bears’:  
“You would have to ask people who had been there and seen them” […] 
“There are different kinds of bears; if one was born red, he will stay that 
way” […] “ The world is large, I don’t know what kinds of bears there are.” 
[…] “Once I saw a bear in a museum, but that’s all”172   
Luria notes in a tone of exasperation that ‘in each case they would avoid solving the 
task.’173 In another exercise subjects were asked to perform a basic mathematical 
problem: ‘It takes thirty minutes to walk to village X, and it is five times faster on a 
bicycle. How long will it take on a bicycle?’ Illi-Khodzk, a 24 year old illiterate 
woman responded: ‘“My brother in Dzhizak has a bicycle, and he goes much faster 
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than a horse.” Nurmat, a 36 year old illiterate woman replied: ‘“I know that bicycles 
go faster than bullock carts.”’174 Luria expresses frustration that the women related 
the question to their own experiences and that they refused to respond when the 
problem was repeated. Again and again Luria observes that despite prompting from 
the psychologists ‘the subjects persisted in their own approach,’175 ‘they refused 
decisively to draw inferences’176 and that ‘every attempt to suggest the possibility of 
categorical grouping met with protest.’177  
 
 Luria did not directly encounter these women, who were interviewed by his 
female colleagues in their homes. He only glimpsed ‘ichkari’ women from afar, 
beneath their veils. Luria’s account of the experiments, which agrees with Hughes’s 
characterisations of the veil, implies that these women’s constrained thought 
processes were a counterpart to their restricted social position, but the frustration that 
pervades his account of their responses to the experiments stems from their 
inaccessibility and apparent imperviousness to change. Fanon describes the Western 
male frustration with the veiled Muslim woman as metonym for the colonial desire 
to conquer, understood in sexual terms (an eroticisism which, as we have already 
seen, was evident in Koffka’s writings on Uzbekistan). The veil implies an 
unknowability and distance that cannot be tolerated. The veiled woman sees without 
being seen and thus represents a threat to the colonising mission: ‘There is no 
reciprocity. She does not yield herself, does not give herself, does not offer 
herself.’178 In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon also discusses the significance of 
non-cooperation within colonial regimes, identifying quotidian refusals to comply 
with the dominant order as acts of sabotage: ‘The native’s laziness is the conscious 
sabotage of the colonial machine; on the biological plane it is a remarkable system of 
auto-protection; and in any case it is a sure brake upon the seizure of the whole 
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country by the occupying power.’179  Fanon views such mundane acts of non-
compliance as evidence of a kind of proto-revolutionary subjectivity, the prelude to 
more militant, organised forms of struggle. On this issue, Fanon’s analysis adheres 
to a Leninist model which sees revolutionary consciousness developing from 
spontaneous acts of resistance. 
 
 For Luria, however, ‘ichkari’ women were the antithesis of the ideal 
revolutionary subjectivity he hoped the social transformations accompanying 
collectivisation would bring into being. In his discussions of these women’s 
responses, Luria proclaims protest and resistance antithetical to revolutionary 
consciousness. Luria may have wanted to create active subjects capable of 
enthusiastically building a collective future, but that future was to be structured in a 
particular way and thus involved the imposition of a particular psychic framework. 
As such, the sparks of resistance in the encounters were not interpreted as flashes of 
spontaneity but as evidence of mental stultification blocking the path to 
consciousness.  
 
 This contradiction is similar to the ‘strife between normativity and the 
deconstruction of norms’, which Fred Moten identifies in Fanon’s work.180 Moten 
sees a fundamental ambivalence within Fanon’s project, describing a struggle 
between the normative impulse of the psychologist and the militant’s desire to 
destroy all norms. Moten suggests that Fanon fails to properly confront the 
contradictory position of the militant pathologist, evading the question of how it 
might be possible to reconcile rehabilitation or reintegration with a politics that 
intends to radically transform the world, asking: ‘who would heal by way of 
explosion, excision, or exorcism?
181 Moten situates Fanon’s work in a Western 
culture of expert knowledge animated by a ‘teleological principle’ akin to the 
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progressive model of human development adopted by Luria.
182
 The question of the 
relationship between order and chaos, framed as a relationship between a social ideal 
and a subject perceived as psychically deficient, continues to animate the following 
chapters of this thesis which consider Luria’s writings on children and brain-injured 
people. Although Luria’s work in Central Asia was not concerned with pathological 
cases per se, insofar as Uzbek people were portrayed as primitive, backward and 
mentally disorganised in contrast to those at the revolution’s vanguard, he does 
impute to uneducated Uzbeks what Moten describes as an ‘ontology of disorder, an 
ontology of dehiscence,’183 defined in implicit opposition to the ‘order’ of the Soviet 
civilising mission. 
  
Moten, in an argument that runs counter to an orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
valorisation of organisation, suggests that disorderliness that might prove 
revolutionary. For Moten, the experience of the colonised is defined by ‘irremediable 
homelessness’;184 outside the coordinates of dominant structures that seek to contain 
it, the colonised subject threatens to unravel those structures through the refusal to be 
contained: ‘the object vibrates against its frame like a resonator, and troubled air gets 
out. The air of the thing that escapes enframing is what I'm interested in—an often 
unattended movement that accompanies largely unthought positions and 
appositions.’185 This troubled air wafts through the transcripts of Luria’s 
experimental protocols. The subjects his works describe vibrate against their frames; 
the misrecognitions and disagreements documented by Luria’s research gesture 
towards the existence of the world beyond his frames. Indeed, the resistance Luria 
describes resides precisely in the ‘ichkari’ women’s refusal to adopt a form of 
thought that privileges framing (which relies on generalisation and abstraction) over 
scattered particularity. Luria claimed that the transition to socialism would be 
accompanied by a ‘revolution’ in thought that would eradicate rather than install 
‘constricted’ forms of thought, allowing people to break out from the confines of 
their everyday life. In the context of these experiments, however, clinging to the 
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immediate seems less constrictive than adopting the normative standards of the 
emergent dominant culture.
 186
  
  
Conclusion 
  
Should one postulate a type for human reality and describe its psychic 
modalities only through deviations from it, or should one not rather strive 
unremittingly for a concrete and ever new understanding of man?
187
 
 
Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
 
In 'Primitive Man and His Behaviour' (1930), Luria and Vygotsky argue that the use 
of magic in primitive societies demonstrates humanity's desire to control nature and 
itself, and thus represents a significant progressive step towards civilization. The 
authors point to magic's rational kernel, arguing that casting spells to create rain or 
love are embryonic forms of civilization: ‘we see in magic in its undeveloped form 
both the future technique for controlling nature and the cultural techniques for the 
control of man’s own behaviour.'188 The husk of irrationality is discarded when 
humanity develops more advanced techniques for mastering its environment. Luria 
and Vygotsky’s argument, formulated immediately prior to the expeditions to 
Central Asia, is the inverse of that put forth by Adorno and Horkheimer in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which enlightened rationality emerges through the 
repression or disavowal of irrationality, rather than through its extirpation. Adorno 
and Horkheimer's argument agrees with Vygotsky and Luria’s insofar as they 
conceive of domination over nature as a central tenet of magic. However, Luria and 
Vygotsky’s argument conforms with Adorno and Horkheimer’s definition of 
Enlightenment thinking as they champion disenchantment and scientific progress. 
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Indeed, Adorno and Horkheimer explicitly argue that state socialism, by clinging to 
the heritage of bourgeois philosophy, failed to escape the dialectic of 
Enlightenment.
189
 For Adorno and Horkheimer, although magic itself already entails 
enlightened thinking, it retains a sensitivity to specificity which modern science 
lacks. The 'corrosive rationality'
190
 of Enlightenment insists on obliterating the 
differences between things: 'All gods and qualities must be destroyed'.
191
 This 
'amputation of the incommensurable',
192
 which reduces nature to exchangeable 
standardised chunks, is achieved through abstraction: ‘Bourgeois society is ruled by 
equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract 
quantities.’193 For Adorno and Horkheimer, humans in advanced industrial societies, 
like terrified rabbits dissected in laboratories, are reduced to isolated but identical 
samples of their species. Concatenated nature is split into discrete specimens of 
matter. Individual suffering is elided and the thing-like bourgeois subject emerges.  
 
  But the irrational cannot be exorcised. Indeed, proclaiming its disappearance  
paradoxically functions to increase its strength. Just as for Freud, who insisted in  
Beyond the Pleasure Principle that progress is paradoxically occasioned by the  
desire to return to a previous state, Adorno and Horkheimer insist that ‘the curse of  
irresistible progress is irresistible regression.'
194
 Adorno and Horkheimer claim that  
an increased power over nature is coupled with the increased subjugation of  
humanity.  By eviscerating the particular, Enlightenment left the 'uncomprehended  
whole'
195
 (nature) free to rebound on the human subjects who had attempted to  
master it. This violence, they claim, has its origins in abstraction which, it transpires,  
is painfully concrete.  
 
The main goal of Luria’s research was to identify and trace the emergence of  
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the capacity for abstract thought, defined as the capacity to generalise, categorise and 
classify objects according to pre-existing socially-established criteria. He viewed this 
as crucial to the progress of civilisation. Following Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
argument, Luria’s faith in the emancipatory potentials of abstract thinking overlooks 
the structure of domination inherent within it. However, a contradiction existed 
between Luria’s discussions of abstraction as a cognitive capacity, on the one hand, 
and as a research methodology, on the other. For Luria not only advocated 
abstraction as a mode of thought but simultaneously insisted that a properly Marxist 
approach to psychology should treat cognition as time-bound and historical.  
His scientific approach claimed to retain a sensitivity to the specificities of his 
objects of analysis that seems alert to the rationalising tendencies of scientific 
abstraction condemned by Adorno and Horkheimer. Luria described illiterate people 
as being insufficiently advanced due to the ‘unmediated’ nature of their thought 
processes, yet immediacy was paradoxically what he strove for when he constructed 
his experiments;
196
 Luria extolled the capacity for abstraction whilst eschewing it as 
a research methodology.  
 
In 1967 Luria informed Jerome Bruner that he planned to write up the results 
of his experiments in Central Asia conducted in the 1930s. He said that he conceived 
of the work as part of a ‘romantic series’ that would also include his two case 
histories: The Mind of a Mnemonist and The Man with a Shattered World (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4 and the Coda).
197
 Luria contrasted the 'romantic' approach 
taken in these late publications to the 'classical' approach typical of most scientific 
writing. For Luria, the romantic scientist hopes to convey the qualitative specificity 
of human experience by abjuring abstraction: 
Romantics in science want neither to split living reality into its elementary 
components nor to represent the wealth of life's concrete events in abstract 
models that lose the properties of the phenomena themselves. It is of the 
utmost importance to romantics to preserve the wealth of living reality, and 
they aspire to a science that retains this richness.
198
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Luria was not concerned with describing symptoms or responses in isolation from a 
person’s whole personality, but hoped that his approach would allow for the 
preservation of 'the manifold richness of the subject'.
199
  
 
In his description of ‘classical’ science, Luria defines abstraction as a 
withdrawal from reality, which drains qualities from the concrete.
200
 In these 
discussions he draws close to Adorno and Horkheimer’s arguments. His distinction 
between ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ science might be aligned with the distinction 
between traditional and critical theory Horkheimer outlined in 1930 (discussed in my 
Introduction). As Adorno bleakly intones in Aesthetic Theory: ‘the concrete 
continues to exist only as a mask of the abstract and the determinate particular is 
nothing more than an exemplar of the universal […] The marrow of experience has 
been sucked out.’201 In Negative Dialectics, Adorno advocates a mode of 
engagement with the world that resists abstraction by attending to objects in their 
specificity, which seems to chime with Luria’s definition of romantic science: ‘To 
yield to the object means to do justice to the object’s qualitative moments.’202  
 
  In the context of the Central Asian expeditions, as this chapter has argued,  
Luria’s declared sensitivity to cultural particularity was complicated by his 
continued imposition of pre-existing normative frameworks onto the Uzbek people  
he encountered. ‘Classical’ scientific abstraction returned through the back door.  
Ultimately, however, as the example of his descriptions of discussions with ‘ichkari’  
women demonstrates, Luria’s publications based on his research in Central Asia did  
not succeed in presenting the people he described as identical with his frameworks.  
Luria’s publications attest to continued tensions between the concrete and the  
abstract. 
 
 The two-fold character of Luria’s understanding of abstraction, which was 
simultaneously ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’, replicates the two-fold character of the 
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dialectic of Enlightenment in which domination and emancipation are constantly 
intertwined. A dialectical understanding of the relation between abstract and concrete 
is acknowledged by Luria when, in his discussion of scientific methodologies, he 
invokes Marx’s ‘strange-sounding expression “ascending to the concrete”’.203 
Similarly, the properly dialectical structure of Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument 
ensures that qualities are never successfully liquidated by abstraction, but remain as 
a substratum of all quantities.
204
 After all, they did not advocate returning to some 
lost past devoid of abstraction (indeed, they are clear that such a past never existed 
as ‘myth is already Enlightenment’).205 Splintered shards of hope coruscate within 
their bleak prose. They insist that 'every form of coercive power' tends towards a 
'negative utopia.’206 Luria’s work could be read as containing a similar impulse to 
dialectically overcome its own domineering aspect. 
 
Luria did not outline his ‘romantic’ approach to science until the end of his 
career, suggesting that only then were the political constraints loose enough to allow 
him to attend closely to the textures of reality such an approach necessitated. The 
closing chapter of this thesis argues that it was only in his case histories (published 
and written in the same period as Cognitive Development but based on material 
gathered after the Second World War) that Luria succeeded in prioritising analysis of 
his subjects over his frames for understanding them. As such, Luria’s attempt to 
develop a scientific method attentive to history might itself challenge Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s sweeping characterisation of science as necessarily on the side of 
manipulation and unification, in favour of a dialectical approach to objects (or, 
rather, to subjects) that did not reduce them to mere quantities.
207
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 This chapter began by asking whether Luria’s research merely reflected his 
Stalinist environment or whether it might have smashed through the mirror. A close 
analysis of materials pertaining to Luria’s expeditions to Central Asia suggests that 
although Luria described abstract thinking as the capacity to intervene in extant 
reality, in practice he was more concerned with creating subjects who reflected the 
structures emerging around them. However, he encountered people who failed to 
appear in the looking glass at all. Perhaps if he was less concerned with discerning 
the outlines of an ideal figure from whom those people departed, he might have 
come closer to a qualitative representation of them. This approach is gestured 
towards in The Mind of a Mnemonist (discussed in detail in the Coda), which opens 
with an epigraph from Lewis Carroll’s Alice Through the Looking Glass. Luria 
declares that his intention in writing the book was to take his readers through the 
glass to explore the unfamiliar world on the other side: ‘Together with little Alice we 
will slip past the smooth, cold surface of the looking glass and find ourselves in a 
wonderland, where everything is at once so familiar and recognisable, yet so strange 
and uncommon.’208  
 
Before leaving Moscow on the second expedition to Central Asia in 1932,  
Luria and his team attended a screening of Eisenstein’s The General Line (1929),  
which was released in Russian under the approved title The Old and the New. The  
film depicts the transformative impact of technology on the traditional agrarian  
countryside. In her discussion of the film’s relation to contemporaneous Soviet  
discourse, Anne Nesbet cites a bellicose speech delivered by Stalin in 1927:  
That which is dying out does not just want to get on with it and die, but rather 
fights for its existence, insists on its own outlived business. Here there is 
always something being born into life something new. But that which is born 
is not simply born, but wails and cries, insisting on its right to exist. (Voices: 
‘True!’ Applause). The battle between old and new, between that which is 
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dying out and that which is being born - this is the basis of our 
development.
209
 
 
Stalin depicted the fight between old and new ways of life, tradition and modernity, 
capitalism and communism, by imagining the latter as a vulnerable newly born baby. 
Luria’s experiments in Central Asia celebrated the birth of the new but bore witness 
to the tenacity of the old (and it was for this reason that his work was eventually 
denounced). This struggle between the old and the newly born also informed Luria’s 
work on child psychology. The study of actual newly born babies was central to the 
question of historical development posed by Stalin. However, as we shall see, the 
wails and cries of those born into Soviet life were often subordinated to the voices of 
those conducting their ‘own outlived business’. The tension between domination and 
emancipation remained unresolved. 
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Chapter 3 
The Child: Between Transformation and Stabilisation 
 
 
 
The dream of having children is merely a beggarly stimulus when it is not 
imbued with the dream of a new nature of things in which these children 
might one day live, or for which they can struggle […] (Herein lies the 
inextinguishable claim of the Fourierist utopia, a claim which Marx had 
recognised (and which Russia had begun to act on).)
1
  
  
 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project 
 
 
The Revolution has radically changed the attitude of children to parents […] 
The division between a generation of parents and children in Russia today 
may be the chasm between two social orders.
2
 
 
 Ella Winter, Red Virtue, 1933 
 
 
Playtime for the modern child in Russia is a part of its apprenticeship to the 
world being built for it.
3
 
 
 Ethel Mannin, ‘Playtime of the Child in Modern Russia’, 1935 
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Introduction 
 
In 1958 Luria met the British psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott at an international 
conference in Copenhagen. Winnicott subsequently contacted Luria to ask whether 
his paper ‘The First Year of Life’ would be of interest to Russian psychologists. He 
concluded his letter by noting: ‘It interests me very much that babies are really the 
same everywhere.’4 Written at the height of the Cold War, when animosity between 
East and West was at its zenith, Winnicott’s comment seems intended as an oblique 
gesture of empathy across the ideological divide. Regardless of his personal views 
on the subject, the continued restrictions on psychoanalytic publications in the Soviet 
Union would have prevented Luria from facilitating a translation. Furthermore, the 
British psychoanalyst’s emphasis on universality was at odds with Luria’s research 
with children, which was enmeshed with the Soviet state’s intention to forge subjects 
that would fundamentally differ from their Western counterparts; Luria emphasised 
particular goals over shared origins.  
 
Despite Luria’s early engagement with Freud, his conceptualisation of the 
child was markedly different in emphasis from psychoanalytic accounts developed in 
post-war Britain, and his exposure to psychoanalytic debates after 1930 was limited. 
Like Winnicott, Luria was concerned with the child’s adjustment to its environment, 
the development of the imagination, and language acquisition, but the family, the 
child’s relationship to the mother, gender difference and childhood sexuality – some 
of the central tenets of psychoanalytic theories of childhood - are conspicuous by 
their almost complete absence from Luria’s writings on child psychology. As Denise 
Riley discusses in her piercing analysis of post-war British developmental 
psychology War in the Nursery (1983), ‘generally held notions – of what an 
individual is, what society is – slip, uncriticised into child psychology’.5  The 
absence of certain concerns from Luria’s work signal the presence of an 
understanding of psychological development organised according to particular 
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precepts and elaborated in a specific social and political milieu where notions of 
what individuals and society were or might become were still unsettled.  
 
 
The child was central to Soviet ideology. Were babies all born alike? What influence 
did hereditary, class, nationality and education have on the child? What was the 
optimal upbringing for a Soviet citizen? What would happen to the family under 
communism? What role would the state play in rearing children? The two decades 
following the revolution witnessed profound shifts in the Soviet state’s attitude to 
children yet, as Lisa Kirschenbaum argues, ‘the happy child as icon of socialist 
transformation remained.’6 
 
In the aftermath of the revolution, bold utopians dreamt of the withering 
away of the family and the construction of a new collective existence: 
The new cities will bring about such drastic changes in life relationships that 
the words ‘my children’ and ‘my parents’ will lose the meaning of ownership 
and will no longer be used. An entirely new scheme of life will develop when 
a family of several thousand people live in a commune, with all the children 
growing up together and every adult contributing his share for their 
education.
7
 
 
The institutions and relationships that formed the basis for a child’s upbringing were 
all subject to change – gender roles in the workplace, family structures, housing, 
dining, education, childcare. Often contradictory ideas aimed at eviscerating old 
forms of everyday life [byt] challenged every aspect of quotidian existence. The 
1918 family code prohibited children from being adopted by individual families, 
positing the state as the guardian of its young citizens in an attempt to radically 
reimagine traditional family structures. The fledgling Soviet government legalised 
divorce and abortion, secularised marriage and encouraged women to enter the 
workforce in unprecedented numbers.
8
 However, women themselves, who were 
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often depicted as neglectful or incompetent mothers in need of state guidance, were 
not always seen as the prime beneficiaries of these policies. According to Lynn 
Mally, ‘women embodied all the problems of the past, but children were the hope of 
the future.’9 New baby names proliferated in the years after the revolution, 
accompanied by new atheistic naming ceremonies. Populating the world with 
‘humans called Spark, Joy, Will, Electric, Rebel and Barricade’ or variations on 
Marx, Engels, Robespierre and Rosa Luxembourg was an aspirational gesture, as if 
the very act of naming alone might bring a world of heroic brightness into being.
10
  
 
 Unlike Vygotsky, who is primarily renowned as an educationalist and 
developmental psychologist both in the former Soviet Union and in the West, Luria’s 
legacy is primarily tied to his post-war work in neurology.
11
 But Luria also published 
works on child psychology throughout his long career.
12
 His most intensive period of 
experimenting with children was from the late 1920s until 1936.
13
 During this period 
Luria was re-training as a neurologist in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, where he 
began to work on the localisation of brain function. From 1931-1934 Luria split his 
time between Kharkov and Moscow, returning permanently to the capital in 1934, 
the year of Vygotsky’s death.  
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Luria and Vygotsky were both associated with Pedology, a discipline 
dedicated to the study of childhood that was briefly ascendant in Soviet psychology 
during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32). Pedology was intended as 
the comprehensive science of the child. Yet so divergent are secondary accounts of 
the discipline’s history that Alexei Kozulin’s assertion that, ‘almost all work in 
educational psychology in the 1920s was called “pedology’’ seems to accurately 
summarise the scope of the project.
14 
 Pedology was not born on Soviet soil. Its first 
practitioner was G. Stanley Hall, the American psychologist responsible for Freud’s 
famous visit to the USA in 1909. A pedological institute was founded in Russia that 
year. But as the discipline dwindled in importance in Western Europe and America, 
its popularity grew in the USSR, reaching its peak in the early 1930s, as Stalin was 
consolidating his power. In April 1928, the Planning Commission for Pedological 
Research in Russia was set up. Former psychoanalyst turned fervent communist 
ideologue Aron Zalkind was appointed its chairman. The journal Pedology also 
started that year. The first All-Union Pedological Congress was held in 1928 and ran 
for a week. Approximately 3,000 delegates attended the event, including high 
ranking party leaders. Nikolai Bukharin, leader of the ‘right opposition’, addressed 
the Congress in a speech that lasted two hours, laying the foundations for the new 
science’s methodological approach. The link between children and the industrial 
future of the Soviet state was clearly stated:  
We need to direct our strength not into abstract chatter, but into an effort to 
produce a certain number of living workers in the shortest time frame; 
qualified, specially schooled machines that we can start up right away and set 
into motion.
15
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This statement by the practicing pedologist M. Gel’mont conveys the rhetoric typical 
of the discipline: 
The foundations of the old social order are disappearing under the huge 
building of socialism. A new socialist life is being created and a human 
transformation is occurring. The old proprietary and individualistic habits are 
being eradicated and a communistic attitude towards work and life is being 
formed.
16
  
 
Pedologists were to play a crucial role in education. Most schools across the Soviet 
Union had a resident pedologist and teachers were encouraged to record the 
behaviour of their students.
17
 By 1930 the Psychological Institute in Moscow was 
renamed the Institute of Psychology, Pedology and Industrial Psychology with 
Zalkind replacing Luria and Vygotsky’s former boss Kornilov as its director.  
 
Communism, however, could not be constructed overnight. As with 
everything in the post-revolutionary period, the concrete conditions of the present 
brushed up against abstract visions of the future. Despite the radical concrete 
changes that were wrought in Soviet social life, the impact and implementation of 
reforms were often hampered by material constraints and more traditional structures 
and practices persisted. Soviet theories of childhood, like actual Soviet children, 
were forced to contend with the realities of a country ravaged first by war and 
revolution and later by rapid industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture. 
By the time the Bolsheviks seized power, maintaining the status quo was not even an 
option, but a new social order structured according to a new set of norms gradually 
began to emerge from the wreckage of the old. As the revolution faded on the 
historical horizon, a stable world began to be built, which still paradoxically defined 
itself as being characterised by immolation and innovation. Situated between 
revolutionary transformation and the consolidation of an emerging order of things, 
the Soviet child embodied the paradox of Soviet society.  
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Walter Benjamin, who visited Moscow in the winter of 1926-27, noted that 
the slowing down of the revolutionary tempo sat awkwardly alongside the drive to 
educate a new revolutionary generation:  
An attempt is being made to arrest the dynamic of revolutionary progress in 
the life of the state – one has entered, like it or not, a period of restoration 
while nonetheless wanting to store up the revolutionary energy of youth like 
electricity in a battery.
18
 
 
Benjamin described a fresh political mood turning stale. He also detected a waning 
of enthusiasm in the revolutionary generation, which he described as a process of 
premature ageing: 
The generation that was active in the civil war years is growing old in 
vitality, if not in years. It is as if stabilisation had admitted to their lives the 
calm, sometimes even the apathy that is usually brought about only by old 
age.
19
 
 
Benjamin suggested that the once youthful vigour of the revolution itself had been 
lost. A contradiction between transformation and consolidation also animated Luria’s 
theorisations of the revolutionary child, but unlike Benjamin he framed the 
maturation of both individuals and the state in positive terms. Luria aligned ageing 
with progress, rather than seeing it as a form of deterioration, detachment and 
waning strength. In the context of a discussion of nineteenth-century pedagogy, 
Benjamin declared that ‘the adult was the ideal in whose image the educator aspired 
to mould the child.’20 This aspiration also structured Luria’s work.  
 
This chapter will contrast Luria’s writings on childhood with Benjamin’s, in 
order to probe the contradictory figure of the revolutionary child, caught between 
routine and rupture, revolution and reproduction, transformation and stabilisation. 
Benjamin and Luria’s contemporaneous works shared a commitment to Marxism, 
but nonetheless reveal very different attitudes toward children, which betray crucial 
differences between their political visions. Benjamin hoped that visiting Moscow 
would help him to decide whether to join the Communist Party. He had also been 
commissioned to write an entry for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia on Goethe. 
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Unlike Luria, whose Encyclopaedia entry on ‘Imagination’ is discussed in detail 
below, Benjamin’s contribution to this standard state-issued reference work was 
ultimately not accepted for publication.
21
 This seemingly trivial episode indicates 
that Luria marched in step with official Soviet discourse, while Benjamin followed a 
more idiosyncratic path. Benjamin never joined the Communist Party; he remained a 
heterodox Marxist. Working within the Soviet system, such an approach was not 
available to Luria, especially as the 1930s unfolded.  
 
Benjamin’s writings on childhood provide an alternative vision of 
revolutionary childhood, setting Luria’s ideas into relief. Both Benjamin and Luria 
assumed some correlate existed between individual and historical development, 
between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic; the question of childhood was a 
revolutionary question not only because children played a role in history but because 
they provided a model for understanding historical development. By contrasting 
Benjamin’s work on children with Luria’s, I hope to draw attention to the constraints 
of the latter’s Marxist-Leninist model in order to recover some moments of 
revolutionary energy and childishness persisting amid the processes of stabilisation 
and maturation it outlined.      
   
The New-born Baby: From Organic Passivity to Historical Activity 
 
‘Imagine a man in whom all the links connecting him with the environment are cut 
off one after another; he turns out to be completely isolated from the world, a lone 
person amidst the world of things that do not exist for him.’22 This is how Luria and 
Vygotsky characterise the new born baby in ‘The Child and its Behaviour’ (1930), 
also likening it to an anchorite monk. They begin by attacking those who would 
present the child as an adult in miniature. This representational fallacy, they say, is 
typical of ‘primitive’ people, and can also be observed in the history of art, which is 
littered with images of the baby Jesus whose bodily proportions resemble those of a 
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grown man. Luria and Vygotsky insist instead that the child is a ‘very special type of 
creature, who qualitatively differs from an adult and whose laws of life and activity 
should undoubtedly be studied with particular attention.’23 
 
The baby’s initial stage of ‘irradiated arousal’ is only gradually replaced by 
more stable perceptions.
24
 The authors claim that young children continue to be 
solitary, passive and organic, concerned only with their own comfort. Young infants 
are ‘parasitic’.25 They have yet to encounter the obstacles presented by reality and 
seek only to satisfy their immediate wants. Similarly, speech for the young child is 
not used to communicate with others but is addressed to the self alone. Here, Luria 
and Vygotsky cite research conducted by Jean Piaget into egocentric speech. 
Although they acknowledge universal characteristics in very young children, they 
note suggestively that Piaget’s conclusions are specific to the environment in which 
he conducted his experiments: ‘Our children, developing in a different environment, 
may show different results.’26 However, Luria and Vygotsky’s description of the 
baby displays none of the attributes that the Soviet state hoped to inculcate in its 
ideal citizens. Elsewhere, Luria explicitly declares that children are full of 
‘shortcomings and inconsistencies,’27 outlining their inadequacies before asking, 
‘what, really, can we expect from such a creature?’28 But he was concerned with 
tracing the process by which humans overcome this initial stage of life through a 
series of dialectical transformations.  
 
Writing in 1931, Vygotsky outlined the methodological differences between 
Soviet pedology and its Western predecessors. Pedology, he argued, had not survived 
in the West, due to the inability of its practitioners to meaningfully combine 
approaches from various disciplines. The child, Vygostky claimed, is a unique object 
and cannot be understood by falsely separating the physical from the psychological, 
the external from the internal, the biological from the social. Faced with the child’s 
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complex developmental transformations, these Western pedologists were unable ‘to 
consciously reflect the dialectical nature of child development.’ 29 Vygotsky claimed 
that a new methodology was required to grasp the unity (but not the identity) of 
mental and physiological processes, of thinking and being, of appearance and 
experience, of the general and the particular. Western pedologists were able to 
identify links between different phenomena (for example between intellect and 
memory, education and nourishment) but ‘deprived them of any internal integrity 
and structure’ and instead described nothing more than disconnected particles; ‘a 
heap of broken glass […] a pile of broken atoms.’30 By adopting a dialectical 
methodology informed by Marx, Soviet psychologists could, Vygotsky claimed, 
overcome these deficiencies. Such an approach would not only describe how 
different psychological phenomena related to one another, but would also situate the 
child in its particular social, cultural and historical environment. According to 
Vygotsky, the dialectical psychologist should consider nothing in isolation.  
 
 Dialectics for Vygotsky was not only a scientific methodology but also 
provided a model for understanding how the child itself developed. Like the 
Communist state’s understanding of historical and economic development, 
pedologists carved childhood into discrete stages with a dialectical transformation 
occurring at each phase of transition.
31
 Vygotsky described human life as an ‘ascent 
up the stages of development’ in which stable periods were punctuated by crises.32 
He explicitly likened this to revolutionary historical processes. During stable periods 
‘development proceeds as if underground,’33 but then a crisis erupts at which point 
‘development takes on a stormy, impetuous and sometimes catastrophic character 
that resembles a revolutionary course of events.’34 As Carolyn Steedman discusses in 
the context of Western European psychology, ‘the child’s developing body and mind 
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could be understood as the epitome of a more general historical progress.’35 In his 
delineation of the different stages of childhood, Vygotsky does not explicitly align 
the stages of human development with particular historical epochs (for example, by 
comparing ancient Greece to infancy as Marx had done).
36
 Rather than mapping the 
content of thought across history onto individual human life, the analogy was instead 
intended to describe the form of developmental transition, characterised by ‘abrupt 
and major shifts and displacements, changes and discontinuities.’37 The process he 
described was not smooth but uneven: ‘the development of the child is a dialectical 
process in which a transition from one stage to another is accomplished not along an 
evolutionary, but along a revolutionary path.’38  
 
 This development was not, however, seen to occur outside of history. As 
outlined in his critique of Western pedology, organic and historical factors were said 
to intersect. This emphasis on history is what differentiates this model of 
developmental stages from that proposed by Piaget.
39
 Although certain developments 
were considered innate and biological (for example, teething or puberty) Luria and 
Vygotsky also insisted that these could not be understood in isolation from social 
factors.  They demonstrate this by way of an agricultural metaphor: 
At first, the earth produced as much as the natural conditions (its properties, 
weather, germination of random seeds) permitted; with cultural management 
and new conditions - fertiliser, development of better tools and maintenance-
it began to yield a far greater harvest, and gradually (under prolonged cultural 
[sic]) the earth itself changed and proved to have adapted to maximum 
production.
40
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Just as Soviet agricultural policies aimed to apply technological innovations to the 
natural material of the earth in order to yield vast grain outputs, Soviet psychologists 
hoped that the natural material of the child could be enhanced by cultural means. 
 
For Luria, the specificities of the ‘cultural-industrial’ environment constituted 
the decisive factor in determining how the individual develops. This was consistent 
with the rhetoric of the First Five Year Plan. M. Ilin’s children’s book The Story of 
the First-Five Year Plan (1931) asked: ‘Why have we begun all this tremendous 
work? Why do we mine millions of tons of coal and ore? Why do we build millions 
of machines? Do we do these things merely to change Nature?’41 The response  –  
that changing nature would change humanity  –  was one that psychologists were 
well placed to address. In the Soviet Union, it was declared, modernity had 
succeeded in conquering nature, creating a technological environment which altered 
human thought in turn. Luria and Vygotsky celebrated the artificial accretions that 
extend human capacities. Tools and language were central to their account of human 
development. Indeed, they described a child’s ‘entrance into life’ not as its birth, but 
as its initiation into the cultural world.
42
 Walter Benjamin similarly noted that ‘little 
babies’ gained entry into the ‘Communist hierarchy’ in Russia ‘the moment they are 
able to point to the picture of Lenin.’43 The passive infant transforms into an active 
subject.  
 
Luria, drawing on Engels, emphasised that the formation of ‘advanced’ 
dialectical thinking came about through a relationship between people and their 
environment. He was concerned with the development of capacities that allowed the 
subject to exert an influence on their environment. For Luria, human subjects and 
external objects were mutually constituted: only through this transformative 
encounter could human thought ascend to a ‘higher’ stage. The dialectic between 
people and their surroundings constituted the basis of historical progress and 
precipitated the development of dialectical thinking: 
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What traits have we become accustomed to seeing in behaviour guided by 
dialectical thinking? A keen regard for the real, the ability to take into 
account all sorts of changing conditions. So as to be able not only to adapt to 
the real world but also to predict its dynamics and to adapt it to oneself; a 
considerable plasticity and flexibility of behaviour that enable one to make 
use of different devices and different means, depending on the situation; and, 
finally, the definitive rejection of all pat, ossified forms of behaviour – these 
are the traits of behaviour that best reflect the dialectical method of 
thinking.
44
 
 
Luria concludes this description of ‘advanced’ thought by remarking that ‘it is just 
these traits that we do not observe in the behaviour of the small child.’45 His work 
with children was therefore directed at encouraging the development of this mode of 
perception from the youngest possible age. In attempting to construct the ideal 
communist subject, however, Luria’s psychological methodologies, as we shall see, 
were often not as critical of ‘pat, ossified forms of behaviour’ as this statement 
suggests.  
 
 According to Luria, the baby adapts to its environment through experience. 
The senses develop in tandem with memory. Eventually the ‘accidental, separate and 
fluctuating scraps’ of jumbled perceptions are replaced by more stable and complete 
pictures.
 46
 But as the external world becomes gradually more orderly, it begins to 
merge with the child’s inner world: ‘In perceiving the world holistically, the small 
child at the same time often loses the boundary separating reality from fantasy, the 
present from the past, what exists from what is desired.’47 As a result, the child 
continues ‘to hatch up unusually vivid fantasies’ in order to live between two 
worlds.
48
 For Luria, the transition to adulthood involves developing the ability to 
keep these two realms firmly apart. It is only then that the individual will be able to 
exert ‘an efficient influence on the world.’49 A process of cultural reconstruction 
must occur for the child to shed fantasies and ascend to the adult stage, adapted to 
(and therefore capable of adapting) the external world. Play plays a key role here. 
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All Work and No Play: Soviet Toys 
 
Vygotsky and Luria’s Ape, Primitive and Child, first published in 1930, explores 
three distinct forms of psychological development: evolutionary, cultural and 
individual. In their introduction, the authors explain that in each case they are 
interested in describing a qualitative, dialectical transformation that concerns the 
development of ‘auxilary means’. The term comes from a passage by Francis Bacon 
which forms the book’s epigraph: ‘A bare hand and a mind by itself are worth not 
that much: everything is performed with the help of tools and auxiliary means.’50  In 
the context of childhood, toys and games are understood as one such tool.  
 
Luria discusses play in the entry he wrote on ‘Imagination’ for the 1929 
edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, which begins by identifying two distinct 
forms of imagination:  
passive or reproductive imagination, which consists of recalling images of 
past experience in the memory without substantially changing them, and 
active or productive imagination, a different process which involves 
combining the results of experience [to create] new images.
51
 
 
Imagination is said to play a role in all intellectual, practical and creative activities, 
as well as in dreaming and in waking fantasy. Imagination relies on the capacity to 
‘spontaneously call forth images that are not drawn directly from environmental 
stimuli.’ 52 Luria characterises imagining as a visual process that involves creating 
new images in the mind. Although this relies on memory it involves more than a 
‘mere repetition’ of previous experience. The non-immediacy of imagination is not, 
however, irregular or anarchic but is governed by laws which, he says, psychologists 
are capable of analysing and describing. He goes on to discuss the centrality of the 
imaginative capacity in children, claiming that ‘distinguishing reality from the 
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imaginary comes only at a certain stage of development.’53 For Luria, this capacity 
to differentiate develops through play. 
 
For Luria, play is simultaneously reproductive and creative; it participates in 
children’s ascension to a higher cognitive level. The function of play is not to invent 
alternate realities, new worlds or original narratives, however; games are a rehearsal 
for adult life. Luria may have criticised representations of children as tiny adults, yet 
he was dedicated to ensuring these peculiar creatures adopted the features of their 
adult progenitors as swiftly as possible. This understanding of play was attuned to 
the Soviet goal of creating fervent revolutionaries dedicated to constructing a new 
world, but it fails to conceive of the child’s distinct modes of perception as 
disruptive in their own right. Here, Benjamin’s writings on childhood provide a 
provocative counterpoint.     
 
Benjamin returned from Moscow to Berlin in 1927 with a bag full of hand-
crafted toys collected from street vendors in the Soviet Capital (Plates 3.1-3.3). The 
following year he wrote a number of articles on childhood focusing on the concept 
of play. In the 1928 review essay ‘Toys and Play’, Benjamin invokes the discussion 
of repetition in play in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). In Freud’s 
essay, which Luria had co-written the introduction to in 1925, Freud gives the 
example of incessant repetitions in play as a phenomenon that demonstrates the 
‘mysterious masochistic trends of the ego’.54 Freud describes a game in which a 
spool is continually thrown away and retrieved by a child. Fort/da, fort/da, fort/da: 
the child repeats in play the distressing experience of his mother’s departure in order 
to master his own feelings of abandonment and to exact revenge on his deserter. The 
game represents an early example of instinctual renunciation through which the child 
learns to forego immediate gratification and adapt to the constraints imposed by the 
reality principle. Through play the child transforms from a passive to an active 
subject: ‘At the outset he was in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the 
experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on 
an active part.’ 55 For Benjamin, however, repetition in play is not only about 
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overcoming past trauma, but also has a celebratory aspect which opens up the 
possibility of new triumphs in the future. Returning to the beginning represents the - 
‘reinstatement of the original condition’ - the possibility of starting afresh.56  The 
game thus represents the possibility of breaking with established trajectories. For 
Benjamin, the child in play emerges as an autonomous subject who can constantly 
renegotiate the course of events by starting over again and again and again.
57
  
 
Play here mediates between routine and rupture. Through experimentations 
with inanimate objects the child familiarises itself with external rhythms and 
structures. Games orient the child to the world, and are crucial for teaching the 
‘struggling little brat’ to perform simple everyday activities: eating, sleeping, 
dressing and washing.
58
 As outlined in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the 
relationship between life and death instincts is a relationship of assimilation to 
dissimilation, of construction to destruction (the oppositional tension which, I argued 
in Chapter 1, Luria and Vygotsky attempted to do away with in their discussion of 
Freud’s essay). Benjamin suggests that play is animated by a similarly paradoxical 
temporality. Play represents ‘the transformation of a shattering experience into 
habit’, but this habit crucially retains its shattered qualities. Early playful experience 
ossifies over time but the creative and exuberant origins of habit die hard: ‘Habit 
enters life as a game, and in habit, even in its most sclerotic forms, an element of 
play survives to the end.’59 Benjamin suggests that even within the most routinised 
activities an element of discovery persists. The childlike zeal for repetition lives on, 
which implies that the capacity to remake the world survives with it.  
 
This contradictory characterisation of play intersects suggestively with 
Luria’s distinction between reproductive and productive imagination. For Luria, 
however, the establishment of habit assembles the shattered perception of the child 
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into a smooth, unbroken whole; habit succeeds shattering. As with his interpretation 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which attempted to remove the contradiction and 
negativity from Freud’s theory, Luria’s definition of childhood occludes any 
consideration of the generative potential of the tenacity of earlier phases of 
development in adulthood. The alternative vision of childhood proposed by 
Benjamin points to disavowed internal contradictions that persist in Luria’s more 
neat teleological account.  
 
‘Everyone must have seen a child reaching his hands toward the moon 
hoping to grasp it,’60 Luria and Vygotsky write in ‘The Child and His Behaviour’. 
They claim that the child reaching towards the moon is in the process of learning to 
master space and perspective. It has yet to understand perspective; everything it can 
see is therefore assumed to be close at hand. The example functions to demonstrate 
the child’s inability to fully comprehend its situation. Benjamin employs the same 
analogy to explain his political approach to history (here inspired by Charles 
Fourier’s understanding of explosivity): ‘the idea of revolution as an innervation of 
the technical organs of the collective (analogy with the child who learns to grasp by 
trying to get hold of the moon)’.61 Benjamin subverts the conventional understanding 
presented by Luria and Vygotsky. He celebrates the child’s unique perspective, 
linking it explicitly to ‘the idea of “cracking open of natural teleology”’.62 The child 
is not constrained to its immediate surroundings but reaches up into the starry 
galaxies. This enlivening contact with the external world is likened to a 
technological transformation: ‘the spark that ignites the powder of nature.’63 
Benjamin places the collective in the position of the child, recalling the observation 
he made of Moscow that ‘the liberated pride of the proletariat is matched by the 
emancipated bearing of the children.’64 The child, for Benjamin, is imagined as a 
utopian figure reaching beyond its natural limits to obtain something it desires. The 
example of the child grasping the moon reappears in a version of Benjamin’s ‘The 
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Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’ (1936), in which the 
analogy between technological transformation and play, revolution and childhood is 
more explicitly articulated:  
Revolutions are innervations of the collective or, more precisely, efforts at 
innervation on the part of the new, historically unique collective which has 
its organs in the new technology. This second technology is a system in 
which the mastering of elementary social forces is a precondition for playing 
[das Spiel] with natural forces. Just as a child who has learned to grasp 
stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for a ball, so humanity, in its 
efforts at innervation, sets its sights as much on currently utopian goals as on 
goals within reach.
65
 
 
A Soviet children’s journal launched in the 1920s was called ‘Isgorka’ – ‘Sparklet’ 
or ‘Little Spark’ (the diminutive of ‘Iskra’) - but Luria intended to defuse rather than 
detonate the explosive material of the child.  
 
Benjamin’s Moscow is a fairytale landscape moving to a rural rhythm. The 
city, he says, ‘swarms with children everywhere’, and its icy pavements, upon which 
one is forced to move clumsily and unsteadily, plunge the visitor back into 
childhood.
66
 He describes dimly lit labyrinthine streets littered with hand-crafted 
objects. Nothing shines here apart from street vendors’ baubles and the falling flakes 
of snow:                                                                                                                                         
The smallest coloured rag glows out of doors. Picture books lie in the snow; 
Chinese vendors sell artfully made paper fans and, still more frequently, 
paper kites in the form of deep sea fish. Day in day out children’s festivals 
are provided for. There are men with baskets full of wooden toys, carts and 
spades […] their peasant origin clearly visible.67                   
                                                     
The frozen artisanal city Benjamin describes in Moscow Diary bears little 
resemblance to the modern communist future that he perceives the faint outlines of 
in Fyodor Gladkov’s seminal Soviet novel Cement (1925).68 Unlike Luria, whose 
developmental models sought to overcome the past, he did not, however, present the 
persistence of the past in the present as necessarily antithetical to the revolutionary 
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project: for Benjamin, communism must redeem the past not obliterate it. Benjamin 
discusses the re-emergence of old forms of manufacturing that incorporate elements 
of the emerging society, like a lacquer box depicting a ‘Soviet Madonna with the 
Cigarettes’.69 He perceived a ‘secret understanding’ between the traditional 
craftsperson and the child, and his accounts of Moscow dwell explicitly on the 
remnants of tradition in the midst of innovation, seeing them as imbued with oblique 
political hope.
70
  
 
After the onset of the First Five Year Plan in 1928, the street traders 
Benjamin described disappeared from Soviet cities, rounded up and arrested for 
‘speculation’ in the campaign to eradicate the last vestiges of private enterprise.71 
This coincided with a re-examination of Soviet state toy manufacturing. In 1930, 
Komsomolskaia Pravda published an article on ‘Soviet Toy Deficiencies’ attacking 
the continued existence of children’s toys and games that belonged to the pre-
revolutionary era. Bourgeois interiors, ‘Philistine family furniture’, lavishly dressed 
dolls, animals dressed in human clothing, overfed clowns – toys were attacked for 
presenting misleading impressions of reality or for reproducing non-proletarian 
values. Instead, the article argued that ‘the factory should produce toys that 
correspond to the aims of communist education […] In this rough and sometimes 
cruel circus world we want to amuse our proletarian children; but we must consider 
the quality of children’s laughter.’72 Toys should be appropriate to children’s role as 
builders of the communist future.  
 
Benjamin noted the physical fragility of the traditional toys sheltered in the 
‘safe asylum’ of the Moscow toy museum.73 He also appreciated their historical 
fragility: ‘who knows how long even this kind of folk art can withstand the 
triumphant progress of technology which today sweeps across Russia. Already the 
demand for these things has supposedly died.’74 In November 1931 the first 
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exhibition of children’s toys was held in Moscow. In stark contrast to the simple and 
traditional objects hewn from ‘wood, clay, bone, textiles, paper, papier-mache’75 that 
Benjamin described after visiting the toy museum in Moscow, this presented a vision 
of industrialised Soviet society in miniature, with all traces of the past erased. The 
exhibition included a miniature model of the Dnipropetrovsk dam (one of the 
showpieces of the First Five Year Plan) and a tiny conveyor belt at which two shock 
brigades of Pioneers were set to work assembling toys (Plate 3.4). Like a living 
maquette of their Stakhanovite adult counterparts, the children were set in 
competition with one another; the importance of maximum efficiency and a love of 
work were to be instilled at the earliest stages of life.
76
   
 
In 1935, the Pedological and Pedagogical Laboratory, with which Luria was 
associated, published a study investigating children’s play, using new Soviet toys; 
toys designed to prefigure a new way of life. It includes dolls corresponding to the 
nationalities of the Soviet Union and different class groups and games based on the 
kolkhoz, the Park of Culture and Rest, public dining rooms, public laundries, 
factories and modes of transport (particularly locomotives, an archetypal symbol of 
progressive Soviet modernity). Construction, mastery of complex narrative and 
cooperation are the central goals of these toys (Plates 3.5-3.6).
77 
  
 
This emphasis on fostering efficiency and practicality was also evident in 
Luria’s research. In 1934 Luria returned full-time to Moscow from Kharkov, where 
750 set of twins were under observation at the Medico-Biological Institute in 
Moscow. Like his experiments in Central Asia, these investigations were addressed 
to fierce debates about nature versus nurture raging at that time. ‘The Experimental 
Development of the Constructive Activity – on the Differential Training of Identical 
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twins’ (1936), co-authored with A. N. Miranova, is based on the analysis of three 
pairs of seven-year old identical twins. Each pair of twins was separated to create 
two groups. The first group (E) were trained to passively copy figures composed of 
wooden blocks. The second group (M) were also trained to reproduce the 
composition, but were only shown the outline of the final shape, rather than the 
positioning of each individual block. The twins were then given a series of tests that 
required them to reproduce different figures on paper or to identify geometrical 
shapes in a puzzle (Plate 3.7). The second group was shown to be more capable of 
accurate reproduction than the first, even 18 months after the initial training has 
occurred. The capacity to accurately reproduce drawings and constructions was 
deemed the most desirable outcome of the experiment. Luria and Miranova claimed 
that creativity was required to accomplish this task; it was not a passive or automatic 
activity.
78
 This, however, in tune with Luria’s understanding of imagination, is a 
narrow definition of creativity which allows for the reproduction of existing forms 
but does not encourage children to invent their own constructions or images. Luria 
emphasises continuity over change, reproduction over revolution, habit over 
shattering. 
 
In another paper, based on the same experiments, Luria is explicit that ‘ad 
hoc creative play’ is not conducive to learning and warns against allowing children’s 
activities to ‘degenerate into simple spur-of-the-moment play’.79  Although he 
concedes that this form of play is more entertaining for the child, he argues that it 
has no pedagogic function as the child proceeds ‘without an analysis of the objective 
properties with which [it] is playing’.80 In this scenario chaos reigns: a wooden block 
might become a cow, a dog or a tree. The child manipulates everything according to 
its whim and does not learn to accommodate ‘realistic’ material constraints. The 
‘creative construction’ involved in reproducing a structure from a model is, by 
contrast, deemed goal-oriented and constrained: ‘the child is always obliged to 
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remain within the framework of constructive activity’.81 Luria wants to replace the 
fragmented perceptions of the child with the unified coherence of the adult. Giving 
free rein to the imagination might be fun but, Luria insists sternly, it has no practical 
social utility. Benjamin emphasised the revolutionary potential of the children’s ad 
hoc and unconstrained perceptions, which envisaged worlds that departed from 
existing adult ones, whereas Luria hoped to train children to work within existing 
frameworks.   
 
In Benjamin’s work it is precisely the child’s capacity to transform inert 
lumps of wood into ever-shifting imagined worlds that positively distinguishes it 
from the adult. Benjamin’s One Way Street (1928) is dedicated to his lover and 
comrade Asja Lacis, whose illness occasioned his visit to Moscow, and whose 
relation to Bolshevism and role as the director of a Proletarian Children’s Theatre 
exerted a strong influence on his work.
82
 In the passage ‘Construction Site’ 
Benjamin attacks contemporary toy manufacturers and educators whose ‘infatuation 
with psychology’ has led to a failure to appreciate the inventiveness of the child for 
whom any discarded object might become a toy. Children are concerned with 
‘haunting any site where things are being visibly worked on’, a statement that 
superficially agrees with Luria’s conclusions. 83 For Benjamin, however, children are 
not concerned with reproducing the adult activities being performed on those sites 
but with gleaning from and repurposing the detritus they generate:  
In waste products [children] recognise the face of the world turned directly 
and solely to them. In using these things they do not so much imitate the 
world of adults as bring together, in the artefact produced in play, materials 
of widely differing kinds in a new, intuitive relationship. Children thus 
produce their own smaller world of things within the greater one.
84
 
 
Crucially, this smaller creation is not a scale model of the adult world but a distinct 
and magical planet constructed according to childish principles. Benjamin suggests 
that the child is most creative when subverting the plans of adults, stating that the 
‘most enduring modifications in toys are never the work of adults […] but are the 
result of children at play. Once mislaid, broken, and repaired, even the most princely 
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doll becomes a capable proletarian comrade in the children’s play commune.’85 
Soviet educators and psychologists imagined play as a rehearsal for work but 
Benjamin, drawing on Fourier, suggests the inverse: play provides an image of work 
freed from exploitation.
86
  
 
Luria’s experiments focus on activities that require children to build or 
mould - wooden blocks and plasticine are his preferred research materials.
87
 
Learning how to construct and mould were also crucial steps in the construction and 
moulding of children. Unlike in Benjamin’s work, creation here is prescriptive. In 
Luria’s experiments children are praised for creating things that correspond to 
reality: reproducing an existing wooden structure is better than inventing a structure 
from scratch, making a plasticine table with four legs is better than making one with 
two. One child is praised for busying himself with the construction of a complex 
metro system including tunnels, stations and trains. His fierce resistance to the 
structure being disturbed by a playmate is given as an example of his cognitive 
progress: he ‘restored the building and returned to playing with it.’88 Mastering such 
activities paves the way for adult life. Perhaps the child would one day work 
building a real Soviet Metro system.
89
 In Luria’s account of childhood development, 
language also plays a key role in the construction of this pathway from disordered 
individualism to organised collectivity.   
 
Language and Organisation 
 
According to Luria, the capacity for abstract thinking is related to the capacity to 
plan, reproduce and organise. Abstraction in this definition is not connected to 
abstract forms of representation. In his analysis of children’s drawings, for example, 
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Luria deems non-figurative scribbles a sign of underdevelopment. As with his 
experiments in Central Asia, it is the ability to think in concepts and to classify 
objects according to socially established criteria that represents the successful 
transition to a higher level of development. He does not celebrate the surreal or 
absurd.
90
  
Speech and the Development of Mental Processes in the Child, based on 
research undertaken in the early 1930s, is also based on Luria’s research with twins. 
The book focuses on one pair of identical twins, Yura and Liosha. Luria notes that 
although the twins are ‘good, cheerful, energetic, mischievous, friendly and 
affectionate’, they are insufficiently advanced.91 The twins have grown up playing 
together and have thus developed a private language that is more simplistic or 
‘concrete’ than that of most children their age. They have a very limited vocabulary, 
tend to distort words and the language they use tends to pertain to their immediate 
surroundings or situation. In the experiment the twins are first observed playing 
together, before being placed in a communal children’s home where they are 
separated, with one receiving additional language lessons. The book traces the 
changes that occur in the twins’ speech and behaviour as a result.  
 
In one experiment, the separated twins are both presented with images of 
animals with human apparel or attributes. Luria records their responses (Child A has 
received extra tuition unlike Child B): 
Yura (A): 
 
‘Does this happen?’ ‘It does’ ‘What is the cat doing?’ ‘The cat is playing’ 
‘Can a cat really play on the violin?’ ‘No’ ‘Then does this happen?’ ‘No’ 
 
Liosha (B): 
 
‘Is this drawing right?’ ‘It is’ ‘Can a cat really dance like this?’ ‘No’ ‘Then is 
the drawing right or not?’ ‘Right’ ‘Have you seen a cat play on a balalaika?’ 
‘No’ ‘Then is this drawing right or not?’ ‘Right’ ‘But can a cat play on a 
balaika?’ etc92 
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This example is used to demonstrate the development of a ‘theoretical’ attitude. The 
first child is deemed more advanced than the second because he is able to identify 
that a cat cannot actually play a musical instrument. As with his experiments with 
wooden blocks, Luria is clear that imagination is valued insofar as it relates to the 
capacity to plan ahead, to construct and enact realistic goals for the future. A clear 
division between fantasy and reality needs to be instilled for the healthy 
development of the child. Children cannot persist in thinking that cats can really play 
the balalaika.  
 
In the 1920s and early 1930s, there were conflicting ideas in the Soviet 
Union about the fantasy life of children. Particularly fierce debates focused on the 
issue of fairytales (traditional Russian folktales known as ‘skazki’). The mainstream 
Party line initially advocated an attack on children’s literature that departed from 
everyday life. One such ideologue proclaimed: 'There is nothing to justify cats 
dressed up in hats or dogs baking pies; these fairground images add nothing positive 
to a child's emotions, nor do they inculcate clear ideas about animal behaviour.'
93
 
Dorothy Thompson, who visited the Soviet Union in 1928, recalled being informed 
by a kindergarten teacher of a proletarian re-writing of Cinderella which saw the 
monarchy overthrown with the justification that ‘“we do not want the energies of 
this coming generation dissipated by fantastic dreams about things which have no 
relation to our life and its problems.”’94 Many Constructivist artists produced works 
aimed at children and children’s literature remained a haven for avant garde writers 
and artists into the 1930s. But though these works were illustrated with dynamic, 
geometric illustrations full of bright colours and off-kilter figures, the narratives 
tended to be grounded in everyday life (Plates 3.8 -3.9). The communal kitchens, 
automatic cooking appliances, zooming locomotives and slick factories that 
appeared in Soviet children’s literature of the NEP period may have been as 
fantastical as any fairy tale, but they were intended as prototypes for the future.
95
 As 
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such, they might be aligned with the form of imaginative capacity discussed by 
Luria.   
 
Luria and Vygotsky approvingly cite the influential children’s author Nikolai 
Chukovsky in ‘The Child and His Behaviour’. Chukovsky’s work came under attack 
in the late 1920s but he eventually emerged triumphant, surviving the purges to 
become one of the Soviet Union’s most prominent children’s authors.96 Although 
socialist realism was established as the dominant Soviet literary genre at the Soviet 
Writers’ Congress in 1934, this, counterintuitively, coincided with the official 
reintroduction of traditional fairytales for children.
97
 Chukovsky was to play a 
prominent role in the eventual denunciation of Pedology later in the decade. His 
Little Children, first published in 1928 and reissued numerous times (under the title 
From Two to Five), presents a collection of the utterances of children, characterising 
them as ‘apt, beautiful and natural’ (Plate 3.10-3.11).98 He praises children’s joyful 
and inquisitive minds, delighting in their malapropisms and incorrect suppositions.  
 
Chukovsky attacks early Soviet educators for not recognising the value of 
teaching poetry to children, quoting from a father’s letter that he says is typical of 
attitudes of the late 1920s:  
Shame on you Comrade Chukovsky, for filling the heads of our children with 
all kinds of nonsense, such as that trees grow shoes. I have read with 
indignation in one of your books such fantastic lines as “Frogs fly up in the 
sky/Fish sit in the fishermen’s lap/Mice catch cats/And lock them up 
in/Mousetraps”. Why do you distort realistic facts? Children need socially 
useful information and not fantastic stories about white bears who cry cock-
a-doodle-doo.
99
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Chukovsky rails against the crushing of children’s creative impulses claiming that an 
overzealous attachment to realism is restrictive and ‘risks fading the colour out of the 
child’s speech, making it anaemic and devitalised, killing in it its wonderful 
childishness and inflicting a permanent harm.’100 Children, he argues, have an innate 
aversion to the established order of things, as such they delight in stories and games 
that enact a ‘violation of reality’: ‘the child is attracted to that topsy-turvy world 
where legless men run, water burns, horses gallop astride their riders, and cows 
nibble on peas on the top of birch trees.’101 Unlike Luria, who maintains that young 
children confuse reality and fantasy, Chukovsky insists that children are well aware 
of the distinction between the two: a child does not eat the sand pie that it bakes on 
the beach.
102
  
 
Chukovsky’s diatribes against people intent on sapping the ‘creative genius 
of the people’103 were explicitly aimed at pedologists who he accused of making a 
‘banal fetish’ of practicality.104 He recounts that in 1929 he visited a children’s home 
where a fairytale book was snatched from him by a man in uniform:  
the pedologists are worried and tremble at the thought that children will 
actually believe that shoes grow on trees. Some children are so suspicious of 
everything – even the most poetic, that is, the most unreal – that everything 
beyond the limits of the everyday and the ordinary they consider a bold-faced 
and senseless fabrication.
105
 
 
For Chukovsky, however, an inversion of reality always existed as a counterpart to 
reality itself, presenting an image of the world turned upside down therefore serves 
to enforce the child’s orientation to the existing state of things. Ultimately, 
Chukovsky and the pedologists he attacked shared assumptions about childhood 
perception and learning processes. Both Chukovsky and Luria were primarily 
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concerned with teaching the child to orient itself to the established structures of the 
world.
106
  
 
Benjamin, again, provides an alternative vision. Benjamin and Luria both 
presented childhood perception as an undifferentiated, swarming mess of colour. It 
was their evaluation of this mode of perception that differed. Luria’s work was 
addressed to a description of how ‘discrete, defined structures begin to crystallise out 
of the chaos of different shades and hues.’107 His work was not descriptive but 
prescriptive, as he intended to discover how this crystallisation process might be 
facilitated through education. Benjamin, on the other hand, celebrated the child’s 
‘colour-bedecked world where everything shifts at every step’.108 He argued that 
picture books should not induct children into an ordered world of things but should 
rather enable the child to imbue objects with a ‘dreamy life’ of their own.109  
 
These differences are evident in Luria’s and Benjamin’s observations of their 
own children’s development. Luria, like Piaget who famously observed his three 
children, made notes on his daughter Elena’s physical development, affective 
responses and perceptions of colour and sound.
110
 His observations about her 
linguistic development emphasise the relation between speech and the gratification 
of need (for example, he notes that she initially communicated in imperatives 
indicating basic wants). He also gives examples of infantile misunderstanding, 
relating an occasion when she mistakenly called a puddle a ‘shame’ as this was what 
her nurse always exclaimed when the child wet herself. Luria describes this as a 
‘comical event’ but, like Chukovsky, interprets the incident as a mistake to be 
corrected.
111
 Benjamin also documented his son Stefan’s language usage, collecting 
his childish aphorisms and idiosyncratic formulations in a special notebook. In her 
introduction to a translation of the surviving fragments of this collection, Esther 
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Leslie differentiates Benjamin’s observations from the more systemic descriptions of 
Piaget (who in this respect was much closer to Luria), noting that his project was  
not directed toward a documentation of the acquisition of language, but 
rather toward specific aspects of infantile thinking and speaking – the detours 
in which it goes astray […] For him, linguistic blunders and 
misunderstandings do not find their meaning in being corrected.
112
  
 
Stefan’s associations and correspondences crack open the world to reveal relations 
between things obscured by adults’ more habitual perceptions.  
 
In Luria’s work, in contrast, language acquisition has an organising function. 
The pre-linguistic child ‘does not yet possess correct and adequate ideas about a 
whole order of things.’113  Through naming the child begins to differentiate objects, 
classify entities in accordance with established systems and communicate in a more 
sophisticated manner: ‘The child becomes aware that a particular object may play a 
different role in different situations; and his perception, refracted through this prism, 
acquires a more dynamic nature.’114 For Luria this enables the child’s thinking to 
become ‘more vital and practical’.115 ‘Dynamism’ for Luria is always related to 
mastery of existing structures, rather than their subversion. Benjamin suggests that 
even as the child masters language its inventive mode of perception continues. Habit 
retains a shattered quality here too. He perceives a parallel between the child 
repurposing objects in play and the reading child: 
The fairy tale is […] a waste product [...] Children are able to manipulate 
[them] with the same ease and lack of inhibition that they display in playing 
with pieces of cloth or building blocks. They build their world out of motifs 
from the fairy tale, combining its various elements.
116
 
 
The reading child is ‘less systematic, more whimsical and boistrous’ than the reading 
adult.
117
 Words imbue the world with wonder and provide new ways of 
experimenting:   
Draped with colours of every hue that he has picked up from reading and 
observing, the child stands in the centre of a masquerade and joins in, while 
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reading – for the words have all come to the masked ball, are joining in the 
fun and are whirling around together like tinkling snowflakes. ‘Prince’ is a 
word with a star tied to it’, said a boy of seven. When children think up 
stories, they are like theatre-producers who refuse to be bound by ‘sense’. 
This is easily proved. If you give children four or five specific words and ask 
them to make a short sentence on the spot the most amazing prose comes to 
light […] At a stroke the words throw on their costumes and in the twinkling 
of an eye they are caught up in a battle, love scenes or a brawl.
118
  
 
For Luria, the ideal child is an architect or engineer constructing an orderly world 
according to existing blueprints, whereas for Benjamin the child is a theatrical artist 
creating bright new forms from the wreckage of the old, forms that might also 
detonate the existing structures of the adult world.
119
  
 
 These conflicting accounts of childhood also reveal distinct understandings 
of revolution and historical change. For Luria, the October Revolution figures as a 
momentous event after which history was set on its course towards the bright 
communist future. This aligns with his discussions of childhood which, despite 
identifying moments of crisis that punctuate the ascent to maturity, is always 
oriented towards a particular future. As in his criticisms of psychoanalysis, 
development might be uneven but it is nonetheless organised along a timeline of 
successive stages which transform previous structures at every step; the old does not 
persist in the new. For Benjamin, on the other hand, the relationship of past to 
present to future is characterised by eruptive interpenetrations of then and now. 
Benjamin not only affirms the unique perspective of the child, but suggests that the 
revolutionary subject is forged through the shattering confrontation of child with 
adult and of childishness with maturity. Mapped onto history, Benjamin’s model 
allows for an understanding of political transformation as an on-going process that 
requires constant renewal; he suggests that children interrupt everyday routines in a 
manner analogous to the proletariat’s role in history. This understanding of both 
individuals and history challenges the progressive model that informs Luria’s work, 
which affirms the current unfolding of history. This difference in perspective is 
magnified in their respective views on pedagogy. The process of how and from 
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whom children learn was a critical yet fraught question in the post-revolutionary 
context. Luria assumed that children (like the proletariat) must be guided by an 
existing tutelary body of some sort, whereas Benjamin insisted that education was 
not a one way street.   
 
Paradoxes of the Vanguard 
 
In The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991), Jacques Rancière addresses the contradictory 
relationship of adult to child. Drawing on the example of a pedagogical experiment 
undertaken in the aftermath of the French Revolution, he asserts the possibility of 
learning between equals. Rancière describes learning as a tussle between 
stultification and emancipation, the stultified and the emancipated. For Rancière, 
assuming the inferiority of any other person will result in stultification, instead 
emancipatory learning must proceed from the assumption that ‘everyone is of equal 
intelligence.’120 Equality is understood as a practice in the present rather than a 
concept to be realised in the future. Rancière dispenses with a hierarchical relation 
that assumes a pairing of ignorance to knowledge. All people are assumed to have an 
equal capacity to learn, which, for Rancière, trumps the disparities between what 
different people happen to know. The relation between stultification and 
emancipation he describes might be aligned with the confrontation of reproduction 
with revolution, habit with shattering, routine with rupture traced in this chapter. 
Rancière is primarily concerned with how to address the asymmetrical power 
relationship between student and teacher. The pedagogical parity he describes was 
crucially, he insists, antithetical to Enlightened notions of progress: ‘Equality was 
not an end to attain, but a point of departure, a supposition to maintain in every 
circumstance.’121  Liberation cannot be founded on oppression. 
 
 Benjamin reflects on the relationship between adult and child in his 1929 essay 
‘Program for a Proletarian Children’s Theatre’. Here, in an argument indebted to 
Asja Lacis’s work in Soviet children’s theatre and informed by his experiences in 
Moscow, he argues that participating in theatrical performance is integral to 
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communist pedagogy. He is quick to condemn forms of instruction that replicate the 
strict and stultifying methods used in capitalist education which impose a particular 
world-view on the child:  
The proletariat must not pass on its own class interest to the next generation 
with the tainted methods of an ideology that is destined to subjugate the 
child’s suggestible mind. The discipline the bourgeoisie demands from 
children is its mark of shame.
122
 
 
Benjamin, like Rancière, perceives that an emancipated society cannot be based on 
relations that assume the domination of one group of people over another. Though 
adults instruct children, for Benjamin, a communist learning process necessarily 
flows in two directions:  
in a performance children stand on the stage and instruct and teach attentive 
educators. New forces, new innervations appear - ones that the educator had 
no inkling of while working on the project. He learns about them only in the 
course of this wild liberation of the child’s imagination.123 
 
Openly attending to children provides adults with important political insights: ‘What 
is truly revolutionary is the secret signal of what is to come that speaks from the 
gesture of the child.’124  
 
The tension between stultification and emancipation is played out in Luria 
and Vygotsky’s writings on childhood. They did not share the ideas expressed by 
some of their more radical contemporaries that adults should follow the lead of their 
more authentically communist progeny. For Aron Zalkind, for example, children 
would ideally form miniature cadres of dedicated revolutionaries untarnished by the 
former ‘stagnant way of life’, setting an example to the older generation rather than 
meekly following its authoritarian lead: ‘children - enthusiasts, activists, gripped by 
collective feeling, carry into musty family life new principles of revolutionary 
ideology […] a future is being formed in its embryonic elements through the 
children’s efforts.’125 Adults were more central to Luria and Vygotsky’s accounts of 
childhood, playing a key role in introducing children to the social world, a world of 
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words and objects organised in particular ways. In their experiments, they traced 
how children gradually learn to appeal to adults for assistance: ‘the road from object 
to child and from child to object lies through another person.’126  
 
Vygotsky’s ‘Play and its Role in the Mental Development of the Child’ 
suggests that in play the child operates according to rules of his or her own devising, 
rather than relying on the external rules imposed by parents or guardians. Children 
become conscious directors of their own activities. In ‘Tool and Symbol in Child 
Development’ (c. 1930),127 Luria and Vygotsky similarly analyse how the child 
learns to master its environment through the use of speech, a capacity which, they 
argue (recalling their critique of Gestalt psychology discussed in Chapter 2), 
qualitatively separates children from apes. With the aid of speech, eventually 
internalised as thought, the child can plan and organise its activities. Narrating action 
is not a passive activity but plays an active role in the performance of practical tasks. 
Symbolic activity and practical activity form a ‘complex unity’ in the human.128 For 
Luria and Vygotsky, the emergence of this ‘newly born unit of perception’ marks the 
beginning of human life proper; the beginning of a mode of cognition that is 
fundamentally distinct from the animal: 
At the moment when, thanks to the planning assistance of speech, a view of 
the future is included as an active agent, the child’s whole operational 
psychological field changes radically and its behaviour is fundamentally 
reconstructed.
129
 
 
Through speech, the child masters both itself and its environment. Planning and 
intentionality are necessary to comprehend reality as more than ‘splintered and 
peculiar’130 sensations or as a ‘hodgepodge of disrupted and disorganised’ 
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perceptions.
131
 Language is necessary for the child to meaningfully manipulate 
objects. Vygotsky argued that in play  
a child is always above his average age, above his daily behaviour; in play it 
is as though he were a head taller than himself […] in play it is as though the 
child were trying to jump above the level of his normal behaviour.
132
 
 
For Vygotsky, the child takes on the position of its own educator. In the prescribed 
imaginary space of the game, the child learns to apply the order inherent to the 
existing adult world. Rules are central to Vygotsky’s account of play, which paves 
the road to working life: play ‘permeates the attitude toward reality. It has its own 
inner continuation in school instruction and work (compulsory activity based on 
rules)’.133 Through play the child learns to derive pleasure from the performance of 
unpleasurable activities, internalising the ‘higher’ structures of thought of the adult. 
Although adults do not directly guide the child here, their ethereal internalised 
presence is indispensable. The function of play remains assimilative and is premised 
on a progressive understanding of development understood as a process of ascent 
towards adulthood.   
 
 The period during which the child learns to play is preceded by a period of 
total dependence on the adult: ‘Definitely everything in the behaviour of the infant is 
intertwined and interwoven into the sociable.’134 In Luria and Vygotsky’s accounts, 
adults, who children initially mistake for objects, appear as the custodians of reality. 
A child’s relation to reality is ‘always refracted through a prism of relations with 
another person.’135 Adults are responsible for introducing children to language and 
social existence. In the intellectual biography Understanding Vygotsky, René Van 
der Veer and Jaan Valsiner summarise the relation of child to adult in Vygotsky’s 
work in the following terms without, however, reflecting on the political 
implications of his position:  
Children should not be left to themselves when acquiring new knowledge 
and wisdom, as this was equivalent to not educating them at all, leaving their 
development to the obnoxious forces of the ‘street’. Bringing up children 
necessarily means restricting their freedom of action, Vygotsky reasoned, 
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sometimes in the interest of the child himself, sometimes in the interest of the 
collective. The role of parents and teachers is and should be enormous: in 
forming part of the children’s environment and organising this environment 
they will steer the child’s mental development to a considerable extent.136  
 
Similarly, in Luria’s experiments with twins discussed above, adult educators play a 
key role in directing activities. The children who emerged as the most ‘advanced’ 
were the ones who received most instruction from educated adults.   
 
 Ella Winter, a sympathetic visitor to the Soviet Union in 1933, declared: ‘The 
child has been freed from exploitation, as women, workers, peasants, national 
minorities have been freed.’137 But freed by whom? Just as with Luria’s experiments 
with national minorities (many of whom were also women, workers or peasants), 
children were not assumed to be of equal intelligence to educated adults. Luria’s 
work imagined educated adults as constituting the fabric of the present into which 
children (and other less ‘advanced’ groups) were gradually stitched. As in Luria’s 
experiments in Central Asia, this approach distributes people who share a single 
historical moment along a trajectory of development which implies some inhabitants 
of the present really belong to the past. Vygotsky’s description of play as an ‘illusory 
freedom’ might be applied here.138 Unlike Rancière’s and Benjamin’s theories of 
education, this model of revolutionary upbringing fails to eliminate the unequal 
relationship between child and adult; it seeks to found liberation on oppression. 
 
Although Luria and Vygotsky’s emphasis on the importance of instruction 
was not unique to their Soviet context, a distinctly Soviet model for understanding 
political development implicitly ungirded their approach to education and 
development. In What is to be Done? (1901-2), Lenin addressed the problem of 
developing revolutionary class consciousness in the proletariat, concluding that 
‘class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without.’139 
Lenin’s model of political mobilisation relies on a revolutionary vanguard: ‘a strong 
organisation of revolutionaries to train the proletariat in steadfast and stubborn 
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struggle.’140 For Lenin, social revolution was coupled to a programme of cultural 
enlightenment. Lisa Kirschenbaum argues in the context of Soviet policies focused 
on children that ‘discipline and education (or control and indoctrination) had long 
existed as revolutionary goals.’141 Luria and Vygotsky’s discussion of teaching 
similarly requires training, organisation and discipline imposed from without. Here 
adult educators take on the role of the revolutionary vanguard in relation to the 
spontaneous masses of children.  
 
In a 1920 essay Lenin famously described left-wing communism as an 
‘infantile disorder’. The Russian term - ‘detskaia bolezn’’ - might more accurately be 
translated as ‘childhood ailment’, implying that Lenin intended to refer to the 
physical development of the child rather than its psychic disposition; to the painful 
but necessary and ultimately immunising illnesses experienced during infancy.
142
 In 
What is to be Done? he deploys a similar metaphor, referring to the ‘growing pains’ 
experienced in political struggle;
143
 he aligns the organic development of the 
individual with the historical journey towards revolution. In describing the 
relationship between spontaneity [stikhinost'] and consciousness [soznatel'nost'] in 
What is to be Done? Lenin uses another organic metaphor that maps political 
development onto the development of life: ‘the “spontaneous element”, in essence, 
represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an embryonic form.’144 He 
goes on to describe how a spontaneous act like a strike acts as a ‘flash’ of 
consciousness, and he is concerned with how to convert a sudden and dramatic burst 
of light into a steady blaze. Luria’s understanding of childhood development was 
structured in a similar manner to Lenin’s discussions of political maturation. Indeed, 
Vygotsky, as we have seen, used the same metaphor as Lenin in reverse - likening 
human development to revolution. For Luria, the life of the individual is imagined as 
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a transition from the spontaneity of childhood to the consciousness of adulthood. 
Luria studied incipient forms in order to understand ‘higher’ ones.  
 
The literate adult was the pinnacle of development in Luria and Vygotsky’s 
account of human development. Their work on ‘primitive’ people and children were 
similarly addressed to explaining the emergence of a more ‘advanced’ mode of 
thinking. For Luria and Vygotsky, in contrast to Benjamin, children were primarily 
interesting because they eventually became adults. Childhood was characterised as a 
process of overcoming chaos and establishing order with the older generation 
responsible for inculcating that order. The analogy with Lenin’s conception of the 
revolutionary vanguard is tellingly imprecise: thrown into this post-revolutionary 
context a broadly Leninist understanding of the progressive development towards 
consciousness paradoxically becomes a theory that aims to consolidate rather than 
overthrow the existing social order. Analogies between the ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic founder on the other side of the revolutionary event where the 
spontaneous acts of resistance that precede revolution are supposedly in the past, 
even if full-blown revolutionary consciousness and a fully communist society still lie 
some way ahead. As with Luria’s research in Uzbekistan, the conclusions of his 
research with children operate according to a confusingly circular logic: revolution 
involves breaking with the established order but once the revolution has occurred 
advanced consciousness is achieved through the top-down instillation of a set of 
predetermined norms. Children no longer represent a new beginning, the possibility 
of doing things differently, but necessarily rely on an existing tutelary body of some 
sort to induct them into communist society.  
 
Benjamin, in contrast to Lenin and Luria, was primarily interested in flashes.  
Susan Buck-Morss’s distinction between avant-garde and vanguard temporalities 
(already discussed in Chapter 2) is relevant here. Luria’s acceptance of the 
vanguardist model implies an ‘acceptance of the party's monopolistic right to control 
the direction of social transformation’, whereas Benjamin advocated an 
understanding of learning closer to the avant garde which hoped to ‘inspire 
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imagination in a way that set reality into question’.145  Unlike Lenin who emphasised 
the importance of establishing ‘stability and continuity’ in a revolutionary 
situation,
146
 Benjamin is not concerned with how a spontaneous flash might 
prefigure or portend something durational and organised (and hence more 
meaningful). He is interested in flashes in their own rights, however momentary or 
fleeting. On the streets of Moscow he witnessed ‘time catastrophes, time 
collisions,’147 and his own work was similarly concerned with interpenetrations, 
interruptions and eruptions. His writing on childhood informs and overlaps with his 
conception of history. In both cases, Benjamin is suspicious of progressive 
narratives. Benjamin’s theorisations of the child therefore open up the possibility for 
challenging the emerging Soviet status quo Luria’s work defended and for 
apprehending the ways in which history failed to conform to the progressive 
narratives upon which Luria’s research relied. Instead, Benjamin affirms the 
continual collision of the past with the present, the child with the adult, suggesting 
that coexisting modes of perception continually interrogate the extant.  
 
In ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ (1933), Benjamin reflects that children 
demonstrate a mimetic faculty that he imagines parallels the perceptions of the 
earliest forms of human society: ‘Children’s play is everywhere permeated by 
mimetic modes of behaviour.’148 He declares that in primitive times people imitated 
the sky and this form of ‘cosmic being’ is replicated in the newborn baby.149 For 
Benjamin this moment of mimesis is fleeting because birth is a singular event. As 
such, the capacity to reproduce is instantaneous rather than durational. This fact by 
no means detracts from its significance, however. He writes:  
The perception of similarity is in every case bound to a flashing up. It flits 
past, can possibly be won again, but cannot really be held fast as can other 
perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily as a 
constellation of stars.
150
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Mimesis, though concerned with reproduction, is imagined as a shattering rather 
than a habitual experience. Again, routine collides with rupture. The child here also 
emerges as a prototype for the historical materialist described in Benjamin’s ‘Theses 
on the Philosophy of History’ (1940). In a passage that strikingly recalls his 
discussion of mimesis he writes there: ‘The true picture of the past flits by. The past 
can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be 
recognised and is never seen again.’151 For Benjamin, contra Lenin and Luria, 
spontaneity is not the precursor to genuinely revolutionary thought or action, whose 
meaning is only realised if it transforms into consciousness. Instead, he affirms the 
‘moment of danger’, the unique experience which ‘briefly flashes up’.152 In his 
definition of dialectical thinking spontaneity and consciousness continually collide; 
the spontaneous flash is necessary to blast open the ‘continuum of history’, to which 
Luria’s work still clung.153 
  
In Benjamin’s work, children continually surprise and challenge adults, even 
as adults teach and care for children. This is what he claimed differentiated 
bourgeois and proletarian education: ‘The children of the bourgeoisie confront it as 
its heirs; to the disinherited, they are helpers, avengers, liberators.’154 That is not to 
say that the child’s forms of perception should be maintained or romanticised, but 
that the processes of interaction, education and recognition flow in two directions
155
: 
‘Is not education, above all, the indispensable ordering of the relationship between 
generations and therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that relationship and 
not of children?’156 Luria’s account of childhood occluded a consideration of how 
adults’ encounters with children might act to unsettle or interrupt existing 
perceptions of the world and thus repeated this bourgeois model. Children may have 
been depicted as being initiated into a liberated society, but they were themselves 
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imagined as heirs rather than liberators. Just as his understanding of historical 
development insisted on the supersession of the past at every stage of development 
and therefore struggled to account for ‘regressive’ experiences, Luria’s 
understanding of childhood sat uncomfortably alongside his professed interest in the 
social and historical milieu in which the people he analysed lived.  
 
Crucially, Luria and the children he was analysing did not live in a liberated 
society. Benjamin’s work suggests that the continuous interaction of children and 
adults troubles progressive visions of the ascent of humanity towards consciousness. 
Even if Luria rejected this understanding of children as potentially subversive, he 
still encountered individuals who deviated from the ordained path to maturity. The 
chaotic social conditions of Soviet life proved difficult for Luria and his 
collaborators to navigate. How could orderly minds be forged in the midst of such 
concrete devastation? And, more importantly, how could the continued existence of 
social and psychological disorder be made to fit with their progressive frameworks? 
 
Children of the Revolution     
 
In ‘Old Forgotten Children’s Books’ (1924), Benjamin outlined an understanding of 
childhood associated with the Enlightenment: ‘if man was pious, good, and sociable 
by nature, it had to be possible to transform children, who were creatures of nature in 
its purest form, into the most pious, the best, and the most sociable beings of all.’157 
In her discussion of children’s fiction, Jacqueline Rose similarly identifies a ‘fetish 
of childhood’ in Western European literature, which conceives of the early years of 
life as a period of lost innocence and unity.
158
 In Enlightenment thinking, according 
to Rose, the child is likened to the ‘primitive’: ‘They are connected by a fantasy of 
origins – the belief that each one represents an ultimate beginning where everything 
is perfect or can at least be made good.’159 The child thus functions as a ‘pure point 
of origin.’160  In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal Émile (1762), Rousseau declared 
human existence a degradation, disfiguration and deformation of the integral and 
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harmonious nature created by God. Though returning to this whole and unmutilated 
beginning is impossible, Rousseau outlines an educational programme that attempts 
to adhere as closely as possible to the natural course: ‘Observe nature and follow the 
path it maps out for you.’161  
 
Luria explicitly linked the child and the primitive, individual and cultural 
development. He had no interest in glorifying a period of imagined lost innocence, 
however. In his work with both children and Central Asian peasants, he was intent 
on tracing a progression from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’ modes of thought: 
Each subsequent stage supersedes and supplants the previous one; only after 
he has gone through the stages of inventing his own devices and has learned 
the cultural systems evolved over the centuries does a child arrive at a stage 
of development that is characteristic of advanced, civilized man.
162
 
 
This transition to the historical is imagined as an emancipatory journey away from 
nature. Once the human ascends to a new level, ‘he loses or discards all the earlier, 
more primitive forms […] each subsequent stage supersedes and supplants the 
previous one.’163 Modern technology, social institutions and collective ways of 
living all contribute to creating a more advanced human being, capable of 
intervening in the world. Capitalism deforms humans; under communism humans 
would consciously form and re-form themselves, each other and the material world. 
 
After the revolution, dominant representations of childhood as a lost idyll 
were displaced by narratives of hardship and endurance. Leon Trotsky’s My Life 
opens with a caustic attack on bourgeois understandings of childhood: 
Childhood is looked upon as the happiest time of life. Is that always true? 
No, only a few have a happy childhood. The idealisation of childhood 
originated in the old literature of the privileged. A secure, affluent, and 
unclouded childhood, spent in a home of inherited wealth and culture, a 
childhood of affection and play, brings back to one memories of a sunny 
meadow at the beginning of the road of life. The grandees of literature, or the 
plebeians who glorify the grandees, have canonised this purely aristocratic 
view of childhood. But the majority of the people, if it looks back at all, sees, 
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on the contrary, a childhood of darkness, hunger and dependence. Life strikes 
the weak – and who is weaker than a child?164 
 
Maxim Gorky’s My Childhood (1913), set in the years immediately preceding the 
revolution, is a tale of torment and perseverance that became the archetypal narrative 
of the early years of life in the Soviet Union. In the 1920s and 1930s it became the 
dominant model for Soviet narratives of childhood, read and re-read across the 
country.
165
 The story opens with the child confronting his father’s death. Little 
Gorky peers into his father’s grave and watches in horror and confusion as some 
little frogs hopping about on the coffin are suffocated beneath the soil. Set in a dull 
quagmire of murkiness, mist and mud, Gorky describes his childhood as a period of 
fear, anxiety and suffering: a ‘dreary life […] full of violence,’ a ‘close-knit, 
suffocating little world of pain and suffering.’166 Gorky’s depiction of his early life 
represented a stark break with the traditions of Russian literature epitomised by Lev 
Tolstoy’s Childhood, which conformed to the Rousseauian model, portraying 
childhood, through a misty haze of nostalgia and sentimentality, as a period of 
purity, virtue and harmony with nature.
167
  
 
 According to Denise Riley: ‘The figure of the child remains an archetype of a 
biological-to-social knot […] as the exemplar of pure nature, pure biology, capable 
of arriving at full humanity only through successive forays into a world it stands 
outside.’168 Riley contrasts the ‘unmuddied’ child which development psychology 
treats as a ‘pure object of study’ with the ‘denser, harder, impenetrably complex’ 
adult ‘hopelessly riddled with the world’s determinations.’169  Although Luria does 
discuss the new born infant as a universal figure situated at the beginning of human 
life, he does not exalt this natural starting point. Furthermore, the period of natural 
passivity he describes is short-lived. The world soon intervenes. Despite Luria’s 
insistence that the external, cultural world would ideally have a positive organising 
impact on the development of the child, he was forced to contend with a chaotic 
society. Soviet children were not pure and unmuddied but already dirtied by their 
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experiences. The interventions of the Soviet cultural world did not correspond to the 
pedagogical methods and tools implemented in the controlled environments of 
Luria’s laboratories. Luria and his team of researchers confronted this when they 
ventured on to the streets of Moscow to interview vagrant children. 
 
Abandoned children (besprizornye or besprizorniki) were a prominent feature 
of Soviet urban life. The bourgeois nuclear family was being challenged for 
ideological reasons but many children were separated from their parents by historical 
circumstances. Bands of urchins roamed the country often resorting to begging, 
stealing and prostitution to survive. Although homeless children existed in Russia 
prior to the October Revolution, in the wake of the violence, famine and epidemics 
that accompanied the First World War and the Civil War their numbers greatly 
increased. By 1922 the Bolshevik government was forced to contend with at least 
seven million besprizornye on the streets of Soviet cities. Initially, Soviet authorities 
blamed the phenomenon on the tumultuous Civil War years, framing abandonment 
as a problem of the past. Networks of children’s homes were initially planned to 
provide child rearing facilities for working parents but in the face of mass 
homelessness these tended to function as shelters (Plate 3.12). The number of 
children living on the streets diminished in the 1920s but as the decade continued it 
became evident that abandonment persisted, forcing the state to address a far more 
uncomfortable reality: besprizornye were also a phenomenon of the present.
170
  
 
Benjamin described the besprizornye as ‘derelict, unspeakably melancholy 
[…] thoroughly savage, mistrustful, embittered people.’171  By the early 1930s, the 
continued existence of vast numbers of homeless youths, many driven to the cities in 
the wake of collectivisation, had become an embarrassment to the Soviet 
government who began to deny their existence.
172
 Observers unsympathetic to the 
Soviet cause pointed to these children as embodied evidence of the revolution’s 
failings. In 1931 the former Socialist Revolutionary Party member Vladimir 
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Zenzinov clearly read the besprizornye as products of history and therefore a 
damning indictment of Stalin’s regime:  
Covered with dust and dirt, with soot and oil, mud and petrol […] clothed in 
rags […] thrown up by the waves of misery and social disorder which have 
washed them into the towns and villages and railways – The deserted 
children! The deserted children!
173
 
 
The glittering, regimented army of dedicated pioneers that marched across Soviet 
propaganda was haunted by this hungry, foul-smelling horde of young people.   
 
  The contradictions of revolutionary childhood are magnified in the figure of 
the abandoned child. Immediately following the revolution, political idealists had 
proposed to transform this swathe of children into the new revolutionary generation, 
accustomed to simple, communal living and untarnished by family life. Zalkind 
proclaimed confidently that these children were ‘closer to the collective comradely 
ethic than the ‘normal’ morality of self-love that children from a bourgeois 
environment have.’174 But in practice educational institutions focused on 
rehabilitation and re-education, which proved difficult. Many of those who found 
their way into the oversubscribed state run institutions were deeply traumatised by 
their street lives, others simply ran away. These young people had grown up isolated 
from social norms: they swore, they smoked, they refused to sit still and they often 
spoke in a street argot that was incomprehensible to outsiders. Like the ‘ichkari’ 
women discussed in the previous chapter, these children occupied a liminal social 
position. This initially marked them out as potential allies in the revolutionary 
struggle who posed a threat to the structures of the past, but they soon figured as a 
threat to the orderly new social structures being erected in the present.   
 
 Langston Hughes, who visited the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, remarked 
upon the contradictory qualities of the ‘pitiful and half-savage children of upheaval’ 
many of whom resisted the state’s attempts to place them on the ‘path to progress’, 
preferring their ‘precarious freedom’ of exciting peregrinations, mischief and petty 
crime, to the relative ‘comfort and regularity’ provided by state institutions, 
                                                                                                                                          
172
 Ball, And Now…, pp. 193-195. 
173
 Vladimir Zenzinov, Deserted: The Story of the Children Abandoned in Soviet Russia (London; H 
Joseph, 1931), p. 129. 
 185 
 
declaring: ‘These determined little hooligans were making a last stand for freedom’. 
In Hughes’ account the ‘wandering delinquents’ are presented as cheeky, inventive 
and charming; a positive reminder of the persistence of irregularity and spontaneity 
in the increasingly orderly communist nation.
175
 Hughes perceived that the children 
represented a potential challenge to the already stultifying social order. But this was 
not the line taken by the Party elite. On the eighth anniversary of the October 
Revolution in 1925 Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin had declared it necessary to 
‘save’ the besprizornye: ‘The situation here threatens grave dangers for the future if 
we are not able to eradicate promptly in youths the bad habits that a vagrant life 
imparts to them.’176 The besprizornye threatened to shatter the ‘good habits’ 
espoused by the nascent communist state. 
 
 Besprizornye often lived on rubbish dumps or coal heaps. Many survived on 
scraps of discarded food. Alan M. Ball vividly describes homeless children nibbling 
at fish heads, chewing on watermelon rinds or licking crumbs from plates. They 
were likened to flocks of sparrows, ravenous locusts or parasites.
177
 Konstantin 
Paustovsky described encountering a group of street children in dirty, over-sized 
jackets in whose pockets they kept all of their belongings –‘bits of broken combs, 
knives, cigarettes, crusts of bread, matches, greasy cards and bits of dirty bandages’ 
– and beneath which could be glimpsed their ‘frozen, dirty, greenish-yellow bodies, 
covered with bleeding streaks’.178 These external attributes were taken to reflect the 
children’s messy and unsavoury inner lives. These filthy children were not pristine 
new babies, lumps of clay ready to be moulded. They were not raw material but had 
already been battered by the ravages of experience. Soviet children’s institutions 
were initially imagined as the forges of the new nation but this was closer to a 
salvage operation.
179
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Whilst working at the Academy of Communist Education,
180
 Luria undertook 
comparative studies of children from different class backgrounds. ‘Speech and 
Intellect among Rural, Urban and Homeless Children’ (1930) is a comparative study 
of the urban city school child, the rural child and the ‘urchin’ child. Such 
comparative studies were a common feature of pedological investigations, which set 
out to distinguish between nature and nurture.
181
 Luria’s research methodology was 
typical of the contemporary experimental methodologies and exemplifies the 
pedological approach. As with his descriptions of Uzbek peasants, the Soviet 
children Luria described, particularly the homeless children, were a far cry from the 
ideal builders of communism envisioned by the architects of the Soviet state. 
 
  Luria set out to show that speech development was tied to a child’s 
environment:  
A person’s class and his particular social experience fill his mind with a quite 
specific content, and the study of this content not only is of considerable 
interest for the infant science of psychology of classes but is also of 
indisputable psychological interest.
182
  
 
He investigated the children’s responses to verbal stimuli – presenting them with 
single words and asking them to respond by association, a similar method to that 
used in his experiments with criminals that form the basis of The Nature of Human 
Conflicts (1932). Environment was assumed to have an impact on both the form and 
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content of thought: it was not only concluded that a rural child would know more 
about farm animals than urban children, but that the speed of their responses was 
specific to the pace and stability of their environment.  
 
Luria noted a contrast between ‘accidental, individualised memories’ and 
‘routine associations common to the entire group’183 and attached a high value to the 
‘homogeneity of collective experience’.184 Urban school children emerged from the 
study as the most advanced as they had a greater grasp of reality beyond their daily 
experiences. These educated urban children were on their way to becoming the ideal 
educated adults at the pinnacle of Luria’s mountain of development. The 
homogeneity of the rural children’s outlook was attributed to their relatively stable 
experiences, whereas the urban school children were shown to be developing a more 
abstract notion of shared identity. Luria claimed that schools  
expose the child to experiences in all spheres of life, and there is practically 
nothing that is totally foreign to him. The material to which he is exposed in 
his schoolwork makes nature and society just as accessible to him as the 
direct impressions he receives from his environment.
185
  
 
Urban schoolchildren were as capable of recognising a rake as their rural 
counterparts who were unable to name objects they had not physically encountered. 
Luria reported that 40 rural children gave 30 different responses to the word ‘Union’, 
a conclusion similar to that reached by the group of pedologists who conducted 
experiments with children in remote Siberia in the same period (discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2). In contrast, the urban schoolchildren without exception pointed to 
social or political forms of organisation: their answers included ‘Soviet’, ‘Youth’, 
‘Trade Union’, ‘Workers’, ‘USSR’.186  Luria assumed that simply making these 
verbal associations equated to comprehending the concepts they describe. Unlike 
Benjamin who emphasised children’s capacity to make idiosyncratic associations in 
order to create ‘amazing prose’, Luria was interested in the establishment of stable 
and shared forms of comprehension.
187
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
182
 Luria, ‘Speech and Intellect among Rural, Urban and Homeless Children’ in Soviet Developmental 
Psychology, ed. by Michael Cole (New York, NY; ME Sharpe, 1977), pp. 32-64, p. 35. 
183
 Luria, ‘Speech and Intellect…’, p. 44. 
184
 Luria, ‘Speech and Intellect…’, p. 46. 
185
 Luria, ‘Speech and Intellect…’, p. 51. 
186
 Luria, ‘Speech and Intellect…’, p. 55. 
 188 
 
The besprizornye emerged as the furthest behind in Luria’s linear trajectory 
of development. They experience the world ‘kaleidoscopically’ due to the instability 
of their daily lives, each providing completely different associations to words like 
‘home’ for obvious concrete reasons. Luria’s experiments revealed the abjection 
experienced by these children. They had ‘grown up without any direct exposure to 
the influence of stable, familiar, more or less unchanging circumstances.’188 The 
homeless children were unfamiliar with formal reasoning and therefore responded 
slowly to the psychologists’ questions:  
Anything even resembling a problem divorced from real life is a novelty to 
him […] the urchin, who is quick and deft at coping with the situations of 
everyday life, becomes quickly disoriented and proceeds slowly in the 
contrived situations of an experiment, in which, moreover, we employed 
abstract linguistic (associative) operations.
189
  
 
Furthermore, they were, like many of the peasants Luria encountered in Uzbekistan, 
and presumably for similarly experiential reasons, distrustful of the adults 
conducting the experiments. Luria sympathetically notes an emotional component in 
the child’s responses that accompanied their intellectual confusion: ‘The urchin has 
had to wage a bitter struggle with life, and that struggle has left its specific emotional 
traces on him.’190 These children may have scored low on standardised tests but 
Luria insisted that ‘in potential they are fully normal; and under the right conditions, 
they could develop into complete, highly productive, human beings.’191 Here, as 
with his experiments in Central Asia, Luria rejected biological determinism, but still 
insisted on the superiority of certain modes of thinking and forms of knowledge over 
others.  
 
Luria’s conclusions were based on an ‘index of commonality’:192 greater 
homogeneity in responses to questions not only indicated greater socialisation but 
was also said to represent a ‘higher’ form of thought (the capacity to think 
abstractly). Luria noted approvingly that educated urban children were beginning to 
recognise the contours of the new Soviet order being constructed around them. In 
contrast, he emphasised the inability of street children to comprehend both abstract 
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concepts and concrete objects beyond their direct experiences. However, Luria 
understood development in relation to the dominant society and therefore read 
differences in response as inadequacies of thought. Despite his claims to 
acknowledge equality of intelligence, his conclusions nonetheless implicitly equate 
ignorance of certain objects and concepts with a lack of intelligence, in precisely the 
terms criticised by Rancière. He could, for instance, have considered the internal 
rules, languages and norms that structured the lives of Soviet street children.
193
 A 
vagrant child may not have been able to describe the interior of a house or to define a 
Trade Union or kolkhoz, but the words that peppered homeless children’s vocabulary 
– including slang terms for cigarette butts, cocaine, pickpockets, policemen and 
prisons – would presumably have been equally as incomprehensible to a rural or 
urban schoolchild.
194
  
 
It was this unique language that Benjamin declared pedagogues needed to 
penetrate in order to communicate with the ‘infantile masses’:  ‘To get through to 
them at all, to he heard one has to relate as directly and clearly as possible the 
catchwords of the street itself.’195 These words were key to understanding their 
‘collective life’ whose structure was, Benjamin insisted, inherently political: 
‘Politics, in the organisation of crowds of such children, is not tendentious, but as 
natural a subject, as obvious a visual aid, as the toyshop or dollhouse for middle-
class children.’196 Asja Lacis worked closely with Soviet street children. Despite 
relating a story in which a child in her care violently beat in the skull of his 
playmate, she insisted that she found the wildest children to be the most gifted.
197
 
Benjamin’s descriptions of Moscow’s urchin children – with their ragged 
clothes, strange assortments of belongings and dirty bodies - might be aligned with 
the figure of the ragpicker who haunts the arcades:  
He collects and catalogues everything that the great city has cast off, 
everything it has lost, and discarded, and broken. He goes through the 
archives of debauchery, and the jumbled array of refuse. He makes a 
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selection, an intelligent choice; like a miser hoarding treasure, he collects the 
garbage that will become objects of utility or pleasure when refurbished.
198
       
 
The ragpicker not only sifts through the waste of society and of history but is their 
waste product. Though a ‘provocative figure of human misery’, the ragpicker creates 
and builds amid the ruins.
199
 Benjamin explicitly links the child to the collector.
200
 
Like children playing or reading fairy tales, who repurpose the scraps of waste 
generated by adult activity, the ragpicker reinvigorates the rubbish. Benjamin 
suggested that the visitor to Moscow should attempt to see the city from the 
viewpoint of its street children: ‘One ought to know Moscow as such beggar 
children know it’.201 Soviet communism, like capitalism, failed to banish human 
immiseration. Unlike Luria, Benjamin was able to acknowledge that Stalinist 
ideology was founded on a promise of happiness that the regime failed to deliver. 
Benjamin’s work suggests that in order to finally rid the world’s streets of the misery 
embodied in figures like the ragpicker or the street child, history should be 
approached from their perspective, as a heap of rubble from which it might still be 
possible to wrest some sparkling shards of hope.
202
 That would have necessitated 
looking down from the gleaming progressive road Luria’s work attempted to map 
out to examine the potholes and litter on the streets beneath his feet.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Task of childhood: to bring the new world into symbolic space. The child, in 
fact, can do what the grownup absolutely cannot: recognise the new once 
again.
203
  
 
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project 
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On July 5
th
 1936 the front page of Pravda was dominated by the news of the VKP(b) 
Central Committee decree ‘On Pedological Perversions in the Narkompros 
System’.204 Pedologists were attacked for emphasising environmental factors over 
psychological propensities, passivity over activity. Pedological publications focusing 
on Soviet children growing up in different social milieus, such as Luria’s study of 
the besprizornye, revealed how far the Soviet Union was from constructing its ideal 
model citizens. It was alleged that the reports and the standardised tests they 
espoused tended towards description rather than intervention, echoing the arguments 
deployed to attack Luria’s research in Central Asia. Despite their revolutionary zeal, 
pedologists were forced to recant and furiously attempted to make amends: ‘The fact 
that subjectively we considered our theory revolutionary has no relevance. By 
excluding the purposive [tselepolagayushchaya] activity of man, his interference in 
the course of events, we automatically excluded also the necessity of educative 
work.’205 Pedology was declared a failure as it was said to describe human beings 
helplessly responding to their environment, rather than fostering dedicated 
revolutionaries intent on re-directing the course of history. Zalkind is alleged to have 
dropped dead upon hearing the news of the discipline’s official denunciation.206 
Vygotsky’s work was blacklisted until the end of the Stalin era.207 Luria’s 
experiments with children were terminated and he turned to focus on neurological 
research (it is unclear what happened to the 750 sets of twins under observation in 
Moscow). By the time of the decree, Stalin had consolidated his position and many 
of the radical assumptions about childhood and family life that had characterised the 
post-revolutionary period were overturned.
208
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Luria’s research participated in the Soviet pedological project, which 
emerged from a period of multivalent often genuinely experimental approaches to 
child psychology and education. Anton Makarenko’s work dominated Soviet 
pedagogy in the wake of the decree on pedology, advocating strict, militaristic 
authority: ‘austere rhythm, iron discipline and distinguished bearing’. 209 But even 
the most utopian visions of childhood developed in the aftermath of revolution 
tended to imagine the transition to adulthood as a transition from chaos to order, 
paralleling the Leninist narrative of the movement of history towards communism. 
Anna Louise Strong’s depiction of the experimental John Reed Children’s Colony 
published in 1925, for example, concluded by contrasting the ‘weeds, broken fences, 
disorder’ of the old landscape with the ‘acres of ploughed fields’ across which a 
young communist hero advances in his tractor.
210
  
 
 Disrupted, disorganised, impulsive, spontaneous - the child in Luria’s 
account is a chaos who perceives the world as an undifferentiated confusion of 
‘noises and splotches’.211 He and Vygotsky wrote that the young child performs ‘an 
imbroglio of actions […] [a] rich and often grotesque mixture of mutually 
contradictory forms.’212 The child’s ‘splintered and peculiar’ perception was 
presented as a mess that needed tidying up.
 213
 According to Luria, the chaotic inner 
life of the baby was soon replaced by the order of the cultural world. Paradoxically, 
as with his research in Central Asia, revolutionary thinking was defined as the ability 
to comprehend existing reality rather than transform it. 
 
Luria distinguished between chaos and order, irrationality and reason, 
ignorance and knowledge as successive stages. Even taking this linear understanding 
of individual development on its own terms, however, it still overlooked the co-
existence of children with adults, their interactions and interruptions. After all, new 
‘disorderly’ babies continued being born. Luria may have dispensed with the 
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Freudian unconscious, a dangerously prehistoric internal reservoir, but he could not 
dispense with the external existence of children who he and Vygotsky described in 
terms strangely reminiscent of Freud’s definition of the unconscious: ‘There are no 
contradictions for the child, he does not see them, contradictory judgments can 
coexist not excluding one another.’214 
 
Luria’s naturally chaotic newborn infant had a historical counterpart in the 
figure of the abandoned child; the besprizornye threatened to disrupt the supposedly 
inevitable course of both individual and historical development. For as Benjamin 
declared: ‘As long as there is still one beggar around, there will still be myth.’215 In 
Luria’s account of development, the incoherence of the baby could soon be 
overcome, even as the actual children he encountered in his research failed to 
corroborate this thesis. The existence of these abject children thus also function as a 
reminder of the persistence of the abject or irrational within psychic life, that Luria’s 
work sought to displace. 
 
 Five years after the decree that banned pedology, Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union. The Second World War was to have a lasting impact on Luria’s work. 
The pinnacle of development in Luria’s work was the ‘civilized’, educated adult but 
these were precisely the people who ended up in Luria’s psychiatric wards with 
bullets in their brains. In his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ Benjamin 
perceived that the ‘vulgar Marxist’ celebration of the progressive mastery of 
humanity over nature failed to acknowledge the ‘retrogression of society’ that 
accompanied it.
216
 As Adorno and Horkheimer declare in The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment: ‘Civilization leads back to the terrors of nature.’217 Work with brain-
injured soldiers dominated Luria’s post-war work - wounded people he was 
dedicated to healing. In these cases, however, incoherence could not be overcome. 
The process of healing proved partial but not futile, forcing Luria to confront the 
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persistence of the shattered in the midst of habitual life, without ever giving up hope 
of a creating a radically different society. 
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Chapter 4 
The Wounded Subject: Between Woundedness and Healing  
 
 
 
The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself 
untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains 
itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself 
[…] Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face.1 
  
G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 
 
 
He felt more comfortable on the burnt-out star of the earth when he was 
unhappy; a glimpse of some strange and far away happiness aroused feelings 
of shame and anxiety in him - he wasn't conscious of it, but what he really 
wanted was for the new world they were eternally building to resemble his 
own shattered life.
2
 
 
 Andrei Platonov, The Foundation Pit, 1930 
 
 
 Already in Marx there lies concealed a wound.
3
 
  
 Theodor Adorno, ‘On Resignation,’ 1961 
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Introduction 
 
  On the Pratzen heights, at the spot where he had fallen with the 
flagstaff in his hand, lay Prince Andrei Bolkonsky, losing blood and, without 
realising it, moaning a soft, plaintive moan like a child.  
  Toward evening his complaining ceased and he became quite still. 
He did not know how long his unconsciousness lasted. Suddenly he felt again 
that he was alive and suffering from a burning, lacerating pain in his head. 
  “Where is the lofty sky I saw today and had never seen before?” 
was his first thought. “And this agony I did not know either,” he thought. 
“Yes, I knew nothing, nothing till now. But where am I?”4 
 
The above passage is from Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace (1865-68). A century after 
the novel’s publication Alexander Luria wrote to his friend Jerome Bruner from the 
estate of the aristocrat upon whom Tolstoy based Andrei Bolkonsky. He declared he 
was at work on his own ‘neurological novel’.5 Luria’s book would also describe a 
man wounded in battle who awakens from unconsciousness like a ‘newborn 
creature’ to a life of suffering he had not previously known.6 Luria described the 
case history as ‘a little book about a great tragedy - a man with a bullet in his brain 
who lost his world, his past and his future.’7 The Man with a Shattered World: The 
History of a Brain Wound (1972), focuses on Zasetsky, a former Red Army soldier 
who fought in the Second World War, surviving a bullet wound to the head that 
permanently damaged his cerebral functioning (Plate 4.1). Like Tolstoy’s epic novel, 
Luria’s little book is also a comment on its epoch, a meditation on war and peace, 
and a sombre reflection on Russian history.  
 
 This chapter situates Luria’s history of a brain wound in the shattered world 
that produced it; the bullet that penetrated Zasetsky’s brain and the burnt tissue it left 
behind is treated as a metonym for the impact of the Second World War on Soviet 
history. Luria composed the text in a self-consciously literary style. As such, this 
chapter situates The Man with a Shattered World in the context of twentieth-century 
literary debates. However, the non-fictional status of the book - the material 
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conditions it arose from, the neurological condition it describes and the therapeutic 
process Zasetsky engaged in - forced Luria to deviate from existing narrative 
models. The scarred surface of the case history stages a dialectic between 
woundedness and healing. As with his experiments with ‘primitives’ and children, in 
his work with brain-injured people Luria hoped to facilitate and describe a 
progressive movement from chaos to order, a movement that paralleled his political 
vision. However, unlike in the developmental paths traced in the preceding chapters 
of this thesis, where Luria was confident that consciousness would succeed 
spontaneity, The Man with a Shattered World is incapable of reaching a final moment 
of synthesis. The wounded subject Luria describes emerges as a figure who, as the 
result of violent catastrophe, lost his connection to the past and the present but, 
ultimately, retained hope for the future. Luria’s text describes the lasting damage of 
his patient’s injury, the interminability of the struggle to heal, and yet it resists 
sinking into apathy. As such, the case history suggests an alternative to the 
progressive narratives that informed Luria’s earlier works; by acknowledging the 
violence of history, it opens up the possibility for ameliorating the damage inflicted, 
and for guarding against the repetition of similar catastrophes in the future.   
 
New Wounded 
 
In The New Wounded (2012), Catherine Malabou asks what mode of expression  
might adequately capture the experience of her eponymous injured figures. For  
Malabou, the ‘new wounded' are people who have experienced a severe neuronal  
disturbance. Her definition encompasses post-traumatic shock, degenerative disease  
and brain injury, and is metaphorically extended to include any experience that  
dramatically interrupts the course of a person's life. The condition, she insists, takes  
a single form: it is characterised by 'coolness, neutrality, absence, and the state of  
being emotionally “flat”'.8 The 'new wounded' live in a perennial present, cut off  
from past identity and future hopes; their suffering is a peculiar form of pain that  
'manifests as an indifference to pain, impassivity, forgetting, the loss of symbolic  
reference points.'
9
 She sees this indifferent subjectivity reflected in the apathy of  
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the contemporary moment. 
  
 Malabou approaches the question of representing the subjectivities of the ‘new  
wounded’ through a consideration of case histories dealing with people with serious  
neurological defects. She discusses Luria's case history The Man with a Shattered  
World alongside those by the popular American neurologist Oliver Sacks, criticising  
both authors for what she sees as a false imposition of affect onto their subjects, for  
their attempts to ‘weave the patient’s coolness, indifference, and the disintegration of  
emotion into a narrative intrigue that must not be disaffected itself.’10 The paradox  
she identifies in such an exercise is that by transforming their subjects into  
exemplary cases, their narratives cannot be as detached as she presumes their  
patients' subjectivities are. The works impose a redemptive structure on the  
patients' conditions, rather than displaying a form of psychic damage that she insists  
is fundamentally beyond all repair. Malabou’s ‘new figures of the void' can only be  
thought in relation to destructive plasticity, a plasticity 'that does not repair, a  
plasticity without recompense or scar, one that cuts the thread of life.'
11
 Following  
both cerebral and social 'accidents', an entirely new subject emerges, totally 
discontinuous from any previous identity. The identity that does emerge is, according  
to Malabou, blank and featureless, devoid of any capacity or will to actively forge a  
new identity in the future. 
 
 Malabou's adherence to a singular definition of post-traumatic subjectivity 
precludes her from analysing the ways in which Luria's case history fundamentally 
differ from Sacks’s.  One major reason for this is her failure to consider the huge 
spectrum of responses that might be produced by brain damage. Sacks’s best-selling 
Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1985) focuses on people with right-
hemisphere disorders. With injuries to the right-hemisphere, the patient not only 
loses their grasp of reality but is also unaware of this loss. As Jacqueline Rose 
discusses, Sacks presents a crisis of 'the narrative function itself, which is either 
missing, frozen in time, or else acted out in a type of wild and meaningless 
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superabundance.'
12
 This, Rose is quick to point out, distinguishes Sacks's work from 
both Freud and Luria's case histories. Sacks’s cases are populated by people who are 
in a state of constantly renewed crisis; there is no progression or resolution. Sacks 
describes subjects who experience time as suspended, but lack any awareness or 
anxiety about its suspension.
13
 The characters that populate The Man Who Mistook 
His Wife For A Hat might indeed be said to exhibit some of the qualities Malabou 
associates with the ‘new wounded’. In contrast, Luria's patient Zasetsky did not 
sustain damage to the frontal cortex. Despite the enormous problems he faced, this 
enabled him to retain the capacity to make and carry out plans. Furthermore, Luria 
claims, the exact cerebral location of his patient's injury also accounted for his acute 
sense of loss, his painful, conscious awareness of what had befallen him.
14
   
 
 Malabou follows Sacks in considering his work as part of a single continuum 
with Luria's.
15
 In his introduction to The Man with a Shattered World, Sacks 
describes Luria as 'an original who thought in his own way'.
16
 He claims that Luria's 
work was 'always and centrally concerned with identity' and suffused with 'warmth, 
feeling and moral beauty.’17 Luria's case histories are described in terms reminiscent 
of a Hollywood film trailer as 'struggles with adversity.'
18
 Although elsewhere 
Malabou provocatively argues that brains should be understood in relation to 
history,
19
 both Sacks and Malabou overlook the historical and cultural specificity of 
Luria's case histories. Malabou fails to apply her own insight that ‘any vision of the 
brain is necessarily political.’20 She asserts that the ‘new wounded’ are emblematic 
of the political torpor of the neoliberal (presumably post-1989) present, insisting that 
destructive plasticity 'refuses the promise, belief, symbolic constitution of all 
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resources to come.’21 It operates in the open space left in the wake of the ‘collapse of 
messianic structures.’22 Destructive plasticity refuses salvation and redemption, 
placing a prohibition on thinking other possibilities: ‘It has nothing to do with the 
tenacious, incurable desire to transform what has taken place.'
23
 Instead, she claims, 
destructive plasticity ‘deploys its work starting from the exhaustion of all 
possibilities, when all virtuality has left long ago, when the child in the adult is 
erased, when cohesion is destroyed, family spirit vanished, friendship lost, links 
dissipated in the ever more intense cold of a barren life.’24 By giving Luria’s case its 
history back and by analysing the text’s peculiar formal qualities, this chapter will 
demonstrate the ways in which his dialectical account of brain injury combines 
destruction with creation, woundedness with healing, fragmentation with unity. 
Despite the severity of the injury it describes, The Man with a Shattered World 
insists on thinking other possibilities and on dialectically transforming what has 
taken place. By refusing to sink into apathy, Luria’s text provides an alternative 
vision of the wounded subject to the ‘new wounded’ described by Malabou, which 
also proposes an alternative, more hopeful, political vision. By returning to the past, 
Luria’s case history suggests a way of thinking beyond the desolate present Malabou 
describes. 
 
Wartime Work: Adaptation and Restoration 
 
Luria begins The Man With The Shattered World with a brief description of 
Zasetsky's life before his brain injury: 'In the beginning it was all so simple. His past 
was much like other people's: life had its problems, but was simple enough, and the 
future seemed promising.’25 The narrative voice then switches. Zasetsky's first-
person narrative begins by stating: 'Then suddenly it was all over.'
26
 The sudden 
event that brought his previous life abruptly to an end was not his injury but the 
Soviet declaration of war: 'Early one morning I was headed for the institute, thinking 
about my future, when suddenly I heard, actually shuddered at, the terrible news: 
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there as a war on with Germany!'
27
 The war not only interrupted the present, it also 
blocked the path to the future. Zasetsky's life story is thus placed in the framework of 
historical events. 
 
On June 22 1941, Germany broke its non-aggression pact with the Soviet 
Union. Operation Barbarossa was the largest invasion in military history. It was two 
weeks before Stalin finally addressed his Soviet ‘brothers and sisters’, mobilising the 
masses for ‘a war of the entire Soviet people’ in which perhaps as many as 30 
million of the country’s citizens would meet their deaths.28  
 
 Like the revolution and Stalinist ‘great break’ that preceded it, the Second 
World War was a violently transformative moment in Soviet history, Zasetsky’s life 
and Luria’s career. Amir Weiner challenges the view that the revolution and 
subsequent socioeconomic transformations of the 1920s and 1930s should be seen as 
the exclusive ‘formative and enduring moments’ in the life of the Soviet polity.29 The 
Second World War, he argues, played as crucial a function in re-shaping the 
revolutionary narrative, disrupting and consolidating Soviet identities in new ways, 
and forging myths that would ultimately outlive the Soviet Union itself. Weiner 
conceives of the revolution as a constantly unfurling project punctuated by a series 
of traumatic events that both shaped and were shaped by the ongoing enterprise of 
building communism:                                                                                
Within this chain of cataclysms, the war was universally perceived as the 
Armageddon of the Revolution, the ultimate clash dreaded yet expected by 
the first generation to live in socialist society, the event that would either 
vindicate or bring down the system.
30
 
 
The almost inconceivably brutal experience of the war had a lasting impact on Soviet 
subjectivities and the archetypes, narratives and images that claimed to represent and 
helped to shape those subjectivities. 
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 This thesis has demonstrated that Luria’s career was informed by the pivotal 
events that dotted Soviet history. As with the major historic events that preceded it, 
echoes of the official narratives identified by Weiner can be found in Luria’s work. 
In his autobiography he writes:       
World War II was a disaster for all countries, and it was particularly 
devastating for the Soviet Union. Thousands of towns were destroyed, tens of 
thousands of people died from hunger alone. Many millions, both civilian and 
military, were killed. Among the wounded were thousands who suffered brain 
injury and who required extended painstaking care. The unity of purpose of 
the Soviet people so clearly felt during the great Revolution and the 
subsequent years re-emerged in new forms. A sense of common responsibility 
and common purpose gripped the country. Each of us knew we had an 
obligation to work together with our countrymen to meet the challenge. We 
each had to find our place in the struggle.
31
 
 
Luria clearly situated his own medical work within the broader collective war effort. 
Also, in conformity with Weiner’s observations, he explicitly positioned the war in 
relation to the project of the revolution. The war appears as a devastating event that 
united the nation around a shared goal.   
 
 Following the outbreak of war, Luria briefly joined the volunteer corps 
before being commissioned to organise a hospital to care for those who required 
treatment away from the front. In the 1930s, Luria had entered medical school and 
re-trained as a neurologist, splitting his time between his studies in Moscow and 
psychological work in Kharkov. He graduated from medical school in 1937. During 
the war, the focus of his work was on people who had survived traumatic brain 
injuries. Aphasia, a neurological condition resulting in the partial or complete loss of 
speech, occupies a prominent place in his publications.
32
 Luria set up a 400 bed 
sanitorium in Kisegatch near Cheliabensk in the southern Urals, overseeing the 
construction of laboratories and therapeutic training rooms. There he worked with a 
team of thirty researchers whose tasks were to diagnose and treat brain injuries. They 
worked to develop ‘rational, scientifically based techniques for the rehabilitation of 
destroyed functions.’33 He wrote to Sergei Eisenstein describing the situation in 
favourable terms: ‘I have a lot of staff with me and the work is going well and 
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productively - I’ve even started producing some books.’34 Luria noted that despite 
their modest equipment, his team’s ‘most important resource was dedication to the 
task.’35 This was not routine scientific research but research carried out in service to 
the state. 
 
 Modern warfare is central to the history of the study of aphasia. Vast numbers 
of soldiers survived the First World War with serious brain injuries. The analysis of 
these casualties of modernity led to new insights into neuronal functioning and new 
therapeutic methods of rehabilitation. Kurt Goldstein in Germany and Henry Head in 
Britain dedicated themselves to healing people (overwhelmingly men) wounded in 
the Great War.
36
 Like Luria’s subsequent Soviet research, these scientists also 
emphasised the social function of their work, albeit in very different national 
contexts. Luria’s work was explicitly indebted to their endeavours. Like Goldstein, 
he emphasised adaptation, readjustment and empathy, and understood wounds as 
both physical and psychological.
37
 The rehabilitative workshops that Luria set up in 
the Urals (which later moved to Moscow) were a counterpart to those established by 
Goldstein at the Institute for Research into the Consequence of Brain Injuries in 
Frankfurt. Luria followed Head in observing patients over long periods of time and 
similarly cast his patients as ‘allies’ and collaborators in the therapeutic process.38   
 
 Luria's Traumatic Aphasia, published in the USSR in 1947, draws on Luria’s 
wartime work.
39
 Juergen Tesak and Chris Code give the book a privileged place in 
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the history of aphasia: ‘Of all the work on aphasia that has come from studying the 
victims of war, this book perhaps deserves to be recognised as the most inspired and 
influential.’40 Luria discusses how the war provided unprecedented opportunities for 
neurologists to examine the impact of localised brain injury. The people who 
sustained injuries tended to be young, which improved their chances of overcoming 
some of the injuries' impact (a factor also emphasised by Head). The priorities were 
to rehabilitate people as swiftly as possible with the aim to return them to service in 
the Red Army or, if their injuries were too severe, to a productive civilian life. The 
initial emphasis of treatment was focused on the healing of physical wounds. 
Following this stage, Luria and his team focused on rehabilitating their patients, 
attempting to discover ways they might recover their lost brain functions. They 
developed therapeutic techniques which incorporated practical tasks, which 
encouraged patients to relearn forgotten skills.  
 
 By 1943 he and his team had already amassed 800 case histories. In Luria's 
work the term 'trauma' [travma], in accordance with its etymological roots, refers 
exclusively to physical wounds. In Traumatic Aphasia, he gives little consideration 
to the emotional impact of war injuries or to the emotional efforts required to restore 
brain functions. Trauma is something that happens to the tissue of the brain. Luria's 
use of the term was consistent with the dominant Soviet understanding. The state 
cultivated an image of brave masculine fighters seemingly impervious to the war's 
horrific events. Catherine Merridale refers to 'the disappearance of individual trauma 
as an issue of public debate' in the Soviet Union, tying it to the state denial of the 
hardship, suffering and terror it unleashed on the population in the 1930s, as well as 
a shifting emphasis from the individual to the collective.
41
 Eyes needed to be dry and 
fixed resolutely on the bright future.  
 
 Short case histories are littered throughout Traumatic Aphasia, as they are in 
Luria's 1948 study Restoration of Function after Brain Injury, but these only give 
minimal details about the context of the injury, the patient's personal history or their 
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emotional state in the hospital. Instead, they all follow a similar format, providing 
the date and geographical location of injury, a description of the wound and a short 
account of the treatment procedure. Occasional glimpses of the affective impact of 
the injuries are suggested by the inclusion of short extracts from patients' first-hand 
accounts of their own conditions, which briefly interrupt the neutral medical tone.
42
 
These perfunctory de-personalised narratives isolate wounds from the subjects that 
bear them. The case histories are organised according to injury type, reducing 
patients to a proper name and military rank. The only context provided functions to 
explain the physical impact of the wound. These works correspond to what Luria 
later criticised as a ‘classical’ scientific approach, governed by ‘careful, consecutive, 
step-by-step reasoning’ but prone to reductionism.43 In stark contrast, The Man with 
a Shattered World, a detailed case history written 30 years after the war, provides a 
deeply personal and emotional account of the patient and his relationship to his 
injury, written in a literary style. Luria described his approach to this book as 
‘romantic’, in that it intended to ‘preserve the wealth of living reality.’44  
 
The Brezhnev-era (1964-1982), during which Luria wrote his case history, 
saw a huge revival of the cult of the Great Patriotic War. At a time when the Soviet 
Union’s economy and global position were struggling, past triumphs were 
celebrated, national pride and unity extolled.
45
 Although Luria’s case history is 
imbued with many tropes that align it with popular representations of the war 
produced in the period, by refusing to cast the conflict as an ecstatic victory his work 
strikes a more mournful note. The Man with a Shattered World does not attempt to 
occlude suffering or deny the extraordinary difficulties Zasetsky faced following his 
injury. It thus acknowledges the lasting traumatic impact of war on the human 
subject in a manner occluded both by the dominant state-sanctioned narratives and 
by Luria’s own medical texts from the immediate post-war period.  
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 Despite being more circumspect on the emotional impact of war than The 
Man with the Shattered World, however, Luria’s earlier texts on soldiers wounded in 
war are similarly addressed to the problem of overcoming or ameliorating the effects 
of brain injury. Traumatic Aphasia and Restoration of Function after Brain Injury 
are both concerned with the possibility of recovering from serious cerebral damage. 
Luria is clear that brain cells do not regenerate: 'the neuronal structures of the cortex, 
once destroyed, are incapable of regeneration.'
46
 Total recovery is not a possibility; 
an inert scar will always remain. This does not, however, lead Luria to conclude that 
no improvement is possible. Unlike in Malabou’s discussions of brain injury, he 
insists on the possibility of healing and restoring a sense of self, however partial or 
incomplete the result. Rather than focusing on full recovery, Luria is concerned with 
compensation, substitution and reorganisation. He developed forms of treatment that 
slowly enabled the brain to find new ways of performing the tasks that were once 
performed by the damaged areas of the brain, which he described as: 'Adaptation to 
new circumstances not to regeneration and restoration'.
47
 Luria’s work relied on a 
conception of the localisation of brain function which departed from the classic 
model proposed by German neurologist Carl Wernike in its insistence on the 
mobility of the brain;
48
 Luria understood the brain as a process rather than a product. 
In Traumatic Aphasia he describes the ‘dynamic localisation of functional systems in 
the cerebral cortex’, which he likens to a constellation or mosaic of interrelating 
zones.
49
 He contrasted the ‘uniform, undifferentiated grey’ appearance of the brain to 
the ‘inconceivable complexity and differentiation’ revealed through scientific 
observation, insisting that the neurologist situate brains in people and people in the 
world.
50
  
 
 For Luria, the disruption caused by a brain injury was always understood in 
relation to the specific functions it precludes. As such, brain injuries were always 
related to a patient’s former existence and to the regular flows of life from which 
they were wrenched: 
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Lesions exclude people from everyday life and work. Restoring their 
functions will enable them to reintegrate into society: How may such a 
patient be brought back into the daily round of social activity and work? 
What measures must be used so that this may be done as rationally as 
possible?
51
 
 
Brain injuries 'disrupt the normal life of the patient, exclude him from social 
intercourse and from work, and may cause irreparable damage to his intellectual 
life.'
52 
Humans are distinguished from animals because they are more socially 
developed: 'Man's mental activity always takes place in a world of objects created 
during the development of society, is always directed towards them, and is 
frequently carried out with their aid.'
53
 Greater levels of plasticity in humans also 
endow them a greater ability to reorient themselves to the world in the case of injury. 
Luria's research thus focused on restorative training using tools as external mediators 
between the patient and their environment. Although a long and arduous process, 
Luria insisted that some progress could be made: 'human activity can be restored 
notwithstanding the irreversible changes affecting those areas of the cortex 
responsible for its performance.'
54
  
 
 Restoration, adaptation and compensation in the face of permanent injury are 
also the focus of The Man with a Shattered World. Zasetsky is aware that he will 
never fully recover but is nonetheless committed to ameliorating his suffering. When 
Zasetsky first awakens in hospital he is unable to orientate himself in his 
environment at all: ‘Right after I was wounded, I seemed to be some newborn 
creature.’55 It is from the opening passages of his account that Malabou quotes, as 
they best demonstrate the total discontinuity she associates with the ‘new 
wounded’.56 However, Zasetsky does not remain in this position of total 
bewilderment; he slowly begins to find ways of anchoring himself in the world 
again: ‘Afterwards, when I’d had a chance to hear words that people use in 
conversation or thinking, various clusters of “memory fragments” developed, and 
from these I began to make some sense out of the life around me.’57  
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 In Central Park Walter Benjamin characterises spleen as 'that feeling which 
corresponds to catastrophe in permanence.' He likens the notion of eternal 
catastrophe to a kaleidoscope being turned in a child's hands. The cylinder is shaken, 
the loose coloured shards settle into a new position and a symmetrical image is 
formed in the mirrors. Something new is created but the act of turning the 
kaleidoscope simply 'collapses order into a new order'. The kaleidoscope's mirrors 
present a jumble of bright fragments as a neat image which, for Benjamin, stand for 
the ruling order, imposing regularity on an iridescent chaos. The solution for 
Benjamin is to smash the kaleidoscope, to let the beads bounce and scatter.
58
 Weiner 
conceived of the war as one in a series of dramatic cataclysms that shook the Soviet 
Union. However, if the revolution was framed as a fundamental break with the past, 
a new beginning, then the Great Patriotic War, however concretely devastating, was 
envisioned as an attack from without that helped to consolidate the already 
established national identity. If the revolution smashed the kaleidoscope, then the 
war only shook the pieces. The threat of dissolution, of rupture, was to be resisted 
rather than celebrated. For Zasetsky, therefore, the future is in some sense always the 
past; recovery is about rediscovery, about reintegration into an existing world rather 
than a totally new beginning. Luria explicitly described it as a 'return to life.'
59
  
 
 The process of re-learning the case history describes is historically and 
culturally specific: the reality Zasetsky reorients himself in is a specifically Soviet 
one, saturated with specific associations and ordered according to particular 
principles. Zasetsky is ‘overjoyed’ when he recognises Lenin’s ‘familiar face’ 
(referred to in the Russian text by the affectionate diminutive Ilicha).
60
 He 
subsequently recalls words like sun, moon, cloud and rain, as well as his own name 
and the names of his family members. This implies that the image of Lenin is as 
taken for granted and familiar as the weather. In the period of the First Five Year 
Plan Luria's experiments in Central Asia indicated that far from all Soviet citizens 
were able to recognise Lenin’s face. By the time of the Second World War, however, 
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the newly introduced culture had become an embedded part of people's lives and 
consciousnesses; it had congealed into Second Nature.
61
 
 
  Zasetsky is clear that his injury makes him feel useless not only in terms of  
his personal life, but also in relation to the life of his country. The narrative he  
produced, which he originally intended to give the title I'll Fight On!, is pervaded by  
militaristic vocabularly. This is even more pronounced in the Russian text: certain  
passages, which underline and repeat the militaristic tropes, are omitted from the  
English translation altogether. For instance, in the opening passages of the Russian  
text Luria introduces the case history by declaring: ‘It is about a fight that did not  
lead to victory [pobeda], and about a victory that has not put an end to fighting.’62  
The loss Zasetsky feels is associated with patriotic feeling. He expresses concern that  
he is no longer ‘of some service to his country’ (the Russian word ‘narod’,  
conventionally translated as nation or motherland, has an even more fervently  
patriotic emphasis).
63
 The English translation also tends to omit the possessive  
pronoun 'our', which litters the Russian text, indicating the close identification  
Zasetsky feels with his nation. When presented with a copy of the daily newspaper,  
he is horrified to discover that he is unable to recognise 'our Pravda', later bemoaning  
the unfamiliarity of 'our Russian words.'
64
 It is not language in general that provides  
his ‘link with life’ but a particular language, bound up with his Soviet identity and  
history. His sense of despair partly derives from a feeling of disaffiliation. The  
specifically Soviet qualities of text are also reflected in its form, which mimics  
Zasetsky’s struggle to re-connect with his former self. 
  
A World Shattered and Re-Made: Between Spontaneity and Consciousness 
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Oliver Sacks conceives of case histories, or what he calls 'Clinical Tales', as 
narratives that strive to reorient the self in a world experienced as broken; they are 
concerned with 'organisation and chaos, order and disorder'.
65
 Zasetsky framed his 
struggle in similar terms, as an attempt to make ‘the bits and pieces to add up to a 
coherent whole.’66 This is also captured by the Russian title of the case history: A 
World Lost and Re-Gained [Poteryannyi i vozvrashchennyi mir]. For Sacks, a 
clinical tale aims to describe the relation of the patient's altered world to 'our 
world'.
67
 But whose world is 'ours'? Notions of chaos and disorder rely on a 
conception of organisation and order, but such apparently stable entities are 
historically contingent. As we have seen, Zasetsky’s world was ordered in a 
particular way that was partially determined by his national context. The worlds 
Sacks and Luria attempted to reintegrate their patients back into were ordered 
differently, and so too were the narrative styles they employed to convey their 
patients' conditions.  
 
 Luria was an avid reader of detective novels. Oliver Sacks and Jerome 
Bruner recall that they were both implored to supply him with works by American 
crime writers including Ngaio Marsh and Nicholas Freeling. Sacks recalls that 
Luria's favourite Sherlock Holmes book was the Seven Percent Solution, in which a 
cocaine addicted Holmes is in analysis with Freud.
68
 Luria explicitly likened the role 
of the psychologist to that of a ‘criminal investigator’.69 Indeed, his experiments 
with criminals that formed the basis of his 1932 book The Nature of Human 
Conflicts (discussed in Chapter 1) saw him working directly with the police. In an 
essay analysing popular detective fiction, ‘The Hotel Lobby’ (1925), Siegfried 
Kracauer claims that both the detective and the detective novel seek to ‘construct a 
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whole out of the blindly scattered elements of a disintegrated world’.70 Luria’s case 
history set out to perform a similar task. However, Kracauer also analyses the 
detective novel as a product of mass culture that provides clues to the mysteries of 
the particular society that produced it. As he observes in ‘The Mass Ornament’ 
(1927): 
The position that an epoch occupies in the historical process can be 
determined more strikingly from an analysis of its inconspicuous surface-
level expressions than from that epoch’s judgments about itself.71 
 
Kracauer declares that the detective novel 'discloses the secret of a society bereft of 
reality.'
72
 He sees the alienation of capitalist society reflected in this genre of popular 
fiction. Kracauer discusses the hotel lobby as the location that defines detective 
fiction  –  a space illuminated by harsh artificial light, and inhabited by spectral, 
disconnected figures whose apathy and inertia might be linked to Malabou’s 
characterisation of the ‘new wounded’, which she also explicitly characterises as a 
distinctly capitalist form of subjectivity.
73
 Luria’s international contacts and ability to 
read in English gave him access to popular Western fiction but this was not a literary 
genre that had a mass readership in the Soviet Union.
74
 The dialectical tension 
between woundedness and healing that animates The Man with a Shattered World 
bears much closer resemblance to a popular literary genre remote from American 
detective fiction: the socialist realist novel. Kracauer’s approach to the products of 
mass culture might be usefully transposed into the Soviet context: attending to the 
surface of Luria’s text provides insights into the epoch and society of which it was a 
product. 
 
  Socialist realism was installed as the official literature of the Soviet Union  
following the Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934, the year of Vygotsky's death. The  
term itself had been in circulation for a couple of years already, and the  
condemnation of Freudianism, Formalism and modernism were already taken for 
granted when the conference began. Katerina Clark discusses the socialist realist 
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novel as a form of ritual, understood as a cultural form and social act through which 
cultural meaning and national myths were generated, consolidated and sustained. 
Socialist realist novels follow a distinct master plot, whose formula, she argues, 
remained remarkably consistent from the 1930s through to the Brezhnev era, with  
even illegally circulated samizdat literature tending to conform to the officially  
established structure. The Soviet novel’s master plot was, she argues, ‘the literary  
expression of the master categories that organise the entire culture.'
75
 As Jochen  
Hellbeck discusses in his analysis of Soviet diarists, Revolution on My Mind, a  
broadly Leninist understanding of society’s progression towards communism and the  
individual’s place in that struggle also structured Soviet citizen’s private reflections:  
‘To truly live meant to rise above selfish pursuits and devote one’s life to society and  
history, to remake accursed, backward Russia through the power of personal  
example and an unflinching orientation toward the future.’76 Zasetsky’s accounts of  
his illness are consistent with Hellbeck’s characterisation of Soviet diary-writers:  
writing was framed as an arduous pursuit which functioned as a space for self- 
interrogation, where the lonely and inadequate individual strove to overcome their  
personal deficiencies in order to merge with the collective. 
 
According to Clark, the hero of the socialist realist novel embodies the  
Marxist-Leninist account of history. The questing protagonist undergoes a 
transformation, which Clark characterises as a working out of the dialectic between 
spontaneity and consciousness (the movement famously described by Lenin in What 
is to be Done?, discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Despite being intemperate and 
chaotic, for Lenin, spontaneity is a prerequisite for the progression towards 
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communism. The movement from spontaneity to consciousness is a progression 
from chaotic resistance to organised revolutionary struggle. In Clark’s  
account, this movement had a counterpart in the socialist realist hero: 
The great historical drama of struggle between the forces of spontaneity and 
the forces of consciousness is unfolded in a tale of the way one individual 
mastered his wilful self, became disciplined, and attained to an extrapersonal 
identity […] the hero achieved greater harmony within himself and in relation 
to his society.
77
 
 
The Man with a Shattered World overwhelmingly corresponds to the master plot of  
the socialist realist novel. The case history describes a heroic man - Luria explicitly  
describes him as such throughout
78
 - struggling with almost superhuman effort and  
determinacy to overcome his own infirmity.  Zasetsky is committed to overcoming  
chaos and re-establishing the order of his broken life in order ‘to impose some order  
and sense of continuity.’79 ‘This book,’ Luria asserts in a passage omitted from the  
English translation, ‘is about a heroic struggle for life’.80 Nature often appears as the  
antagonist in socialist realist narratives - dam building, farm collectivising and  
factory constructing in hostile environments all feature prominently in novels of the  
genre. For Zasetsky, however, the nature being overcome is not external but internal;  
Zasetsky is at war with his own brain.  
 
Lilya Kaganovsky identifies two conflicting yet coexisting images of 
masculinity operating within Stalinist culture: the healthy, virile, strong figure 
familiar from socialism realist statues and paintings, and the damaged, scarred and 
mutilated male body that appeared in cinematic and literary works of the period. She 
sees superimposed over the image of 'extravagant virility' presented in the visual 
arts, the heroic invalid - 'limping, bandaged, bedridden, grounded, unwilling or 
unable to marry' - a staple archetype in Soviet literature and film which punctures the 
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idealised image of masculinity:
81
 'The heroic invalid is the exemplary Stalinist 
subject.'
82 
Zasetsky conforms to this archetype. 
 
 Kaganovsky reads the coexistence of these conflicting images of masculinity 
in psychoanalytic terms, as a fantasy of 'radical dismemberment', representing the 
fundamental gap between real and ideal gender norms.
83
 She frames this in Lacanian 
vocabulary: her heroes live with lack, staging the incommensurability of penis and 
phallus. But the gap between ideal and reality is not simply a question of gender as 
Kaganovsky implies; it is precisely what animated the experience of building 
socialism. Unlike nineteenth-century realism, socialist realism was not strictly 
mimetic; it was not concerned with simply depicting the present as it really was. 
Socialist realism was never intended as a mirror of the present but more like a 
window into the future, juxtaposing an idealised image of current existence with a 
prefiguration of the bright communist world to come. Régine Robin characterises 
socialist realism as an 'impossible aesthetic' whose impossibility derives from the 
fundamental incompatibility she discerns between the conflicting temporalities at 
work within socialist realist narratives, which she describes as ‘the impossible 
inscription of the description-prescription oxymoron.’84 From this tension between 
the what-is and the what-ought-to-be, the narrative derives its relentless forward-
moving drive; the novel is always dynamic, with an emphasis on the ongoing 
struggle to build communism, to bring a new reality into being. The fantasy (future) 
of unity and reconciliation is combined with the reality (present) of dismemberment. 
Radical dismemberments paradoxically propel the hero forwards; he strives to 
overcome the obstacles in the external world as well as those presented by his own 
body. 
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The most striking parallel with The Man with the Shattered World is Nikolai 
Ostrovsky’s prototypical How the Steel was Tempered, first published in serial form 
between 1932 and 1934, just prior to the 1934 Soviet Writer’s Congress. The novel 
tells the story of revolutionary hero Pavel Korchagin who joins the Red Army during 
the Civil War, tracing the young hero’s progress from passive individual to collective 
subject. Pavel is severely injured in battle but his disability does nothing to quell his 
revolutionary fervour. At the end of the novel, though bedridden and blind, Pavel 
remains ‘determined to resume his place in the ranks of the builders of the new 
life.’85 Like Zasetsky, he does this by writing an account of his struggles. The novel 
concludes when he receives a telegram from Leningrad confirming that his work will 
be published, returning him ‘to the fighting ranks and to life.’86 Zasetsky’s writing 
plays a similar role and he expresses himself in the embattled vocabulary of the 
socialist realist hero: 'I'm fighting to recover a life I lost when I was wounded.'
87
 In 
both cases the text, the process of writing and the writing subject cannot be 
disentangled.
 
 Ostrovsky’s own life famously paralleled that of his mutilated hero. 
The novel’s torturous composition formed an integral part of its symbolic status, 
elevating writing to a heroic and revolutionary act.
88
 Zasetsky attempted to achieve 
consciousness through writing, and the case history bears witness to the strenuous 
therapeutic process of which it is a product.  
 
The Writing Cure 
 
Psychoanalysis is a talking cure; the treatment proceeds through a peculiar form of 
conversation in the consulting room, configured by temporal and monetary 
constraints. Friedrich Kittler argues that the psychoanalytic encounter should be 
understood as a ‘pure realm of hearing’.89 According to Kittler, psychoanalysis has 
'no vague parallels to film; it has much more precisely learned the lesson of 
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technological sound recorders',
90
 which originated 'not coincidentally' at the same 
time.
91
 In both Discourse Networks 1800/1900 and Gramophone, Film, Typewriter 
Kittler quotes Freud's ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis’ 
(1912) in which the analyst is likened to a telephone receiver adjusted to the 
transmitting microphone of the analysand: ‘mouths and ears have become 
electrotransducers’.92 The telephone does not prioritise certain sounds over others; it 
does not separate sense from nonsense, indeed these categories do not exist for it at 
all. The catch though, as Kittler is quick to point out, is that Freud’s telephone 
analogy is just that: an analogy rather than a telephone. Just as images are transposed 
into words in the interpretation of a dream, so the acoustical data of the consulting 
room is not recorded by a machine but listened to by a human-all-too-human analyst 
who transforms the material of the session into written words from memory: ‘This is 
the relation between analytic practice and theory. What would have disturbed free-
floating attention during the session later occurs after all: Freud reaches for his 
pen’.93 Freud did not even take notes during analytic sessions, but relied on his 
memory, as he notes in 'Dora' (1905): 'the record is not absolutely – 
phonographically – exact.'94 Whereas the phonograph records noises 'regardless of 
their so-called meaning',
95
 writing, even if it selects nonsense, always selects. 
Kittler's critique of the psychoanalytic method is grounded in a concern with the 
transformations and distortions that occur when one medium (speech) is transposed 
into another (writing).  
 
 Kittler’s discussion is primarily concerned with how the written case history 
is produced, but a body of feminist secondary literature on the Freudian case history 
has focused on the issue of who produced the writing, and attempted to redress the 
imbalance balance between writing analyst and speaking analysand by reinserting 
the analysand's voice into the history of the case.
96
 In a similar vein, Malabou 
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accuses Luria of muffling his patient’s experience by smothering it with his own 
written account. She claims Luria falsely imposes clarity on his fragmented patient: 
'narrative work is a clinical gesture.'
97
 Unlike Freud's case histories, which transpose 
one medium into another, however, Luria composed his case history from texts 
written by Zasetsky, the composition of which was central to the therapeutic process. 
Following Kittler’s argument, by operating within the same medium as his patient, 
Luria's method could be said to present his patient in a less mediated (though 
certainly not unmediated) fashion. Although the patient’s experience is still framed 
by the neurologist, his words are represented in the case history in a way that the 
psychoanalytic method precludes.  
 
 Kittler extends his discussion of the limitations of the human analyst by 
pointing to the failure of the written case history to capture the 'white noise' of free 
association; for imposing order on chaos. Free association is characterised by a lack 
of calculation, of organisation, of coherence; the analysand is encouraged to relate 
whatever is on the ‘surface’ of their mind however meaningless, trivial or absurd-
seeming.
98
 In producing a case history, the analyst alone is responsible for 
reproducing the unruly utterances (and silences) of the analysand. Luria’s techniques 
and goals were very different from free association as he emphasised the voluntary 
over the involuntary. Luria encouraged Zasetsky (who, unlike the subjects of Freud’s 
case histories, was not given a pseudonym) to use writing to reorder his own broken 
life. In the opening pages of the case history he explicitly declares that Zasetsky 
should be considered book’s author: ‘It is not false modesty on my part to wish no 
credit for this book. The real author is its hero.’99 It is not the doctor but the patient 
who takes responsibility for piecing things back together, inserting shards of memory 
into a coherent narrative: ‘His only material consisted of fragmentary recollections 
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that came to mind at random. On these he had to impose some order and sense of 
continuity.’100  
 
In his autobiography, Luria explains that he frequently employed writing as a 
form of therapy with brain injured patients. Initially, he claimed that his patients 
experienced their memories as ‘pieces of a jigsaw puzzle piled up haphazardly’ 
before them.
101
 Luria devised a writing exercise to assist these people in completing 
the puzzle. The patient would write down ‘the fragments of narration they remember 
on separate pieces of paper’, lay the pieces in front of them and rearrange them into 
a ‘coherent order.’102  Using similar methods, writing provided Zasetsky with his 
only ‘link with life, his only hope of not succumbing to illness but recovering at least 
part of what had been lost.’103 Re-mastering his lost language allowed Zasetsky to re-
connect to humanity. Writing acted as a mediator between patient and world; the 
process of composing narratives was used to weave the frayed strands of his life 
back into the fabric of society. Writing was crucial to the therapeutic process, rather 
than an act performed by the psychologist post factum. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the analysand who reclines on the couch as a means of encouraging the relaxation 
necessary for free association, Luria describes Zasetsky's process of writing as a 
laborious and deliberate pursuit. Initially, Zasetsky cannot even remember how to 
use a pencil or form letters on a page. Although he gradually remastered the ability 
to write, producing words remained torturously difficult: ‘every word he recalled, 
every thought he expressed, required the most excrutiating effort.  When his writing 
went well, he managed to write a page a day, two at most, and felt completely 
drained by this.’104 Yet it was this constant battle with linguistic expression that gave 
Zasetsky’s life meaning: ‘This work caused him no end of despair, but the hope that 
had impelled him to write carried him along.’105 
 
The frenzied approach Zasetsky took to writing, the fervent application that 
the case history returns to throughout, does not, however, succeed in producing a 
neatly ordered document:  
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I tried to remember whatever I could with that battered memory of mine and 
write it as a true story, just as a writer would. But when I started I realised I’d 
never be able to do that since I didn’t have enough of a vocabulary or mind 
left to write well.
106
 
 
Luria based The Man with a Shattered World on three thousand pages of written 
notes composed by Zasetsky over a period of over twenty five years. He evocatively 
describes the material output yielded by the therapeutic process: 'Before me is a pile 
of notebooks: some of them faded, makeshift affairs dating from the war years; 
others, thick, oilcloth-covered books covering the recent past.’107 Although the 
transformation that occurred in turning this raw material into a case history may not 
be strictly analagous to the process of composing a psychoanalytic case history, 
which relies on the analyst’s memories of the spoken analytic encounter, it was still 
Luria who edited, arranged and commented upon the huge unwieldy mass of written 
material Zasetsky produced. Unlike in a psychoanalytic consulting room the 
therapist encouraged his patient to order his thoughts, but this nonetheless proved 
impossible. Indeed, Zasetsky was only capable of writing automatically, ‘without 
thinking’, which suggests that his method of producing words was not as remote 
from free association as his descriptions of his intense application to the task 
imply.
108
 Zasetsky might have been driven to heal, to restore himself to the world, 
but the vast accumulation of notes that he produced suggest that his efforts were 
always undercut by the impossibility of doing so: ‘I’d try to dig up another idea and 
find suitable words for it, and I’d write these down on various scraps of paper… 
what a torture it was.’109 He forgot the most simple words, produced ‘disjointed 
phrases’ and found re-reading his own words extremely difficult.110 In the pursuit of 
making sense of his life, Zasetsky piles words on words, pages upon pages, 
notebooks upon notebooks. Ultimately, for all its strenuous exertions to pull the 
disparate pieces together, the work and the patient it describes remain in pieces:  
I wanted terribly to write this story but I worked so hard at it, I finally felt 
sick - both from my head wound and the endless job of writing about it. It’s 
been an enormous strain (still is). I work at it like someone with an 
obsession.
111
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In ‘Dora’ Freud claims that an analysand’s initial account of their experiences 
‘may be compared to an unnavigable river whose stream is at one moment choked 
by masses of rock and at another divided and lost among shallows and sandbanks 
[...] leaving gaps unfilled, riddles unanswered.'
112
 It is only by the end of the 
treatment that 'an intelligible, consistent and unbroken case history' will emerge.
113
 
Freud, however, is quick to undermine this claim. The case history is, after all, 
entitled ‘Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’ and his patient cut off her 
analysis. Luria, like Freud, is incapable of replacing the unnavigable river with a 
straight canal (a conclusion no socialist realist novel would tolerate). Rather than 
condemning Luria’s case history, as Malabou does, for failing to communicate the 
peculiar qualities of his patient’s condition, however, the text does not completely 
banish the unruly quality of his patient’s writings. The text might not be a transparent 
representation of Zasetsky’s condition but its fragmented form bears witness to the 
relationship between the patient and his doctor, and between Zasetsky’s present 
experiences and imagined healthy future. The gesture of ordering the material into a 
case history mimics the structure of the treatment, and ultimately the fragmentary, 
non-linear structure of the former, does justice to the unfinished, interminable quality 
of the latter.  
 
Returning once more to the form of the text, it is possible to discern moments 
in which the forward moving progressive thrust of the socialist realist narrative is 
undermined by Zasetsky’s constant digressions and regressions. Luria’s 
contemporary, the Soviet literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin, argued that language is 
always internally split.
 114 
 He acknowledged that language is 'ideologically 
saturated',
115
 claiming that the apparently rigid structures of what he calls 'unitary 
language' always operate in the midst of heteroglossia; a tendency to unite is 
constantly undermined by a tendency to disassemble. The unitary language and 
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heteroglossia are in constant interaction - the former imposing limits, tending 
towards stasis and ossification, the latter always fighting to resist these constraints. 
The unitary language is centripetal, it keeps the language moving uniformly along a 
prescribed path, heteroglossia is centrifugal, it has a decentralising tendency. For 
Bakhtin, every utterance is 'a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two 
embattled tendencies in the life of language.'
116
 The contradictory qualities of 
language described by Bakhtin, recall the movement traced in Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, in which Eros or the life instincts draw things together while the 
death drive pulls them apart. These contradictions and tensions animate The Man 
with a Shattered World. Zasetsky’s injury produced linguistic and perceptual 
disturbances that the treatment attempted to overcome. Zasteky sought to reintegrate 
into the existing world from which his injury excluded him, a process the case 
history formally and linguistically mimics. Ultimately, however, Zasetsky is 
operating within a particular ideologically saturated discourse that the condition 
being described refuses to be fully contained by. The specificities of the cerebral 
condition of the patient crack open the official unitary language with its emphasis on 
wholeness and resolution. Heteroglossia intrudes, unravelling the centripetal 
qualities of the text’s socialist realist unitary language. 
 
The Man with the Shattered Brain: The History of a World Wound 
 
Malabou challenges the assumption that narrative can function to reunite wounded 
people with their former selves. Instead she asks: ‘What mirror could reflect a 
brain?’117 Although she insists that the ‘new wounded’ cannot be healed, she does 
suggest that their experience of total detachment could be represented. Luria's case 
history, Malabou argues, fails to do justice to the 'rupture of narrativity' that she 
assumes characterises the psychic condition of the patient being described.
 118
 
Instead, she identifies Samuel Beckett's 'theatre of absence' as the literary form most 
capable of representing the 'affective impoverishment and destructive 
metamorphosis' that she insists is characteristic of the new wounded.
 119
 Beckett's 
writings, she claims, are uniquely capable of capturing the 'blank spaces that emerge 
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when the network of connections is shredded'.
120
 Malabou proposes that Beckett's 
work might be suited to conveying the subjectivity of the new wounded because of 
its 'interruption, pauses, caesuras'.
121
  In practice, however, her analysis focuses on 
content rather than form; she is more concerned with the kind of subjects she claims 
Beckett describes, than in his use of language per se. For example, she draws heavily 
on the recent work of Antonio Damasio, favourably remarking upon his predilection 
for Beckett, without pausing to consider the literary form Damasio employs, in 
which the matter-of-fact voice of the doctor takes precedence over those of his 
patients in a far more pronounced way than in Luria’s case history, where the first 
person perspective switches between doctor and patient. The subjects Damasio 
describes may conform to Malabou’s singular definition of the ‘new wounded’ but 
she does not ask why the narrative style of his case histories, which are written in 
continuous prose without interruptions, pauses or caesuras, bears no trace of his 
professed literary influences.
122
   
 
  Unlike Damasio's cases, The Man with A Shattered World proceeds in a jerky,  
jolted fashion. Though concerned with establishing unity and coherence, Luria does  
not present the wounded subject as already healed nor is the text unified and  
coherent. Luria employs two interweaving narrative voices, switches between  
various tenses and genres, and jumps backwards and forwards in time in order to  
mimic the patient’s non-linear experience. By relying on large chunks of first-person  
testimony, it is written from the perspective of terrified disorientation, as felt by  
Zasetsky: 
When I came out of the bathroom, I forgot which way I had to turn to get 
back to my room. So I just started walking, dragging myself along. Suddenly 
I banged my side against the door […] I was amazed that this had happened 
[…] I turned in the other direction and fell, because I got confused again and 
didn’t  know which way to walk. Suddenly the words right, left, back, 
forward, up, and down occurred to me, but they weren’t any help since I 
didn’t really understand what they meant.123  
 
The book is full of surreal and bewildering passages that might indeed come from  
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the pages of Beckett: spoons appear as 'peculiar bits of space',
124
 familiar towns  
become alien labyrinths, heads might become as large as tables one minute and as  
small as chicken heads the next, hands and legs vanish and must be 'hunted' for, and  
written language appears as a mysterious series of squiggles. Zasetsky sees  
everything as though through a swarm of tiny flies (Plate 4.2). Luria writes: ‘the  
objects he saw no longer appeared stable. They would glimmer fitfully and become  
displaced, making everything appear as if it were in a state of flux.’125 Words  
appear as though they had been 'gnawed, plucked around the edges, and what's left  
are scattered points, quills, or threads that flicker like a swarm'.
126
 Objects 
confront him as completely mysterious, ‘alien, colourless and fragmented.’127 For  
Zasetsky, vision takes on a monstrous life of its own; it not only obscures reality but  
is actively nibbling away at it, wearing it down: ‘I see only a grey mist in which  
spots, threads, and little bodies seem to shift and flicker back and forth.’128  
 
  Immediately after re-gaining consciousness Luria describes asking his patient  
to recount the moment of his injury: ‘“Well, you see… it’s, it’s… a long time  
already… must be two, three.. What’s the word?…”’129 This last question, as Laura  
Salisbury discusses, recalls Beckett’s final work ‘What Is The Word’, written after its  
author suffered a stroke that resulted in temporary aphasia. Salisbury describes a  
work ‘scattered with stuttered dashes, abrupt elisions, compulsive repetitions and  
controlled echoes that inhabit an uncanny hinterland between the voluntary and the  
involuntary.’130 Unlike Beckett, Luria attempted to overcome the disruptions.  
Writing had a therapeutic function, providing Zasetsky with a means to reorient  
himself in a world experienced as broken. Nonetheless, despite the efforts of its  
authors, The Man with a Shattered World also evokes an uncanny hinterland between  
voluntary and involuntary; the dialectic between woundedness and healing is never  
fully resolved.  
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  The text is riven with breaks that correspond to gaps in Zasetsky’s memory.  
Contrary to Malabou’s criticisms, Luria’s translator claims that ‘Luria has  
scrupulously preserved the repetitions and inconsistencies which are symptoms of  
the patient’s condition.’131 Elisions punctuate the description of his last memories  
before being wounded: ‘Under fire, I jumped up from the ice, pushed on…toward  
the west…there…and…’132 Luria also reproduces the pauses and non-sequiturs that  
dotted Zasetsky’s speech. In its form this recalls Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of  
Beckett’s writing, which he describes by way of a neurological metaphor (borrowed  
from Beckett’s 1937 letter to Axel Kaun):133 ‘Beckett clamours for a style that would  
proceed through a perforation and proliferation of tissue.'
134
 Malabou briefly  
mentions Deleuze’s characterisation of Beckett as a writer of exhaustion without  
noting that in Deleuze’s discussion the exercise of exhausting the possible in  
Beckett’s writing (achieved through exhaustive combinations of words) does not  
result in the kind of barren qualities she associates with the ‘new wounded’ at all.  
Instead, Deleuze argues, foregrounding the strangeness of language allows for a kind  
of desubjectivised affect to seep back into Beckett’s texts. Drilling through language  
results in a wound. The problem with words, Deleuze claims, is that they are over  
burdened by habit, memory and history: 'their surface, barely broken, heals over  
again.'
135
 The implication is that the total devastation - the 'absence of persistence,  
of revivification, or of regression'
136
 - Malabou claims is embodied in Beckett’s  
writing was never achieved. His writing captures a tension between woundedness  
and healing, rather than embodying the unhealable wound itself. The Man with a  
Shattered World contains a similar tension between the habitual skin of the world  
and the wound that tears through its surface. Zasetsky’s condition precludes him  
from participating in routine social activities: working, shopping, conversing, finding  
his way around. Once familiar words become strange and opaque; the surface does  
not heal. The impossible, the unreality of reality, thus erupts into view: 'words burst  
and backfire on themselves to reveal their own outside.'
137
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  It is precisely these moments, in which routine existence is revealed as  
strange and arduous, that Beckett discerns in Proust’s work: ‘the perilous zones in  
the life of the individual, dangerous, precarious, mysterious and fertile, when for a  
moment the boredom of living is replaced by the suffering of being.’138 The Man  
with a Shattered World inhabits such a perilous zone. Rebecca Comay characterises  
Proust's project as one of endless accumulation, which the author pursued with an  
obsessiveness bordering on the pathological. She compares his habit of scrupulously  
recording his experience of illness to Beckett's description of Molloy's farts: 
The involuntary processes of the body are registered in the archive of the 
voluntary memory until the very act of accounting is transformed into a kind 
of spiritual exercise—a running litany of complaints from which emerges at 
once both the possibility and the impossibility of writing.
139
 
 
Comay invokes Benjamin’s discussion of the interaction of memory and forgetting in 
Proust which he likens to Penelope’s shroud; every weaving is an unweaving.140 In 
The Origin of Tragic Drama Benjamin describes the search for origins as being 
animated by a similarly dialectical rhythm. For Benjamin, any discussion of origins 
must also contend with subsequent history: ‘That which is original […] needs to be 
recognised as a process of restoration and reestablishment, but, on the other hand, 
and precisely because of this, as something imperfect and incomplete.’141 This dual 
movement also animates The Man with a Shattered World; though aimed at 
restoration the process remains incomplete. Although Luria's case history functions 
as an attempt, performed by both doctor and patient, to tame the unruly profusion, 
obtrusion and confusion of words wrought by Zasetsky's injury, ultimately, it is not 
his recovery that determines his being, but his determination to recover:  
He was acutely aware of what it means to be human, and to the extent that his 
strength permitted, worked feverishly to overcome his problems. He suffered 
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intensely, and though his world had been devastated, in the deepest sense he 
remained a man, struggling to regain what he had lost.
142
 
 
Zasetsky goes in search of lost time, only to find its scattered and splintered 
remnants cannot be neatly reassembled; it is the persistence of their sharp edges and 
rough textures that define him.   
 
Clark maintains that socialist realism was not only a literary genre but a form 
of cultural ritual. Zasetsky’s attempts to describe his life might similarly be 
understood as ritualistic. It is a ritual that is repeated compulsively. The beginning is 
constantly returned to, the steps of the journey retraced: ‘I’ve repeated the same 
points over and over again in my story and may do it again’.143 Like the movement 
of the death drive which is always impelled to return to the beginning, Zasetsky 
pushes forwards by moving back through his most distant past: ‘My memories come 
back from the wrong end… my recollections mostly have to do with my 
childhood.’144 This movement is mirrored by the structure of the case history itself, 
which not only recounts the treatment in a non-linear fashion, but also includes a 
series of scientific ‘digressions’ (the Russian term ‘otstupleniye’ also means 
‘retreat’). Though the narrative of the case history is progressive, it constantly loops 
back on itself: ‘I’m still caught in a vicious circle. I can’t break out of it.’145 These 
reversals and repetitions nonetheless propel the narrative forwards. Returning to the 
original site of disaster and to the happier times that preceded it, also gestures 
towards the possibility of re-writing history or at least recovering something that was 
lost there: ‘In the beginning it was all so simple’.146  
 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud described the child’s game, which 
returned to the beginning over and over again. Fort/Da: the repetitive rhythm of the 
game represents an early attempt to gain mastery over the instincts. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, Benjamin suggested that this discussion of repetition in play 
could also be understood as a ‘reinstatement of the original condition.’147 Politically, 
this implies the possibility of starting afresh, of renegotiating the course of events. 
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This possibility is central to Comay’s understanding of memory, which she also 
relates to the temporality of the death drive: 
Forgetting is not opposed to the work of remembrance […] To forget to undo 
the past, to make it all “un-happen”, is precisely to remember a moment 
before it all happened, to undo the inexorability of fate by re-staging the 
beginning, even if only in imagination and in proxy: to act as if we could take 
it over again, as if we could cast aside the legacy of dead generations, as if 
we could refuse the mourning work of cultural succession, as if we could cast 
off our patrimony, rewrite our origins, as if every moment, even those long 
vanished, could become a radically new beginning - unprecedented, 
unrehearsed, unremembered. This is why Freud will connect repetition with 
the death drive: the compulsion to repeat expresses a desire for inanimate 
existence and ultimately for non-existence: it is the desire to return to a time 
before the beginning—to go back not for the sake of regressing but in order 
to take it over, do it otherwise. The desire for repetition is essentially the 
desire for difference.
148
 
 
This understanding of repetition also indicates an understanding of recovery that is 
distinct from reintegration into an existing state of things. For Comay, Proust's drive 
to accumulate speaks of both anticipation and loss, it gestures towards the past as 'a 
constantly expanding repository of unrealised possibilities, botched initiatives, and 
thwarted hopes.'
149
 The work of remembrance is therefore oriented towards the 
future; it returns to the past in order to recover and reactivate lost opportunities:  
It is rather about returning to a time before possibilities were eroded, to a 
moment before opportunities were squandered: what is being reactivated or 
repeated is not only the pressure of unrealised futures but of futurity itself in 
its ineffaceable obduracy—a potentiality all the more potent for being 
irretrievably past. Benjamin speaks of “hope in the past.”150 
 
In his furious writing and re-writing, weaving and unweaving Zasetsky returns again 
and again to the sites of squandered experiences, failure and lost chances, which are 
held in an unreconcilable tension with the violent actualities of subsequent history.  
It is precisely for this reason that The Man With the Shattered World emerges not 
only as a modernist document but also, obliquely, as a document of political hope.  
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 Luria concludes by suggesting that Zasetsky ‘reverted to the past’ as a way of 
making sense of his experience in the present: ‘he could not understand why the 
world had become so peculiar, why war was necessary, or find any justification for 
what happened to him.’151 Zasetsky attempted to find a social justification for his 
condition, but he struggled to convince himself that his sacrifice had been 
worthwhile. Zasetsky seems to blame war for putting an end to the possibility for 
building a communist society: 'were it not for war, the world would have become a 
great place to live long ago.'
152
 He asks poignantly: ‘What need is there for war, 
violence, slavery, oppression, murder, executions, poverty, hunger, back-breaking 
work, or unemployment in countries that have so much wealth?’153 The Russian text 
explicitly says ‘in capitalist countries’ [‘v stranakh kapitala’] but the mistranslation 
is suggestive nonetheless, as Zastesky was coming to terms with a shattered Soviet 
world which had also failed to banish most of the social ills he lists.
154
 If, as Adorno 
powerfully argues in ‘Reconciliation Under Duress’ (discussed in detail below), ‘in 
countries where the decisive facts cannot be called by their proper names, the marks 
of the Terror are branded on everything that is uttered in their place,’155 then perhaps 
The Man with a Shattered World could be read as a reflection on the failures of the 
revolutionary project, rather than solely on the devastating impact of war. After the 
famines and purges of the 1930s, the war allowed for the public expression of 
emotions that were previously suppressed. Popular culture emerged in the wake of 
the war that was, according to Richard Stites, ‘personal, loose, relaxed, earthy, 
coarse, natural, spontaneous, free, autonomous, expressive, honest about death and 
suffering and heroism and hate.'
156
 Merridale argues that the war provided many 
Soviet citizens with an outlet for anger and sadness that had been completely stifled 
during the 1930s.
157
 Talking about the horrors of war provided some respite from the 
silence about the Terror that had preceded it. The catastrophes that could not be 
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spoken of might in some sense be contained in the catastrophe of the war that is the 
explicit focus of the case history. Rather than looking to the officially ordained 
future of the socialist realist novel, The Man with a Shattered World returns to the 
past and in so doing opens up the possibility of thinking a different world. The case 
history documents Zasetsky’s ‘problems of coping with a world that seemed to have 
disintegrated.’158 The problems he faced were, on the one hand, particular to his 
neurological condition,
159
 but the feeling of disaffiliation and disappointment the 
case history expresses has a social and political resonance that transcends Zasetsky’s 
specific struggle.    
 
The closing passages of the case history are overwhelmingly optimistic:  
In this age we have an opportunity to build and create a fine and beautiful 
world, to feed, clothe, and shelter all of mankind, not only the present 
generation but those for centuries to come. The water and earth of this world 
have an endless supply of energy and raw material, there is no need to fear 
any shortage of them. Soon there will be flights to outer space - first to the 
moon and the nearest planets. This will give us an even greater chance to 
enrich life with rare elements and substances that may be more plentiful on 
planets other than the earth.
160
  
 
In the English text this bombastic utopian statement is undercut by the threat of  
human violence. The epilogue concludes with the sombre acknowledgement: ‘We  
could do this, were it not for war….’161 Zasetsky’s confrontation with his own  
labyrinthine inner space undercuts the possibilities promised by visions of  
journeying into outer space. Both of these movements might be infinite, but  
instead of pushing outwards spatially into the unchartered cosmos, the text instead  
suggests that the future must be reached by way of a temporal movement back  
through history, which cannot banish the antagonisms of the past. The English  
version of the case history ends with an ellipsis rather a full-stop, suggesting that  
Zasetsky’s struggle is on-going. The Russian text has a different ending, however. In  
the English version the authorial voices of Luria and Zasetsky merge, whereas in the  
Russian the closing statements reflecting on the future are attributed to Zasetsky, but  
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the final sentence on war is omitted. Instead, Luria appends two concluding  
questions of his own: ‘Need we say anything else? Is not this line, full of optimism,  
the best possible end to this short book?’162 Again, by finishing with a question  
rather than a definitive statement, the ending remains open, but the Russian  
conclusion is more hopeful, suggesting that although the struggle to ‘build and create  
a fine and beautiful world’ may be continuous and arduous, it is not therefore futile;  
‘we could do this’… 
 
Monuments as Ruins: Between Modernism and Socialist Realism 
 
Evgeny Dobrenko claims that one of the distinctive features of socialist realism was  
the ‘elusiveness of its boundaries’, arguing that socialist realist aesthetic forms were  
‘engrafted’ onto Soviet consciousness with a thoroughness that gave shape to the  
Soviet experience and cannot therefore be confined to the realm of artistic  
production.
163
 For Dobrenko, in the absence of real socialism, socialist realism was  
necessary to produce images of a transformed world. These images, he argues,  
eventually took on a reality of their own; socialism was socialist realism. That reality  
in the Soviet Union (whether it was really socialist or not) was never identical to a  
socialist realist artwork is of little concern to Dobrenko: ‘The fact that everything is  
imagined in this “reality” only emphasises the status of construction and image of  
reality in Soviet culture, that is, the status of the aesthetic’.164 This chapter has  
attempted to make a different claim: that socialist realist narratives (which  
themselves conformed to Marxist-Leninist understandings of historical  
development)  permeated and gave shape to Soviet experiences and expectations 
(and were therefore not external to reality), but that experiences and expectations  
nonetheless contradicted and exceeded those narratives. The Man with a Shattered  
World registers the discrepancy between socialist realism and Soviet reality rather 
than confirming their identity.  
 
 Unlike a socialist realist novel, Luria’s case history was forced to contend 
with the reality of the irreparable. The drama of the socialist realist novel is driven 
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by the hero's attempts to overcome obstacles and to sacrifice his private interests for 
the public good. Like Zasetsky, the ultimate goal of the socialist realist hero is social 
integration and the achievement of collective identity. As Hellbeck notes of Soviet 
diarists:  
The enlarged life of the collective was seen as the true subjecthood. It 
promised vitality, historical meaning, and moral value, and it was intensely 
desired. By contrast, a life lived outside the collective or the flow of history 
carried a danger of personal regression stemming from the inability to 
participate in the forward-thrusting life of the Soviet people.
165
  
 
Kaganovsky discusses the 'trauma of returning home as unproductive and useless  
members of society', experienced by many veterans of the war.
166
 Despite the  
presence of wounded heroes in Soviet fiction, disabled people, though numerous  
after the war, were not greeted as heroes but ostracised. Zasetsky’s disability  
classification was downgraded in 1959, which exacerbated his recovery process by  
reducing his state benefits and declaring him fit to work.
167
 Luria’s colleague Karl  
Levitin explicitly reflected on the gap between Zasetsky’s struggle and the image of  
heroism routinely presented by the Soviet press who eagerly, ‘report on a well-driller  
who saved a rig from blowing up, or a construction worker who covered a hole in a  
dam with his body’, but would be unlikely to discuss Zasetsky’s internal conquering  
of material nature in the same terms.
168
 Zasetsky noted mournfully: ‘I’m aware  
just how abnormal I am when I talk to people.’169 He compared his own plight to the 
preoccupations of Soviet discourse in a slightly different manner, noting: ‘there is a 
good deal of talk now about the cosmos and outer space’, but that interest in 
intergalactic flight detracted attention from a less grandiose kind of flight:  
The flight of a bullet, or a shell or a bomb fragment, that rips open a man’s 
skull, splitting and burning the tissues of the brain, crippling his memory, 
sight, hearing, awareness - these days people don’t find anything 
extraordinary in that.
170
  
 
Though a rhetoric of unity and coherence reigned during and after the war, this  
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disavowed the brutal devastation it wrought.  
 
 Esther Leslie blurs the neat line apparently separating modernism and 
realism, arguing that modernist art was not a rejection of reality, but a reaction to the 
new fractured realities of modernity: 
Modern experience is fragmentary. We experience the world in bits and 
pieces because we are alienated, because the world and ourselves are split in 
multiple ways. Capitalist social relations prevent us being complete 
individuals. Modernist art, in re-mediating that fragmentariness, produces a 
historically authentic mirror of experience. To that extent, it is an art of the 
real.
171
 
 
In response to Malabou’s question - ‘What mirror could reflect a brain?’ - perhaps 
the mirror that could best reflect modern subjectivity is a broken one. Leslie asserts 
that socialist realism 'closed the door on the exchange between realism and 
modernism, in an epoch when the divisions hardened.'
172
 Despite the official 
silencing of these debates, however, these two apparently self-contained camps were 
always related to one another in complicated and contradictory ways. In the USSR, 
the connection was quite literal: many of the artists and writers associated with the 
avant garde were later forced to morph into realists of various kinds (as the example 
of Eisenstein, discussed in detail in the Coda, demonstrates). Devin Fore argues that 
the return of figurative art in Europe in the interwar years did not imply a regression: 
realism after modernism could not be the same as realism before modernism; it bore 
the traces of the journey. Implicit in this thesis is the notion that realism after 
modernism was still realism during modernity. Realism was forced to contend with a 
fundamentally transformed human subject: 'that body is no longer an organic whole 
and the human is no longer […] a perfect integer.'173 
 
The Man with a Shattered World is a portrait of a person who experiences the 
world in bits and pieces. He is alienated, split, incomplete. The process of writing is 
an attempt to re-integrate the subject back into a whole. Yet despite the hopeful 
assertions that litter the text, a moment of final reconciliation is never reached. Luria 
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clearly stated that his patient could ‘no longer synthesise.’174 The scar that runs 
across Zasetsky’s brain had an external counterpart in Soviet society; there was no 
reconciled whole into which Zasetsky could be integrated. The world itself was 
shattered. Zasetsky is a mutilated subject produced by the realities of modernity. In 
Luria’s case history, conventional socialist realist forms were not sufficient for 
conveying the reality of a shattered world. In The Man with a Shattered World 
socialist realist and modernist literary forms, by necessity, converge.  
 
 According to Régine Robin, although the hero of the socialist realist novel 
can undergo tragedy, can end up alone, can experience failure, conflict and 
alienation, he cannot, she insists, be uncertain of his destiny, and the destiny of 
history with which he is in harmony: 
In the new man, there is necessarily and by definition and in the midst of 
disasters, mud and horror- a wager on the future, on the construction of a new 
society, a wager on the well-foundedness of the struggle that reconciles him 
at some point […] with the movement of history, with which he turns out to 
be in harmony […] there is the idea that the deficiencies will be overcome, 
and that the transparency of social and individual relations will finally be 
established.
175
 
 
Zasetsky himself does not express doubt about the well-foundedness of the struggle 
he continues to wage, but his optimistic proclamations are undergirded by a poignant 
acknowledgment that the catastrophes of war (and implicitly the horrors that 
preceded it) block the path to the version of the future that appeared glowing on the 
horizon in Soviet propaganda and socialist realist artworks.  
 
 Robin cautions against interpreting the establishment of socialist realism as 
official doctrine as a straightforwardly oppressive top-down gesture, claiming that it 
emerged from heated collective debates that included thoughtful acknowledgments 
of the potential pitfalls of the genre and the dangers of ‘inane optimism that no 
longer mirrors any aspect of the harsh stuggles of the present.’176 Despite all that was 
foreclosed in Soviet literature, Robin insists that ignoring the continued existence of 
polemic, risks downplaying how much was still at stake in Soviet literature: 
'wrinkles on the surface of discourse […] disclose the violence of the underlying 
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aesthetic debate.'
177
 Socialist realist novels might have sought to present the image of 
the future as a perfectly smooth surface, but wrinkles persisted. Attending to these 
creases, folds and crinkles suggests that the image of reconciliation presented by the 
socialist realist novel, in tension with the historical present that produced it, always 
contained some disavowed acknowledgement of its own impossibility; an 
impossibility that is heightened in Luria’s non-fictional case history. 
 
 In The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (1956), in what became a 
canonical text in parts of the Eastern bloc, György Lukács defined and defended 
realism against modernism.
178
 Lukács's main criticism of modernist literature is that 
it does not criticise reality but presents an 'aesthetically appealing but decadent' 
image of the contemporary world refracted through the prism of subjectivity.
 179
 In 
the process, he claims, events are robbed of their historicity and meaning: 'the 
reflection of a distortion becomes a distorted reflection.'
180
 Lukács does not define 
modernism formally or aesthetically but ethically; he describes it as a particular 
comportment to world.  Here, his attacks on modernism recall Malabou’s 
descriptions of the ‘new wounded’: apathetic, detached, hopeless, or, in Lukács 
words, ‘without direction, without motivation, without development’.181 For Lukács, 
modernist works by definition lack a communist horizon. They are static, inert, 
nihilistic; they imagine the world as a baffling, alien landscape governed by 
inexplicable malign forces rather than by concrete social relations. Modernist 
literature, he claims, depicts angst and chaos, whereas socialist literature should aim 
to transcend it. His analysis primarily focuses on European nineteenth-century 
‘critical realist’ novels, with Thomas Mann emerging as the approved culmination of 
this tradition. In the book’s final chapter, Lukács turns to a consideration of socialist 
realism, which he advocates as the literary form to pursue.  
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In Lukács’s definition, despite its fragmentary form, Luria’s work would be 
classified as a social realist rather than a modernist text as it is driven by ‘the will to 
overcome angst and chaos.’182 Furthermore, it also conforms with Lukács’s claim 
that a realist approach is taken by those committed to peace, which he sees as 
continuous with the communist conviction that human effort can change the course 
of history.
183
 Lukács’s characterisation of anti-war sentiment as evidence of a politics 
committed to the possibility of challenging the existing state of things might be 
applied to Luria’s case history, in which a lament for a socialist society that did not 
come to pass is combined with a critique of war that prevents it from sinking into 
nihilism.  
 
In 'Reconciliation under Duress' (1961), Adorno launched a searing critique 
of The Meaning of Contemporary Realism. He unrestrainedly pours scorn on 
Lukács, asking whether an author who so flagrantly disregards the literary merits of 
the works he is considering, in favour of coarse formulaic prose riddled with 
'threadbare cliches'
184
 and characterised by the 'unrelieved sterility of Soviet 
claptrap',
185
 deserves to voice an opinion about literature at all. Adorno cites Lukács's 
discussion of Hegelian reconciliation, in which he acknowledges that a novel may 
end in the hero's inability to realise his (or very rarely her) dreams and hopes. This 
conclusion, Lukács argues, is itself Hegelian as reconciliation for Hegel is never 
completely distinct from resignation. Adorno argues that Lukács proceeds to ignore 
the implications of this insight for his own work, blithely and blindly assuming that 
'all is well with society, that the individual has come into his own and feels at home 
in his world.'
186
 In his early work The Theory of the Novel (1916), Lukács had 
ascribed the sensation of 'transcendental homelessness' to the present, juxtaposing it 
to the presumed wholeness of the ancient world.
187
 Here Lukács longed for the time 
when the soul knew no ‘abyss within itself’, noting mournfully that the fragmented 
and alienated modern human subject could not comprehend the unity that preceded 
                                                 
182
 Lukács, Meaning, p. 72. 
183
 Lukács, Meaning, p. 81. 
184
 Adorno, ‘Reconciliation’, p. 152. 
185
 Adorno, ‘Reconciliation’, p. 151. 
186
 Adorno, ‘Reconciliation’, p. 176. 
187
 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. by Anna Rostock (London; Merlin Press, 1971), p. 41. 
 236 
 
it: 'everything that falls from our weary and despairing hands must be incomplete.'
188
 
Adorno is attacking Lukács for abandoning this position, for falsely discerning in 
state socialism the unified utopia that his earlier works had identified in the ancient 
past. 
 
Beneath the spiteful veneer of Adorno’s essay, lurks a melancholy for the 
writer Lukács was before succumbing to the strictures of the officially sanctioned 
idiom. Adorno describes the constraining aspect of the Soviet 'imbecility imposed 
from above' on Lukács’s later writings as a ‘conceptual structure to which he has 
sacrificed his intellect [which] is so restricted that it suffocates anything that might 
have breathed more freely'.
189
 To wilfully misread this metaphor more generously 
than seems intended, although the structure stifles and suppresses, it does not kill. 
Like Luria’s case history, Lukács’s prose strains and creaks within the linguistic 
constraints of the sanctioned nomenclature, while never becoming identical with it; 
tiny gasps of breath can be discerned. There are wrinkles on the surface. 
 
 Returning to Luria's case history, it could not be maintained that it suggests 
all antagonisms will finally be eliminated. Although ostensibly staging a transition 
from spontaneity to consciousness, from the broken to the unified, from the wounded 
to the healed the work is not, finally, a portrait of reconciliation. The real fissures in 
both subject and world cannot be ignored. However, Zasetsky’s determination to 
heal and the case history’s optimistic ending ensure that the work is emphatically not 
a portrait of resignation either. Rather than castigating it for falling prey to naïve 
optimism in a system that cannot be redeemed (as Adorno does Lukács), perhaps it 
could instead be read an attempt to discover something in the contradictions, in the 
wrinkles; to find hope in the failures of the past.  
 
 Robin imagines the majestic monuments of the fallen Communist regime 
coming to life and remembering their past. The monuments had attempted to install a 
kind of forgetfulness, an uncomplicated image of wholeness. Now as they crumble, 
the contradictions they attempted to suppress emerge. Robin understands this process 
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in psychoanalytic terms as a form of repression; the more the contradictions were 
denied, the more they threatened to erupt into view:   
Socialist realism which strove to block out opaqueness and 
misunderstanding, tragically destroyed the revolutionary social imaginary. I 
would say that the more fantasies of clarity, flamboyance, purity, 
homogeneity, transparence, fusion, and non-separation are nurtured, the more 
they repress obscurity, dissonance, gaps and holes, then the more obscurity, 
the unmasterable, dissonance, and events return into the rear. By driving out 
history, events precipitate themselves. By parrying distrust, madness 
precipitates itself. Fostering the romance only develops the horror.
190
 
 
However, perhaps we can begin to recognise the monuments of the socialist regime 
as ruins even before they crumbled.
191
 Here we might recall Kracauer’s claim that 
‘the position that an epoch occupies in the historical process can be determined more 
strikingly from an analysis of its inconspicuous surface-level expressions from that 
epoch’s judgments about itself.’192 The rough and wrinkled surface of Luria’s text, 
saturated with familiar Soviet rhetoric yet riven with gaps and holes, registers the 
antagonisms of history. Indeed, it was Luria’s development of a ‘romantic’ approach 
to science that allowed him to apprehend (and therefore question) the horror of 
history. The text approaches the possibility of a transformed future via the past in the 
manner Comay describes as ‘the fragile moment where the unforeseeable meets the 
immemorial –the point where sketch meets ruin.’193  In The Theory of the Novel, 
Lukács spoke of writers who tried ‘to forge an armour of purple steel out of their 
own streaming blood so that their wounds may be concealed forever’.194 Luria’s text 
concedes that as long as the blood is still flowing the wounds cannot be ignored. 
 
 In their introduction to the Russian translation of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle in 1925, Luria and Vygotsky praised the dialectical qualities of Freud’s 
essay, but refused to accept the conservatism of the instincts it outlined. Their 
attempt to by-pass the death drive, however, drained Freud’s work of precisely the 
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contradictory tension that Luria and Vygotsky had lauded as dialectical. Luria and 
Vygotsky thus hazily imagined a harmonious communist future free from the 
entropic drag of an instinct that seeks to restore a previous state of things. For Freud, 
death (or inorganic nature) is an original and ultimate state of reconciliation, but as 
long as life exists so does tension; life and death are locked in a constant tussle of 
assimilation and negation. Death paradoxically propels life forwards, without it life 
would be reduced to a tepid and stagnant subsistence. Luria and Vygotsky’s attempt 
to politically radicalise Freud’s theory missed this fundamental insight of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. In his early work, written in the heady post-revolutionary years, 
Luria imagined a straight path to a harmonious communist future, but The Man with 
a Shattered World, provides an alternative vision. Luria ultimately acknowledged 
that final reconciliation was impossible, but in the process found a means of 
questioning the concrete conditions of the present. Just as Freud’s therapeutic 
pessimism did not compel him to abandon psychoanalytic treatment, so Luria’s 
confrontation with the violence of history does not leave us in a position of 
resignation. Although the path is blocked, strewn with catastrophic debris, the 
journey is not abandoned. Luria is instead forced to adopt the limping movement of 
Freud’s essay. The Man with a Shattered World, like Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
is animated by a negative dialectic, in which persistent conflicts impel history 
forwards.     
   
Leaving Scars Behind 
 
The 'end of history' was infamously proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama in 1989. After 
the fall of the Berlin wall and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
capitalism was apparently unassailable. Fukuyama intended to reclaim the dialectic 
for the right, inverting the Marxist assumption that history was driving towards 
communism. This theoretical formulation was borrowed from Alexandre Kojève.
195
 
Kojève's 'explosive reinvention' of Hegel, laid out in a hugely influential series of 
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lectures in Paris, conceived of history as already at an end.
196
 According to Kojève, 
with the cessation of time, the tension between subject and object ceases. Humanity 
dissolves back into the natural world. This does not spell a ‘cosmic catastrophe’ in 
which humanity literally dies, but the end of ‘man’ as a negating entity: ‘the natural 
World remains what it has been from all eternity […] Man remains alive as animal in 
harmony with Nature of given Being. What disappears is Man properly so called.’197 
Humanity in history was defined by action, the transformation of the natural world 
through negation. When a moment of final reconciliation is reached, dynamic 
modification is replaced by unification; 'man' as such ceases to exist. The 
disappearance of humanity for Kojève is the disappearance of 'action negating the 
given, and Error, or, in general the Subject opposed to the Object'.
198
 Absolute 
Knowledge, for Kojève, is thus the end of historical time. In Fukuyama’s hands, this 
future-less present was signalled by the defeat of state socialism; capitalism becomes 
indistinguishable from nature, its continued existence assured in perpetuity.
199
  
 
 Malabou's first book The Future of Hegel deviates from Kojève in her 
insistence on the centrality of the future to Hegel. She attacks the 'congealed form of 
a perpetual present' that Kojève's writing points towards.
 200
 Plasticity, she insists, 
gives form to the future. The moment of Absolute Knowledge is not the end of all 
time, but the end of a specific form of time. In its place arises a 'new era of plasticity 
in which subjectivity gives itself the form which at the same time it receives.'
201
 
However, in her more recent work, the focus has shifted from creative to destructive 
plasticity; the future disappears from the horizon. Malabou's 'new wounded' are 
figures at the end of history, cut off from past and future. No scar is left behind, not 
because the wound is healed, but because the damage is too profound. Accidents do 
not merely graze the surface, but represent absolute discontinuity, a total obliteration 
of the subject's essence. The Hegelian aufhebung simultaneously preserves and 
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destroys, whereas Malabou identifies a form of pure destruction. The subject here - 
without history, affect or agency - implodes. And Malabou does not confine her 
analysis to people who have experienced brain injuries. She argues that the 
transformations in subjectivity experienced by brain injured people can also be 
witnessed in those who have experienced socially induced trauma: ‘the impact of 
social war today is just as forceful as a brain lesion, and no less violent that being 
struck by a bullet or an iron bar.’202 These two experiences are not only linked by 
their severity, but also by their apparent lack of any meaningful aetiology: ‘their 
sense, like that of a brain lesion, remains dissimulated beneath and absence of sense 
- social conflict without dialectic, as anonymous as a natural catastrophe - an 
absence that reveals the very coolness of the political and the social today.’203 
Malabou’s turn to destructive plasticity drains plasticity of the dialectical qualities 
she assigned it in her earlier work. Politically, this leads to a position of resignation: 
she diagnoses the contemporary condition without attempting to treat it.   
 
Malabou claims that Luria's case history fails to acknowledge the 'the 
incursion of the negative' in his patient Zasetsky’s condition. 204 However, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, Luria did recognise the violent and destructive impact of 
the wound Zasetsky survived and acknowledged the permanent damage it inflicted. 
He also reflected upon its specific social origins. He insisted that the wound existed 
in dialectical opposition to his patient’s will to recover. The 'new figures of the void' 
described by Malabou, on the other hand, enter a perpetual present cut off from 
former identities and future hopes: ‘history has been annihilated’.205 The negativity 
Luria describes always exists in opposition to something - Zasetsky is driven by all 
that he lacks - whereas Malabou describes a state of pure negativity; life and death 
are no longer dynamically opposed, they meld into a flat singularity.  Unlike in 
Luria’s case history, for Malabou’s ‘new wounded’, destruction is not accompanied 
by creation.  
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Hegel insisted otherwise. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History Hegel, 
lampooning Volney, describes the feeling of sadness inspired by the contemplation of 
ancient ruins, acknowledging that it seems impossible to regard change in such 
situations in anything but a negative light: ‘What traveller among the ruins of 
Carthage, of Palmyra, Persepolis, or Rome, has not been stimulated by reflections on 
the transiency of kingdoms and men, and to sadness at the thought of a vigorous and 
rich life now departed’.206 However, he continues by observing that the historical 
events that bring about such dissolution simultaneously give rise to 'a new life — 
that while death is the issue of life, life is also the issue of death.’207 Spirit may exist 
in an 'eternal now' but this 'comprehends within it all earlier steps’. It is only through 
confronting the 'empty and fruitless sublimities' of the 'slaughter-bench' of history 
that a better life might emerge.
208
 
 
'The wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scars behind', Hegel famously 
declares in his rush towards reconciliation at the closing of Phenomenology of 
Spirit.
209
 This seems to indicate the possibility of reaching a time without ruins in 
which historic slaughters can be left behind. When the End of History has been 
reached, dialectical tension apparently disappears. Comay notes with perspicacity 
that Hegel's declaration is anathema to the contemporary reader: 
In our trauma-besotted, memory-obsessed 'wound culture', Hegel's formula 
seems magical, shamanistic, apologetic – cosmetic surgery applied to the 
structurally unhealing or contingently unhealed wounds of historical 
existence.
210
 
 
As George Bataille famously noted in a letter to Kojève: 'the open wound that is my 
life - constitutes all by itself the refutation of Hegel's closed system.'
211
 Yet 
characterising Hegel as naïve, lax or apathetic for conceiving of a final moment of 
reconciliation, says Comay, misses the point of Absolute Knowledge. She reads 
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Hegel against the grain, insisting that even in the closing pages of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit reconciliation retains an unfinished aspect, characterised by 
a restlessly impelling urge to reconcile. This negative dialectic, she argues, 
resembles the Freudian death drive, which impels the organism to take circuitous 
conflict-ridden routes towards its final moment of reconciliation (death). In both 
cases the journey is more important than the destination. Contra Kojève’s vision of 
the end of history and Malabou’s discussions of the new wounded, Comay suggests 
that Absolute Knowledge confirms rather than refutes the wounded life that Bataille 
described:  
The only way to close the wound, or rather to undo its coercive power, is to 
reopen it; to become what we are. Absolute knowing is just the subject's 
identification with the woundedness that it is. Antidote is in this respect 
indistinguishable from injury, health from illness, and poison from cure.
212
  
 
It is this (non)identification that Luria’s case history captures; Zasetsky’s sense of 
self derives from the struggle to heal rather than the achievement of healing. The 
case history is dialectical, and the dialectic it describes, like the similarly compulsive 
death drive, constantly weaves and unweaves like Penelope: 'the work is infinite and 
the shroud forever unfinished.'
213
 The Phenomenology emerges for Comay as ‘the 
perfect case study of interminable analysis’ in which woundedness and healing 
remain intertwined.
 214
 This, she says, allows for a confrontation with ‘the infinity of 
the injury […] the repetitive, restless energy of the dialectic, its obsessive, circular, 
doing and undoing’.215  
 
In her discussion of reconciliation in Hegel, Comay draws on Adorno’s 
discussions of Beckett. Adorno treats Beckett’s Endgame as the exemplary work of 
art after the Second World War. Beckett succeeds in capturing the ‘bombed-out 
consciousness’216 that emerges from the debris, a smashed subjectivity that can no 
longer reflect on itself: 
After the Second World War everything is destroyed, even resurrected 
culture, without knowing it; humanity vegetates along, crawling, after events 
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which even the survivors cannot really survive, on a pile of ruins which 
renders futile self-reflection of one’s battered state.217 
 
The Man with a Shattered World describes a wounded subjectivity akin to that 
described by Adorno. Luria’s shattered subject bears a superficial resemblance to 
Malabou’s ‘new wounded’ – humanity severed by the sudden violence of an 
unforeseen event. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Malabou’s 
accident (which might be anything or nothing)
218
 and Adorno’s specific, historically 
unprecedented catastrophe. Ultimately Malabou’s proposition is bleaker. She insists 
that the ‘future harbours nothing to come,’219 whereas Adorno discerns a glimmer of 
hope in Beckett’s work. As he comments in Aesthetic Theory: ‘Even artworks that 
incorruptibly refuse celebration and consolation do not wipe out radiance.’220 For 
Adorno, the terrain in Endgame is not empty, it is almost empty. An ‘oblique light’ 
shines.
221
 Beckett specifies that the action plays out under a grey light.
222
 When Clov 
looks through his telescope he sees ‘Grey. […] Grey! […] GRREY!’.223 The light is 
feeble, certainly, but it is not identical with darkness. In this near darkness 
‘consciousness begins to look its own demise in the eye, as if it wanted to survive 
the demise.’224 A faint shard of hope glints dimly in the bleakness. And this tiny 
fragment - or ‘smithereen’ in Clov’s terms225 - is what constitutes the plot of 
Endgame: ‘The tiny bit that is also everything – that would be the possibility that 
something could perhaps change.’226 This is what Malabou fails to discern in Luria’s 
text (and in Beckett’s characters who she aligns neatly with the affectless new 
wounded). Zasetsky may have been unable to fully recover but his fervent pursuit of 
recovery defines the narrative of the case history. Hope is maintained in the face of 
catastrophe. ‘To think perhaps it won’t all have been for nothing!’227  
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In the concluding passages of Luria’s analysis of Zasetsky he remarks: 
His wound healed twenty years ago, but the formation of scar tissue has 
resulted in attacks. The damaged areas of the cerebral cortex could not be 
restored. Hence, when he tried to think, his mind had to detour around these 
scorched areas and employ other faculties with which to learn and try to 
recover some lost skills. He desperately wanted to wake from this terrible 
dream, to break through the hopelessness of mental stagnation, to find the 
world clear and comprehensible instead of having to grope for every word he 
uttered. But it was impossible […] He continues to try to recover what was 
irretrievable, to make something comprehensible out of all the bits and pieces 
that remain of his life.
228
 
 
The ‘bits and pieces’ of the world can never become ‘clear and comprehensible’, but 
perhaps it is possible to make a ‘detour around these scorched areas’, not to a place 
of final reconciliation but at least engaging in a ‘continuing struggle’ and ‘exhausting 
effort’ in order to regain something of what has been lost, in the hope of creating 
something truly transformative in the future. Luria’s case history seems to 
acknowledge that history is not driving towards a definite end point but that it might, 
nonetheless, be possible to carve out a path through the debris or, like Benjamin’s 
ragpicker, to build something new amid the ruins. As Derrida observes of the 
movement traced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which, like Comay, aligns 
Freud’s text with the dialectical movement of Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘no Weg 
without Umweg: the detour does not overtake the road but constitutes it, breaks open 
the path.’229 Zasetsky was aware that he would never reach his destination, but the 
restless work of weaving and unweaving, the properly negative propulsion 
epitomised by both the dialectic and the drive must continue. There is no end to 
Luria’s case history, just as there is no end to history: 'He has returned to his story 
and is still working on it. It has no end.'
230
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
228
 Luria, Shattered, p. 158. 
229
 Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. by Alan Bass 
(London; University of  Chicago Press, 1987), p. 267. 
230
 Luria, Shattered, p. 159. 
 245 
 
Coda 
Alexander Luria and Sergei Eisenstein: Beginnings and 
Endings 
 
Method is a digression. Representation as digression - such is the 
methodological nature of the treatise. The absence of an uninterrupted 
purposeful structure is its primary characteristic. Tirelessly the process of 
thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a roundabout way to its original 
object. This continual pausing for breath is the mode most proper to the 
process of contemplation. For by pursuing different levels of meaning in its 
examination of one single object it receives both the incentive to begin again 
and the justification for its irregular rhythm. Just as mosaics preserve their 
majesty despite their fragmentation into capricious particles, so philosophical 
contemplation is not lacking in momentum.
1
 
 
 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama 
      
Plunging Back 
 
Instead of reaching a neat resolution, this thesis will conclude by following the 
looping temporal logic of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle with which it 
began. Fort/Da: it approaches the future by returning again to the past. Rather than 
re-tracing the same steps, however, it revisits the key moments and concerns of 
Luria’s career discussed in the preceding four chapters through a consideration of his 
relationship with the Soviet film director Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948).  
 
 Luria met Eisenstein soon after moving to Moscow in 1923. They remained 
friends until the film director’s death just after the Second World War. Not only did 
Luria and Eisenstein discuss psychological and aesthetic questions, but they also had 
many overlapping interests: in psychoanalysis, in primitivism, in childhood and in 
pathology. Like Luria, Eisenstein lived and worked through the heady post-
revolutionary period and, despite experiencing criticism and censorship, survived the 
Stalinist Terror and the Second World War. Their work existed in fraught relationship 
to the Soviet state and its erratic yet prescriptive vocabularies and policies. 
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Euphemistic references to the constraints of the period pepper the letters that Luria 
sent Eisenstein throughout their acquaintance, subtly bewailing, for instance, the 
difficulties he experienced in obtaining permission to travel abroad.
2
 Analyses of 
Eisenstein’s oeuvre, like my discussions of Luria’s psychological research, 
necessarily contend with his absorption of (or, some would argue, by) state ideology. 
Debates continue to rage about the extent to which Eisenstein’s aesthetic vision was 
fundamentally compromised by Stalinist imperatives.
3
 As with Žižek’s discussions 
of Shostakovich’s symphonies discussed in my Introduction, scholars have read 
Eisenstein’s final film Ivan the Terrible, Part II (completed in 1946 but banned until 
1958) as both a justification and a critique of Stalinism.
4
 For the purposes of this 
thesis, Eisenstein, like Luria, is interesting because he produced work under duress 
which necessarily worked in a particular idiom without being reducible to it. Indeed, 
the differences between Eisenstein and Luria’s understandings of Marxism, 
communism and the unfolding of history indicate the extent to which discrepancies 
in thought persisted even during the most oppressive periods of Soviet history.  
 
 This coda will consider moments of convergence and divergence between 
Luria and Eisenstein in the hope of interrogating the understandings of dialectics and 
development that informed Luria’s work, and that have shaped this thesis, setting 
contrasting elements ‘into relations of conflict with one another,’ in a method 
inspired by Eisenstein’s discussions of montage technique. 5 
 
Colliding Forms of Perception 
 
In his discussion of Eisenstein’s aesthetics, Peter Wollen declares: ‘Eisenstein was 
influenced by two powerful, but in many ways incompatible teachers of psychology: 
Freud and Pavlov.’6 Eisenstein’s connection with Luria, which Wollen overlooks, 
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was more concrete. Luria had attended Eisenstein’s production of The Wise Man at 
the Proletkult Theatre in 1923 and the pair remained in touch until the director’s 
death twenty five years later.
7
 Wollen emphasises Pavlov’s influence on Eisenstein 
above all other psychologists, but neglects to consider Eisenstein’s personal 
connections with non-Pavlovian Soviet psychologists like Luria and Vygotsky, and 
with the German Gestalt psychologists to whom Luria introduced him in the late 
1920s.
8
 Eisenstein described Luria as his ‘unfailing adviser, friend and consultant’9 
and credited the psychologist with introducing him to ‘a large number of secrets of 
experimental psychology, usually inaccessible to ordinary mortals.’10 Luria’s work 
was thrown into the seething cauldron of disparate influences Eisenstein drew on. 
My concern here, however, is not to ascertain the influence Luria exerted on 
Eisenstein but to juxtapose moments and motifs from their parallel careers, setting 
up a contrapuntal relationship in order to throw the developmental movements traced 
by Luria’s research into relief.11 
 
   Luria granted Eisenstein access to his patients and laboratories. Luria in 
turn made use of the Institute of Cinematography to produce scientific instructional 
films.
12
 In The Cinema of Eisenstein, David Bordwell claims that the director’s 
‘discussion of prelogical thought reflects his continuing affiliation with Vygotsky 
and Luria, who studied children, preliterate cultures and brain-damaged patients in 
search of cognitive processes at variance with deductive reasoning.’13 Eisenstein also 
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engaged with Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pondering the implications of 
the death drive for art - his theoretical writings touched on the four modes of 
development around which this thesis is structured.
14
 As Bordwell observes, Luria 
was indeed interested in the relation between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic. 
His work also dwelt on moments of origin and processes of development. However, 
as this thesis has demonstrated, unlike Eisenstein, Luria had little interest in 
celebrating the thought processes of children, preliterate cultures and brain-damaged 
patients.  
 
 Eisenstein declared: ‘Let’s work… backwards.’15 Luria, on the other hand, 
faced forwards. He studied these figures in the hope that they might shed light on 
and help to precipitate a transition to an ideal form of ‘advanced’ cognition. I have 
argued that Luria’s understanding of individual development could be understood as 
a counterpart to a Marxist-Leninist understanding of historical development. As the 
opening three chapters of this thesis discussed, Luria’s psychological work 
emphasised successive and progressive linear processes. He sought to trace and even 
encourage the settling of chaos into order. He viewed the past as something that 
could and should be left behind: civilisation succeeded primitivism, adulthood 
succeeded childhood. Eisenstein’s concerns were similarly oriented towards an 
emancipated communist future, but his work proceeded through conflict, shock and 
superimposition, rather than depicting individual and historical progress as a journey 
through a successive series of stages. Eisenstein suggested that the past might collide 
with the present to create something new, whereas Luria was concerned with its 
elimination or overcoming. Eisenstein hoped to overturn established modes of 
perception, whereas Luria sought to assimilate people into a pre-existing order.  
 
 This difference in emphasis is evident in Eisenstein’s essay ‘Beyond the 
Shot’ (1929). Eisenstein justifies his abandonment of realist proportion and scale in 
cinema through a discussion of children's drawings shown to him by Luria. In these 
sketches the children have not obeyed the laws of realism, but depict the object of 
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most importance as much larger than other objects in the scene. The proportions of 
the image correspond to the relative significance of the different objects, rather than 
their literal size. Eisenstein uses this example to launch an attack on ‘orthodox 
formal logic’ which attempts to uphold ‘the inviolable order of things’. 16 He 
announces that: ‘Positivist realism is by no means the correct form of perception. It 
is simply a function of a particular form of social structure, following on from an 
autocratic state uniformity of thought.’17 The principle of montage creates ‘collision’ 
and ‘conflict’, blasting through the staleness and ‘ideological uniformity’ of received 
modes of perception.
18
 Luria’s psychological work is mobilised by Eisenstein in 
support of an art form that will unsettle people’s habitual ways of seeing.  
 
 Here, however, Eisenstein’s discussion of childhood perception is closer to 
Walter Benjamin’s contemporaneous writings (that form the basis of my discussion 
in Chapter 3) than to Luria’s:19 Eisenstein suggests that children point to ways of 
unsettling or challenging the existing adult world, whereas Luria sought to instil a 
mode of representation in accordance with established forms of logic. Luria 
discusses the same drawing referenced by Eisenstein (of a room in which a box of 
matches are presented as disproportionately large) in ‘The Child and its Behaviour’ 
(1930) (Plate 5.1). His main concern in analysing the drawing is with pointing to the 
child’s failure to perceive the connections between things: 
 A complex systematic picture of the world, an arrangement of its phenomena 
 according to their connections and causative relations is replaced by a simple 
 ‘gluing’ together, a primitive combining, of isolated features.20 
 
In the same discussion Luria also includes a drawing of a figure on a horse by an 
illiterate Uzbek peasant, a reproduction of which is preserved in the Eisenstein 
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archives (Plate 5.2). Luria links childhood perception to this ‘primitive’ 
representation, claiming that both isolate elements ‘without synthesising them into 
an integral image’.21 In highlighting the shortcomings of childhood perception and 
the perception of an ‘Uzbek woman with little cultural background’,22 Luria’s 
intentions seem closer to that criticised by Eisenstein: ‘Displacing the expressiveness 
of archaic disproportion for regulated ‘stone tables’ of officially decreed harmony.’23  
 
 This coda will first compare Eisenstein’s late interest in origins with the 
conception of progress that informed the majority of Luria’s work. It will then turn 
to a discussion of Luria’s case history The Mind of a Mnemonist, the protagonist of 
which Eisenstein evinced a particular fascination in. This thesis has argued that 
Luria’s case history The Man with a Shattered World, demonstrated a break from the 
progressive models which informed his writings on psychoanalysis, Uzbek culture 
and childhood. This coda similarly begins by contrasting Luria’s progressive 
developmental model for understanding individual and historical development 
(which forms the basis of the discussions in the opening three chapters of this thesis) 
with Eisenstein’s less linear discussions of dialectical development and 
revolutionary modes of perception. In my concluding discussion I argue that in his 
two case histories Luria discarded his customary frameworks and provided a vision 
of the possibilities for human and historical transformation that surpassed 
Eisenstein’s by attending to the struggles and fissures of past and present, without 
losing hope for the future. 
 
Beginnings and Endings  
 
When Eisenstein died in 1948 Luria performed an autopsy, slicing open his friend’s 
skull to search for material signs of creative genius. Luria kept photographs of the 
film director’s brain until his own death thirty years later, showing his students the 
unusually enlarged right hemisphere (the section of the brain responsible for visual 
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processes).
24
 One of Luria’s former collaborators recalled that Luria preserved the 
brain itself in a glass vessel filled with alcohol ‘because it had an interesting 
shape.’25  
 
 In life, Eisenstein had his own collection of deathly objects. Nestled among 
the books, antiquities and Mexican handicrafts in his Moscow apartment, he kept a 
human foetus in a jar of formaldehyde. He was moved to acquire the specimen, 
which floated eerily on the threshold between pre-human and human, after 
experiencing a foetus die in his hands during a shoot for an educational film about 
abortion in Switzerland.
26
  
 
 As his own life neared its end, Eisenstein became increasingly preoccupied 
with beginnings and endings. On the ontogenetic level, he dwelled on intrauterine 
experience and death. He also returned to the beginnings of his own life, composing 
a memoir reflecting on his formative childhood impressions and experiences. In this 
autobiographical work he noted that his ‘life had passed at a gallop, without a 
backward glance, in constant transit, leaving one train to catch after another’, but 
that he was now inspired to pause and cast his eyes back over the journey.
27
 These 
interests had a phylogenetic counterpart: Eisenstein’s writings turned to explorations 
of the primitive, pre-historic and primordial.
28
  
 
 On the 19
th
 September 1947, just five months before his death, Eisenstein 
wrote in his diary:  
 Aleksandr R Luria telephoned me yesterday, inviting me to give a series of  
 lectures on the psychology of art at the Psychology Institute of Moscow  
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 University (for students of the senior class). Not having made up my mind to 
 do it, I naturally started planning this morning while in bed how I would  
 present such a series.
29
  
 
In the conspectus he submitted to Luria for their planned collaborative lecture course 
on 'The Psychology of the Creative Process’, Eisenstein outlined his intention to 
discuss art through an analysis of life in its embryonic form, and an exploration of 
the sensuousness of thought prior to the acquisition of language. This chimes with 
his discussion of human psychology in his autobiography: 
Regarding ‘man’ again, it is interesting that the presence of the human (very 
human!) basis interests me in its most ‘not yet human’ stage. That is, in all 
those spheres and beginnings where man is present in art in a way that is 
hidden, not yet manifest.
30
 
 
His notes suggest that he saw the artwork as a means of accessing and re-
experiencing these early stages of existence: ‘Plunging “back” to the stage of 
sensuous thought, we lessen partial control.’31 
 
 In his 1946 essay ‘On Folklore’, Eisenstein describes how he increasingly 
became interested in ‘worlds which are dormant within us.’32 He dates this shift in 
his thinking to a 1935 speech delivered at the All-Union Creative Conference of 
Workers in Soviet Cinematography, in which he controversially declared that 
artworks needed to reawaken ancient modes of perception: ‘Art is nothing else but 
an artificial retrogression in the field of psychology towards the forms of earlier 
thought processes’.33 He also recalls a significant discussion with Luria, which he 
credits with sparking his interest in the subject of biological origins.
34
  
 
 Like the movement traced by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in 
which death both precedes and succeeds life, Eisenstein suggested that life was 
book-ended by moments of reconciliation. In the course proposal he drew up for 
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Luria in 1947 he noted: ‘In the embryo, there is not yet a conflicting reaction.’35 Like 
Freud’s equation of death with inorganic nature, Eisenstein imagined a quiescent 
state from which life emerged and to which it would eventually return.
36
 Eisenstein’s 
return to early forms of life, civilization and thought was still conceived of in 
revolutionary terms, however. He claimed to be drawn to the earliest stages of life 
and civilization because they, like the imagined communist future, were classless: 
‘To where we are plunging them back. To paradise. To the stage of non-
differentiating thought. But also the pre-class stage. And therein lies the 
fascination.’37 Plunging back was therefore also conceived of as a pushing forwards. 
As Anne Nesbet discusses, for Eisenstein: ‘prehistory is never exactly left behind, 
but rather turned into a dialectical component of the present historical or aesthetic 
moment: even the highest most developed image bears at least a plastic trace of its 
most primitive ancestry.’38 He hoped that exploring the dawn of humanity and the 
beginnings of life itself might dialectically combine with the contemporary through 
cinema to create an ecstatic feeling in his audience.
39
 Eisenstein’s late work does not 
dispense with the dialectic, but a collision of objects in space (both on screen and in 
the movie theatre) is replaced with a collision of moments in time.  
 
 Eisenstein, like Luria, aligned the thought processes of children with those of 
primitive peoples; he aligned individual with historical and even with evolutionary 
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development. He too framed this as a transition from figurative to abstract thought: 
‘The individual progressively moves from thinking in images and emotions to the 
maturity of consciousness’.40 Unlike Luria, however, whose work described how 
these early stages would ideally be surpassed, Eisenstein hoped that a great artwork 
could access dormant yet still extant modes of perception. This involved going 
beyond the mechanistic physiology of conditioned reflexes that dominated his earlier 
work (as discussed by Wollen) to access a more distant organic substrate of being: 
A responsive reaction is triggered deep within me - beyond the convulsions 
of the brain, somewhere in the tissue- by the very structures which are my 
contemporaries from the time when I was an individual on the evolutionary 
ladder, no more than a child; an embryo, a ball of albuminous protoplasm or 
a fertile drop, which is all that I once had been.
41
  
 
Eisenstein insisted that this regressive movement was progressive.  
 
 The process of digging down to reach the most primal forms of thought was 
addressed to transforming the present. Ancient elements would be brought to the 
surface where they would combine with the most advanced forms of consciousness 
to take on ‘new, ultra-contemporary forms.’42 According to Eisenstein, this dual 
movement is integral to great works of art. Eisenstein describes how ‘a determined 
progressive ascent towards ideas at the highest peak of consciousness,’ must be 
combined with ‘a penetration through the structure of form into the deepest layer of 
emotional thinking.’43 Like the relationship between the death drive and Eros 
described by Freud, great artworks, for Eisenstein, are animated by a tension-
producing polarity between two opposing tendencies. 
 
 The developmental model that underpinned Luria’s psychological theories - 
from his early rejection of the death drive, through his work with illiterate people 
and children - does implicitly posit a moment of final unity and reconciliation akin to 
the classless harmony described by Eisenstein. He does not, however, suggest that 
this recapitulates a lost earlier form on a new level. Unity is only located in the 
future; Luria does not look back. As such, his work is devoid of the stark opposition 
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of forces integral to Eisenstein’s theories, which come closer to the works of Freud 
and Benjamin that I have counterposed to Luria’s more straight-forwardly Marxist-
Leninist accounts of historical and individual progression in this thesis.  
 
 Despite noting his increased interest in early forms of life, Eisenstein did, 
however, identify a unifying theme that ran throughout his written and cinematic 
oeuvre: 
If I were an impartial researcher, I would say of myself: this author appears 
to be constantly fixated on one idea, one theme, one subject. Everything he 
has thought up and done, not only within the different films but through all 
his plans and films, is in each and every case one and the same thing. Almost 
invariably, the author uses different periods […] different countries and 
peoples […] different social movements and processes within the shift 
towards different social forms, as different masks covering one and the same 
face. This face is the realisation of the ultimate goal - the attainment of 
unity.
44
 
 
Luria may not have been interested in recapturing original unities but his future-
oriented work was similarly concerned with an ultimate goal: the ‘advanced’ human 
subject (and his or her implicit historical counterpart: communism or civilization).  
 
 This thesis has, however, noted a shift in Luria’s theoretical approach evident 
in his late case history The Man with the Shattered World that runs counter to the 
shift in Eisenstein’s career trajectory sketched out above: Luria, contra Eisenstein, 
moved away from an emphasis on synthesis to an acknowledgment of fragmentation. 
This shift was prompted, I have argued, by the violent events of history. Eisenstein’s  
experiments in cinematic form were intended to find an aesthetic equivalent to 
revolution, whereas Luria responded to the shattering impact of war. Confronted 
with a patient who could not heal but who nonetheless retained a determination to 
improve his condition, negativity made an incursion into Luria’s work. Luria’s neat 
developmental framework was no longer tenable and he was forced to abandon unity 
as a goal; non-identity displaced identity.  
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 Luria’s case histories, written at the end of his long career, point to a more 
nuanced, sombre and conflicted political vision than Eisenstein’s more 
eschatological equation of a classless society with intrauterine experience or primal 
protoplasm. The unexpected junctures, collisions and shocks that characterised 
Eisenstein’s films of the 1920s find an unexpected counterpart in Luria’s case 
histories, which describe pathological conditions that preclude their subjects from 
assimilating into existing structures. This thesis will conclude with a consideration of 
Luria’s case history The Mind of a Mnemonist. Published just before The Man with a 
Shattered World, Luria’s first case history describes a person with an innate 
psychological condition, rather than someone whose condition was the result of a 
specific historical event. Although the subject The Mind of a Mnemonist describes 
was not born of war like Zasetsky, Luria nonetheless claimed that the war had a 
shattering impact on his scientific methodologies, suggesting that this text also 
emerged from Luria’s historical experiences.45   
 
Suffering from Reminiscences  
 
Intrigued by Luria's accounts of a synaesthetic patient with an extraordinary 
memory, Eisenstein asked that the psychologist introduce them.
46
 In his late essay 
'On Colour' (1937-1940), Eisenstein discusses how his reflections on the use of 
colour in cinema were inspired by his encounters with Luria's synaesthetic patient, 
Shereshevsky (or ’S’), about whom Luria eventually wrote the best-selling case 
history The Mind of a Mmemonist (1968).
47
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 Eisenstein declares that colour is the solution to finding synchronicity 
between sound and image, but insists that the meanings of colours are deeply 
subjective and changeable: 'all these quests are individual and arbitrary.'
48
 He 
celebrates the non-absolute relation, advocating the role of art in creating new modes 
of perception: 
a fixed and once-and-for-all scheme of mutually linked associations, would 
be profoundly inimical to the very nature of art. For one of the aims of art is 
to blaze new trails in our awareness of reality, to create new trains of 
association on the basis of utilising those which already exist.
49
 
 
Despite insisting that existing correlations and associations are contingent, he does, 
however, imagine that they might eventually assume a fixed form (perhaps making a 
dutiful nod to the prevailing aesthetic discourses): 
in the progression of ever more perfect fusions of colour and sound, in the 
 ever more perfect images that reflect the reality of our time, we shall also 
draw nearer to an ever fuller representation of the absolute truth of our 
unique, socialist way of life.
50
 
 
New modes of perception will be blasted into consciousness but will ultimately settle 
to establish a harmonious truth. He implies that a fixed scheme of meaning will 
emerge under communism and that cinema can participate in bringing that future 
unity into being.  
 
 Eisenstein may not have believed that syntaesthetes could perceive essential 
connections between things. He did, however, claim that synaesthesia was a mode of 
perception that was closer to primitive forms of thought. Eisenstein described 
synaesthesia as ‘sensuous primitive thinking’, as an ‘original bliss’ that most humans 
have evolved away from.
51
 He thus saw the synaesthete as being closer than most 
modern humans to the unity that he imagined characterised the earliest forms of 
perception. In Eisenstein’s descriptions, Luria’s patient replicates the ideal 
temporality he hoped to achieve through art; early forms of perception co-existed 
with advanced cognition:  
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Comrade S’s unique gifts were due to the fact that, while being a person of 
absolutely normal development, he had also retained into mature age all the 
characteristics of primal mental activity which other people lose as they 
develop intellectually and evolve towards normal, logical patterns of 
thought.
52
 
 
Eisenstein was primarily interested in the sensuous associations that characterise 
synaesthesia. In the essay ‘Vertical Montage’ (1940), he describes Shereshevsky’s 
ability ‘to see sounds as colours and hear colours as sounds,’ and to perceive vowels 
as ‘gradations of light’.53  
 
 Luria’s case history had a different emphasis: it dwells on the emotional toll 
of his patient’s vast memory. Far from an almost magical capacity to perceive 
connections between things or an ability to apprehend some lost unity, Luria’s 
narrative presents his patient’s condition as distressing and alienating. As in his work 
with illiterate peasants and children, Luria insisted that the retention of more 
‘primitive’ forms of thought could only be detrimental to future development. The 
past experienced by Shereshevsky was not harmony but an overwhelming and 
disorientating chaos, which separated him from his immediate surroundings. 
 
 The condition described in The Mind of a Mnemomist contrasts starkly with 
Luria’s other case history The Man With the Shattered World. The latter’s protagonist 
Zasetsky was cut off from his history and sought desperately to reconnect to it, 
whereas the mnemomist Shereshevsky suffered from too much connection to the 
past. His attachment to every experienced moment caused him to disconnect from 
the present. Even when he purposefully tried to rid himself of information - by 
scribbling his memories on scraps of paper and throwing them into the fire - he was 
ultimately incapable of forgetting anything.   
 
Shereshevsky retained words based on the sensual impression they made. As 
a child reading the Torah with no knowledge of Hebrew, he was able to retain long 
passages of text as the sounds registered as a series of splashes or puffs of steam that 
he could exactly reproduce in his mind. He created extraordinarily elaborate interior 
worlds in order to reconstruct things and all of these psychic fabrications were as 
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imperishable as his memories of the external world. When presented with a 
mathematical equation he would narrativise it, letters became people and symbols 
became actions: numbers might become jackdaws on a tree or cigarettes in a square. 
He would be able to reproduce a meaningless equation many years later by using this 
apparently circuitous visual method. Often he would memorise passages of text or 
long series of numbers by reconstructing a journey around Moscow, inserting objects 
along the route that corresponded to specific words. He describes placing a giant 
transparent head at Sretenski Gates and a statue of a Russian merchant woman on the 
pavement outside a cinema. He would then be able to repeat this ‘journey’ and 
reproduce all that he saw along the way, occasionally stumbling if he had 
accidentally placed an object in an inconspicuous place: ‘Sometimes I put a word in 
a dark place and have trouble seeing it as I go by.’54 It was this associative capacity 
that inspired Eisenstein. He hoped to follow the example of Japanese Kabuki theatre, 
which he claimed succeeded in producing a synaesthetic effect on stage: ‘we actually 
“hear movement” and “see sound”.’55 
 
  Although Shereshevsky was able to recall the same passages of text or series 
of numbers many years later, his method for recalling was completely remote from 
received forms of logic. Luria describes it as ‘a distinct type of dissociation.’56 He 
discusses how Shereshevsky would employ the same laborious method of 
visualisation even when given a series of sequential numbers like 1,2,3,4: ‘He had no 
need for logical organisation, for the associations his images produced reconstituted 
themselves whenever he revived the original situation in which something had been 
registered in his memory.’57 Similarly, Luria’s patient found it difficult to follow 
stories as the narrative would be obscured by the rush of images associated with 
individual words or syllables. He was often unable to follow the meaning of a 
conversation as he would be distracted by the taste or smell produced by a person’s 
voice. He noted that Vygotsky had a voice like crumbly yellow cheese, whereas 
Eisenstein seemed to speak with many voices at once, like a bouquet: ‘listening to 
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him it was as though a flame with fibres protruding from it was advancing right 
toward me. I got so interested in his voice, I couldn't follow what he was saying.’58 
 
 Words for Shereshevsky sparkled or chafed. They could be bright or sharp, 
rough or bitter, prickly or sticky. The word ‘soul’ evoked an image of animal livers 
and lungs on a table. At times his perceptions of words would conflict with their 
meanings, interfering with his daily activities. He describes his horror at discovering 
an ice cream seller with a voice which evoked black coal. This overpowering sensual 
association prompted him to recoil with revulsion, rendering him incapable of 
purchasing any dessert. If he read while eating the taste associations aroused by the 
food would blot out the meaning of the text. Although he learnt to direct or enhance 
his capacities through performing feats on stage, he was not able to fully control his 
capacity to recall; involuntary associations blotted out the voluntary. In conversation 
he would ‘digress endlessly’ distracted by his elaborate chains of association.59 The 
words he encountered provoked such vivid visual associations that meaning was 
scattered, disrupting his ability to follow instructions or conversations: ‘at each step 
he had to contend with superfluous images and sensations’.60  
 
 Eisenstein claimed that Shereshevsky’s ‘characteristics and abilities were 
retained alongside all the completely normal features of a fully developed mind and 
intellect,’61 whereas Luria stressed that his patient’s synaesthesia precluded him from 
experiencing a ‘normal’ life. Even though Shereshevsky could work and perform the 
kinds of routine tasks Zasetsky found impossible, he could not establish meaningful 
human relationships. He found it difficult to remember faces because he experienced 
them as ‘changing patterns of light and shade’.62 Shereshevsky’s rich interior life 
overshadowed his connection to his immediate surroundings: ‘[at] times smoke or 
fog appears […] and the more people talk, the harder it gets, until I reach the point 
where I can’t make anything out.’63 Indeed, his imaginative capacity was so vivid 
that he could mentally place himself in different situations in order to modify his 
body temperature or lower his threshold to pain. Luria characterised Shereshevsky’s 
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life as 'a struggle against images that kept rising to the surface of his mind.’64 He 
dealt with the world, including his relationships with his closest family members, 'as 
though through a haze'.
65
  Although he was more capable of functioning in society 
than Zasetsky, Luria presents Shereshevsky’s case as the more tragic due to his 
patient’s detachment and apathy. Though both men were focused on reaching a better 
future, only Zasetsky retained an acute awareness of the struggle required to improve 
his condition. His relation to the future was rooted in an acknowledgment of the real 
conditions of the present he inhabited.  
 
 In contrast, Luria claimed that Shereshevsky experienced his fantasy life as 
more ‘real’ than his everyday experiences: ‘The boy was a dreamer whose fantasies 
were embodied in images that were all too vivid, constituting in themselves another 
world, one through which he transformed the experiences of everyday life.’66 He 
often felt deep disappointment when reality failed to coincide with his imagined 
scenes. His everyday experiences thus faded into insignificance:  
He lived in wait of something that he assumed was to come his way, and gave 
himself up to dreaming and 'seeing' far more than to functioning in life. The 
sense he had that something particularly fine was about to happen remained 
with him throughout his life – something which would solve all his problems 
and make his life simple and clear. He 'saw' this and waited [...] Thus 
everything he did in life was merely 'temporary’, what he had to do until the 
expected would finally come to pass. “I read a great deal and always 
identified myself with one of the heroes.”67 
 
 This description of Sherneshevsky’s condition might also be applied to the 
progressive vision that undergirded the majority of Luria’s research, in which the 
present was treated as being less significant than the future it anticipated: the 
‘primitive’ was encouraged to become ‘civilised’, the child to become an adult. The 
people Luria examined may have all inhabited the same historical moment, but Luria 
placed some of them further back on a developmental ladder. Like Shereshevsky, 
who described himself as living always ‘in the meantime’, Luria’s research relied on 
a temporality of deferral. He analysed children or Uzbek people as exemplars of 
incipient forms of a linear trajectory of development with a pre-determined end 
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point. As such, he was not always attentive to the psychologies of those people as 
they existed in the present moment.  
 
 As this thesis has demonstrated, in his work with illiterate peasants and 
children in the 1930s, Luria sought to replace the existing psychologies of those he 
was studying with more ‘advanced’ forms. He wanted immediacy to be replaced by 
shared mediating structures. He framed this as a process of stabilisation, defined by 
the cumulative mastery of pre-existing social forms. The psychic reality of the 
present was thus subordinated to a fantasy of coherence located in an imagined 
future; an idealised mode of subjectivity was given precedence over the particular 
subjectivities he encountered in the present. This progressive model of development 
had a counterpart in the imagined historical trajectory towards communism that 
permeated Soviet discourse, which similarly imagined spontaneity as a precursor to 
consciousness and relied on the temporality of ‘in the meantime’. The Russian title 
of The Man with a Shattered World - A World Lost and Regained - gestures towards 
John Milton,
68
 yet most of Luria’s work, in synch with the Soviet experience, 
implied a paradise infinitely deferred. The socialist realist novel assures its readers 
that harmony will be reached but its promised utopia was situated on an ever-
receding horizon.  
 
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud defined the reality principle as the 
'temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure'.
69
 
He goes on to discuss how the death drive similarly prompts people to take long and 
indirect roads through life to death. For Freud, it is these detours that constitute life. 
To repeat Derrida’s characterisation of Beyond the Pleasure Principle: ‘no Weg 
without Umweg: the detour does not overtake the road but constitutes it, breaks open 
the path.’70 Luria observed that when he went through transcriptions of 
conversations with Shereshevsky: ‘I realised how difficult it was to single out what 
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was essential from my conversations with S from his endless digressions.'
71
 
Shereshevsky similarly perceived his own life as an endless digression. Yet 
digressions were the essence of his case, just as they constituted the history of the 
Soviet Union. In both cases the ideal ending was never reached but that does not 
make the experiences that took place along the way any less significant or real.  
 
 Unlike Shereshevsky himself, Luria’s The Mind of a Mnemonist, by attending 
to the particularities of its protagonist’s experiences does root the case in its history. 
It attends to haze that stood between patient and world as a real experience rooted in 
the present. Like in The Man with a Shattered World, Luria does not occlude the 
struggles, detours and frustrations that characterised his patient’s condition. These 
‘romantic’ case histories are informed by a methodological approach to their subjects 
that succeeds in anchoring them in their environments in a manner the publications 
that form the basis of my discussions in Chapters 1-3 failed to achieve.  
 
 In a letter to Wilhelm Reich in 1934, Eisenstein attacked psychoanalysis in 
terms reminiscent of Adorno’s remarks in Minima Moralia discussed in my 
introduction. He noted with frustration that psychoanalysts were overly concerned 
with delineating norms which, he argued, served to uphold the existing state of 
things. Instead, he insisted that ‘the boundary between the normal and the 
pathological cannot be drawn.’72As this thesis has discussed, the bulk of Luria’s 
work was structured around ideal norms of both individual and social development. 
His case histories, however, were portraits of pathologies that focused on their 
protagonists rather than defining them in opposition to a ‘normal’ figure from whom 
they departed. Without denying the suffering his patients experienced (often as a 
result of their disaffiliation from ‘normal’ society), Luria’s case histories nonetheless 
attempted to describe the psychic experiences of his patients on their own terms, 
without making them appear as deviations from a ‘correct’ path of development. The 
romantic methodology Luria elaborated thus suggests an approach to human 
psychology that could open up the possibility for critiquing rather than affirming 
norms. Shifting the emphasis of psychology from an ideal vision of what is ‘normal’ 
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to a consideration of particular human subjects with all their inconsistencies and 
contradictions might then make it possible to question and perhaps even change the 
‘pathological social world[s]’ people continue to inhabit.73 Rather than approaching 
its subjects from the standpoint of an ideal yet to be realised, a revolutionary 
psychology must begin in the present. 
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Plates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 1.1 
 
Gorky House Museum, Moscow (formerly home to the Russian Psychoanalytic 
Society). The sweeping central staircase was constructed from concrete and designed 
to imitate nature.  
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Plate 2.1 
 
Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Horace Kallen from Samarkand, Uzbek 
Soviet Socialist Republic, May 15 1931 
 
Despite the modernizing campaigns underway Soviet postcards tended to portray 
Central Asia and the Caucasus as traditional places.  
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Plate 2.2 
 
Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Horace Kallen from Andijan, Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic, August 12 1932 
 268 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.3 
 
Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Kurt Lewin from Tbilisi, Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, January 25 1936 
 
 269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.4 
 
Postcard sent from Alexander Luria to Sergei Eisenstein from Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, August 28 1930 
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Plate 2.5  
 
Examples of tests used by Kurt Koffka in Central Asia. Subjects were asked to name 
the shapes shown in the columns.  
 271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.6 
 
Example of test used by Alexander Luria in Central Asia.  
 
As with Koffka’s tests, subjects were asked to name the numbered shapes. Those 
deemed more advanced would describe, for example, 1 as a circle and 2 as a triangle, 
whereas those deemed backward would describe 1 as a bracelet and 2 as a kettle 
stand.  
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Plate 2.7  
 
Uzbek woman in traditional paranja with children, 1929 
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Plate 3.1 
 
Wooden toy, whose photograph Benjamin took on a visit to the Moscow Toy 
Museum 
 
‘The earth on three whales. Made out of wood by artist. The motif stems from a 
Russian tale.’ 
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Plate 3.2 
 
Two dolls Benjamin admired in the Moscow Toy Museum 
 
‘It is interesting to compare the two Viatka dolls. The horse, which is still visible on 
the model, has merged with the man on the one next to it. Demotic toys strive for 
simplified forms.’ 
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Plate 3.3 
 
Peasant-made toys observed by Benjamin in the Moscow Toy Museum. 
 
‘Nanny with two children. Very old type of toy.’ 
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Plate 3.4 
 
Children assembling toys on a miniature assembly line at an exhibition of new 
Soviet Toys, Moscow, 1931. 
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Plate 3.4 
 
Toy Red Army soldier and sailor, given as examples of new ‘proletarian toys’ that 
would, it was hoped, replace peasant playthings, 1933. 
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Plate 3.5  
 
Soviet children playing with newly designed toys which were intended to be 
‘constructive’ and plot driven, 1935. 
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Plate 3.6  
 
In this experiment conducted by Luria and A.N. Miranova in 1936 five pairs of 
identical twins were separated. Group M were taught to reproduce structures from an 
outline alone, whereas Group E were allowed to see the position of all the blocks. 
Here both groups were shown the same model and asked to reproduce it from 
memory. 
 
The top image shows the models both groups were shown. The image below shows 
the results. Group M  (bottom left) reproduced the model, whereas group E (bottom 
right) built something very different.  
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Plate 3.7 
 
Example of a children’s book – Toys (1928) by A Oluf’eva - illustrated by prominent 
Constructivist artist, Liubov Popova 
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Plate 3.8 
 
S. Marshak, Morozhenone [Icecream] , with illustrations by V. Lebedev (Moscow; 
Molodaia Gvardiia, 1929), p. 8 
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Plate. 3.9 
 
Nikolai Chukovsky, Malen’kie Deti [Little Children] (Leningrad; Krashaia Gazeta, 
1928) 
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Plate 3.10 
 
Example of an illustrated children’s book by Chukovsky published during the NEP-
period. 
 
Nikolai Chukovsky, Hasha Kukhnia [Our Kitchen], with illustrations by N. Lapshina 
(Leningrad; Gosudarskvennoe izdael’stvo, 1928) 
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Plate 3.11 
 
Photograph of Soviet children’s home for bezprizornye, 1930 
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Plate 4.1 
 
X-rays showing Zasetsky’s skull and the shrapnel lodged in his brain 
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Plate 4.3 
 
Zasetsky’s drawing of his vision. The top image shows his memory of vision before 
his accident and bottom image depicts his vision following injury. 
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Plate 5.1 
 
In this children’s drawing, discussed by both Luria and Eisenstein, a room is 
depicted in which a box of matches (labelled ‘5’) is represented as disproportionately 
large in relation to the other objects in the room. 
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Plate. 5.1 
 
‘Rider on a Horse’ 
 
Drawing of a figure on a horse by an Uzbek woman. This drawing from the 
Eisenstein archives was reproduced and labelled with body parts by Luria. The 
image also appears in Luria’s essay ‘The Child and its Behaviour’. For Luria, 
‘primitive’ thinking is characterised by breaking up entities into their composite 
parts. 
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